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Abstract
Preference under Ambiguity: Testing and Identification
Xinxi Song
October 2015
This dissertation focuses on testing and identifying individual ambiguity
preference under the framework of ”smooth ambiguity preference” devel-
oped by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Following the seminal
contributions of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), experimental data have
consistently demonstrated that individuals do not behave in accordance
with predictions of the expected utility model when they face uncertainty.
As one important class of ambiguity utility, the smooth ambiguity model
distinguishes ambiguity aversion from risk aversion, which makes the com-
parative statics possible. However, currently there is little work on testing
and recovering such preferences based on observable choices.
The dissertation contains four parts. Chapter 2 uses two approaches to
derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for observed individual port-
folio choice to be compatible with the smooth ambiguity preference. The
first approach is the revealed preference method, and is based on finite ob-
servations. The second approach is demand function testing, and is based
on infinite observations. Chapter 3 establishes the conditions under which
the smooth ambiguity preference can be uniquely identified from individual
demand functions. In Chapter 4, I extend the argument of Varian (1988)
to multiple observations and incomplete market case to non-parametrically
test different shapes of risk aversion, and then to test hypotheses on shapes
of ambiguity aversion. In Chapter 5, to use household survey data to iden-
tify household risk and ambiguity aversion, I build a simple parametric
model to identify household risk and ambiguity aversion from their saving
and portfolio choice. The data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household
Income and Wealth 2008 and 2010 support the constant relative risk aver-
sion and constant relative ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and give evidence
of the magnitude of household risk and ambiguity aversion.
vii
Chapter 1
Preference under ambiguity
1.1 Testing and identification
Over the past 50 years following the seminal contributions of Allais (1953)
and Ellsberg (1961), laboratory data predominantly based on observed
choices over lotteries, have consistently demonstrated that individuals do
not behave in accordance with predictions of the expected utility model.
In recent years, extensive effort has concentrated on developing models
that accommodate the fact that in many real world problems individuals
face choices characterized by uncertainty, and not just risk. This is not
handled well by expected utility maximizers who exhibit behaviour reflect-
ing the Ellsberg paradox. One class of models that focus on incorporating
uncertainty and overcoming the problems of the expected utility theory is
referred to as ambiguity preferences.
A number of alternative models of ambiguity preferences have been
developed. These include multiple-priors or maxmin preference, Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), smooth ambiguity preference, Klibanoff, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2005), multiplier preference, Anderson, Hansen, and Sar-
gent (2003), variational preference, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini
(2006), vector expected utility, Siniscalchi (2009). For some relevant lit-
erature on decision theory, see Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon (2012), Gilboa
(2009), and Gilboa and Marinacci (2011). The applications of ambigu-
ity preference in economic and finance modelling include portfolio choice
and asset pricing Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2011), Epstein
and Schneider (2010), Gollier (2011), Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013), Ju and
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Miao (2012), and macroeconomics Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen and
Sargent (2007), Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006).
This dissertation focuses on the ”smooth ambiguity preference” model
due to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). There are two reasons:
first of all, this model explicitly separates ambiguity aversion from risk
aversion, so it is meaningful to test the restrictions of ambiguity aversion,
and to identify the ambiguity aversion index; secondly, the utility function
is well-behaved, i.e. it is differentiable and concave, so the analytic ma-
chinery developed in utility and expected utility theory can be generalized
to deal with ambiguity utility.
This dissertation will address two questions: what are the testable re-
strictions of the smooth ambiguity model on observable individual portfolio
choice? if an individual’s portfolio choice is compatible with the smooth
ambiguity model, could his ambiguity preference be uniquely identified?
The first question deals with existence problem, and the second deals with
uniqueness problem.
In Chapter 2, we will derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for
observed portfolio choice to be consistent with the strictly increasing, and
strictly concave smooth ambiguity preference, using two approaches: re-
vealed preference approach and demand function approach. The revealed
preference approach developed by Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) requires
only finite observations of individual portfolio choice, and does not specify
any parametric utility functional form, thus is fully nonparametric. The
conditions developed here consist of nonlinear inequalities, and can be used
to test portfolio choice from incomplete markets. The demand function ap-
proach assumes individual asset demand functions are given. We develop
two tests based on demand functions: a functional form test and a demand
derivative test. The demand functional form test requires the observed
asset demands have particular functional form restrictions, while the de-
mand derivative test gives Slutsky−like restrictions. Unlike in the revealed
preference test, we assume there are complete state consumption claims
contingent on both ambiguity states and risk states. Such an assumption
is extreme, and such data can be obtained only under well controlled labo-
ratory experiments. However, we think to derive theses restrictions in ideal
data case is an important first step to understanding the implications of
smooth ambiguity model.
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In Chapter 3, we assume observed individual asset demands pass the
tests in Chapter 2, and develop conditions under which his smooth ambi-
guity utility function can be uniquely identified. In Chapter 2, the smooth
ambiguity preference can be explicitly constructed if an individual’s asset
demands satisfy the revealed preference conditions; however, such construc-
tion is not unique, since finite observations cannot pin down an individual’s
indifference curves. We tackle uniqueness by assuming individual asset de-
mand functions given. This work builds on the recoverability literature for
expected utility preferences in Green, Lau, and Polemarchakis (1979) and
Dybvig and Polemarchakis (1981). For us to address the recoverability of
ambiguity preferences, several important new technical results are required.
We assume there is one riskless asset and one ambiguity-free asset (i.e. the
payoff distribution is invariant across ambiguity states). We show that un-
der these assumptions and one technical condition (full rank condition),
the individual’s risk aversion index and ambiguity aversion index can be
uniquely identified from his asset demand functions. The technical condi-
tion basically means individual has ambiguity on the mean return of risky
assets. The existence of riskless and ambiguity free asset can be relaxed;
however, it will put more restrictions on the underlying utility function,
like time separability and analyticity at 0.
Chapter 4 tests the restrictions of smooth ambiguity preference with a
particular shape (decreasing or increasing ambiguity aversion) on portfo-
lio choice, and gives lower and upper bounds for these measures. Recent
papers in economics and finance show that the implication of the smooth
ambiguity model crucially depends on the shape of the risk and ambiguity
aversion and their magnitudes. Varian (1988) derives the nonparametric
restrictions of decreasing or increasing absolute (increasing) risk aversion
on one observation of Arrow−Debreu security, and gives the lower and up-
per bounds for these measures. I revisit Varian’s argument, and extend it
to multiple observations in incomplete markets. The conditions involve the
existence of Afriat numbers, and can be used to bound risk aversion. Then
the restrictions of different shapes of ambiguity aversion are derived.
Chapter 5 investigates systematically the nature of household ambigu-
ity preferences using household survey data within a parametric framework.
Despite the importance of individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion
in determining individual decision making and equilibrium implications,
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there is rare evidence on the shape of individual ambiguity preferences,
except a little evidence from either lab experiments or pure thought ex-
periments using variants of Ellsberg’s urns. I derive an explicit solution
in a two-period smooth ambiguity model due to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005) assuming constant relative risk aversion and constant rela-
tive ambiguity aversion, and show that time preference, risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion can be uniquely identified from a special panel dataset.
From the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
2008 and 2010, the most important findings are: constant relative risk
aversion and relative ambiguity aversion can be a good approximation; the
recovered preference parameters display considerable heterogeneity; the av-
erage relative risk aversion is much smaller than 1; and the average rela-
tive ambiguity aversion is around 3 or larger. Other interesting findings
include, firstly, households’ expectations are very pessimistic, and are sub-
ject to much ambiguity; secondly, the over-identification restriction implied
by the subjective expected utility model rejects the null hypothesis that
households are subjective expected utility maximizers, in favor of the am-
biguity model; finally, household risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are
not correlated, can’t be explained by observable household characteristics,
and have a quantitatively significant effect on consumption and portfolio
holding.
This dissertation contributes to understanding smooth ambiguity pref-
erence both theoretically and empirically. Chapters 2-4 provide theoretical
foundation for future empirical work on testing and recovering individual
smooth ambiguity preference. Chapter 5 provides fresh empirical evidence
on the shape and magnitude of household risk and ambiguity aversion based
on household consumption and saving data, which sheds light on the dis-
tribution of ambiguity preference, and can be used in finance and macroe-
conomic calibration to examine the implication of ambiguity preference
models.
In the next section of this chapter, I set up the economic environment
in which a consumer makes his choice. This model setup and notations will
be used in the following chapters, and will not be repeated.
4
1.2 Setup
In this dissertation, I consider a one-good two-period economy. Assume
states of the world in the second period are represented by ω ∈ Ω, a finite
set that has a product structure: Ω =A × S, where a ∈ A are states of
uncertainty while s ∈ S are states of risk.1 Ω can be interpreted as the
set of possible outcomes of two-stage lotteries, where A includes outcomes
of the first stage lotteries, and S includes realizations of the second stage
lotteries. I follow the literature, and assume that the consumption and
the payoff of financial assets are contingent on the realization of risk states
only.2 For a finite set E, let ∆E be the set of probability measures on E,
or, equivalently, the simplex of dimension (#E−1). A probability measure
on the set of the states of the world is pi ∈∆(Ω), and it decomposes
pi = (µ⊗ ν)
into a probability measure over states of the uncertainty
µ ∈∆(A)
, and a family of conditional probability measures over states of risk
νa : A→∆(S);
evidently,
pi(a, s) = µ(a)ν(s|a).
From now on, for notational ease, I denote pi(a, s) by pias, µ(a) by µa,
and ν(s|a) by νas.
A distribution of wealth across the risk states is
x = (..., xs, ...) ∈ ×s(0,∞).
1The exception is Chapter 5, where I assume lognormal distribution with a continuum
of states.
2If consumption and asset payoff depend on both uncertainty and risk states, as
can happen when the two-stage lottery is a compound objective lottery, my arguments
survive with a bit modification of notation.
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A utility function over distribution of wealth is
U : ×s(0,∞)→ R.
It is continuous, strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi−concave.
In the interior of its domain of definition, DU  0, and D2U is negative
definite on the orthogonal complement of the gradient, DU⊥.
Savage (1954) or, alternatively, Anscombe and Aumann (1963) derive
a probability measure
pi = µ⊗ ν
, and a cardinal risk−uncertainty index
u : (0,∞)→ R,
such that
U(x) = Epiu(xs) = EµEνau(xs).
3 (1.1)
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) derive a convex set of probability mea-
sures
C ⊂∆(Ω)
and a risk index
u : (0,∞)→ R,
such that
U(x) = min
pi∈C
Epiu(xs). (1.2)
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) derive a probability measure
pi = µ⊗ ν,
and a (cardinal) risk index and an uncertainty index
u : (0,∞)→ R and φ˜ : u((0,∞))→ R,
3In the original formulation in Savage (1954), the domain of preference does not
include compound lotteries; however, it is shown by Anscombe and Aumann (1963),
and Segal (1990) that the reduction of compound lotteries is necessary for the expected
utility theory when the domain includes two-stage lotteries.
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respectively, such that
U(x) = Eµφ˜
(
Eνau(xs)
)
.
Alternatively,
φ : (0,∞)→ R
and
U(x) = Eµφ
(
u−1
(
Eνau(xs)
))
, (1.3)
which, as in Selden and Wei (2014), also Hayashi and Miao (2011), al-
lows for invariance to an increasing affine transformation of the risk index
and generate appropriate comparative statics. The individual is ambigu-
ity averse if φ is a concave transformation of u, and ambiguity neutral if
φ ◦ u−1 is linear. Evidently, φ = φ˜ ◦ u establishes the equivalence of the
formulations.
Within the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), µ is the sub-
jective probability over horse race lotteries, and ν is the objective proba-
bility over roulette wheels. As shown by experimental evidence in Halevy
(2007), the non-reduction of compound objective lotteries is also consis-
tent with the smooth ambiguity aversion, in which case both µ and ν are
objective probabilities.
More generally, individual ambiguity preference can be defined without
reference to the probability of ambiguity states:
U(x) = Φ
(
w(x)
)
= Φ
(
..., wa(x), ...
)
, (1.4)
where
wa(x) = u
−1(Eνau(xs)),
is the certainty equivalent wealth at a state of uncertainty, a;
ν : A→∆(S),
is a family of conditional probability measures over states of risk;
w(x) = (..., wa(x), ...),
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the distribution of certainty equivalent wealth across states of uncertainty;
u : (0,∞)→ R
is a risk index; and
Φ : ×a(0,∞)→ R
is an ordinal utility function over the distribution of certainty equivalent
wealth across states of uncertainty.
Evidently, others are special cases. And, there is no explicit reference
to a probability measure over states of uncertainty.
There are J assets, where J is a finite number. Payoffs of asset j are
rj = (..., rsj, ...)
′
,
a column vector with S rows, i.e. its payoff is risk state contingent. Without
loss of generality, let
Epirj = 1.
At a state of risk, payoffs of assets are
Rs = (..., rsj, ...),
a row vector with J columns. The matrix of asset payoffs is
R = (..., rj, ...) = (...,Rs, ...),
a matrix of full column rank.
A portfolio of assets is
y = (..., yj, ...).
It generates the distribution of wealth across states of risk
x = Ry.
The set of portfolios of assets that generate strictly positive distributions
8
of wealth across states of risk is non-empty,
Y = {y : Ry  0} 6= ∅;
since R is of full column rank, Y is open. The domain of prices of assets
that do not allow for arbitrage is
P = {p : Ry > 0⇒ py > 0} = {p = ΠR,Π 0}.
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Chapter 2
Testing smooth ambiguity
preference
2.1 Introduction
The standard consumer theory assumes that a rational consumer will max-
imize his well-behaved utility function subject to a budget constraint. In
certainty case, the testable implications of such theory have been derived
from two different approaches. The first approach dated back to Antonelli
(1971) and Slutsky (1960) is to assume the whole demand function is ob-
servable, and derives the necessary and sufficient condition on the derivative
of demand functions, which is known as Slutsky equation.1 The second ap-
proach attributed to Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and
Varian (1982) is to assume finite data observation, and derive the necessary
and sufficient condition to be compatible with utility maximization, which
is known as Afriat theorem, see Kreps (2013).2
Under risk, a rational consumer’s preference is expressed as expected
utility in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954) and Anscombe
and Aumann (1963). The testable restrictions of expected utility theory
1For the Slutsky condition to be sufficient, income-Lipschitz condition of the demand
functions-i.e. the derivative of the demand functions with respect to income is bounded
on the domain, is needed, see Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971).
2This approach is called revealed preference approach since originally the conditions
are expressed as Weak Axiom of Reveal Preference by Samuelson (1938). Afriat (1967)
charaterize the restrictions by a system of inequalities called Afriat inequalities. Var-
ian (1982) proves that the Afriat inequalities are equivalent to Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference.
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have been exploited using both approaches. Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014)
derive Slutsky conditions under complete markets, which involves deriva-
tives of demand function with respect to probability. Basically, they work
in the framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and they as-
sume probability is observable and changes across observations. They also
give a functional form test, where the contingent claim demand must sat-
isfy certain form restrictions. Polemarchakis and Selden (1983) derive the
Slutsky-like conditions under incomplete markets, where the probability
is fixed, and the conditions involve the existence of some unknown func-
tions. The revealed preference conditions have been developed by Green
and Srivastava (1986), and Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014). The model
setup in Green and Srivastava (1986) is quite general, and is applicable
to incomplete markets, and multiple goods in each state. The necessary
and sufficient conditions there involve existence of unknown utility levels
and multipliers. Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) assume one good in each
state under complete markets, and characterize the necessary and sufficient
conditions by strong axiom of revealed expected utility (SAREU), which is
free of existential quantifiers.
The expected utility theory has been challenged by Ellsberg’s paradox
Ellsberg (1961) and other experimental evidence, which demonstrate that
individual’s choice will violate the independence axiom when he is am-
biguous about the probability distribution of relevant events.3 In recent
years, the decision theory literature has developed alternative models to
accommodate individual choice behavior under ambiguity. In developing
laboratory tests of whether a particular model provides a satisfactory de-
scription of choices of individuals, decision theorists have focused on choices
over lotteries whereas the economists alternatively have focused on choices
over assets (or contingent claims). One potentially important limitation of
the former is that the choices over lotteries reflect neither variable prices for
lotteries nor budget constraints associated with a fixed income. In recent
work that overcomes the latter problem, there has been considerable focus
on developing revealed preference tests, where following the classic work of
Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982), one seeks to verify whether observed asset
(price,quantity) pairs are consistent with specific demand tests derived for
3For the early evidence, see the survey article Camerer and Weber (1992).
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assumed non-parametric forms of utility (such as additive separability or
weak separability). Two important applications of this approach to ambi-
guity preferences are Bayer, Bose, Polisson, and Renou (2013) and Ahn,
Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014). For instance in the former, the authors de-
rive testable inequality conditions, associated with the assumed risk and
ambiguity indices, which are consistent with maximization of ambiguity
preferences. This work, while extremely interesting, would seem to have
two limitations. First, only very special non-parametric forms of ambiguity
preferences can be addressed. Second, almost all of the revealed preference
work in risky or uncertain settings of which we are aware makes the very
strong assumption of complete asset markets where the number of states
of nature equals the number of assets, which span the state space.
In this chapter, we use both revealed preference approach and demand
function approach to test smooth ambiguity model. In both approaches, we
assume the probability distributions are known, and change across obser-
vations.4 The revealed preference approach does not put any requirement
on the financial market, i.e. the necessary and sufficient conditions can be
used to test portfolio choice from incomplete markets. For demand function
tests, we assume complete state consumption contingent on both ambiguity
and risk states.
2.2 Revealed preference test
As mentioned in Section 1.2 in Chapter 1, the ambiguity preference can be
written more generally as
U(x) = Φ
(
..., Eνau(xa), ...
)
. (2.1)
We will put some regularity assumptions on the functional form (2.1)
and asset return structure to make the individual optimization problem
well-defined.
Assumption 1
(1) u is C2 on R++, is strictly concave and satisfies ∀x ∈ R++, u′ > 0;
4As will be seen, observing the probability distribution is not necessary for the re-
vealed preference test.
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(2) Φ is C1 on RA++, is strictly concave, and satisfies ∀w(x) ∈ RA++,
Φa > 0 for all a = 1, ..., A;
(3) Φ
(
..., u−1(Eνau(xs)), ...
)
is strictly quasi-concave on RS++.
Assumption 2 For each conditional probability distribution va, the
gross return rj of asset j, j = 1, ..., J satisfies:
(1) prob{rj ≥ 0} =1;
(2) prob{rj = 0} 6= 1;
(3) rj is linearly independent with return vectors of other assets;
(4) Eνar
l
j < +∞.
Now we specify the data we can observe: dataD={pn,yn,νna ,R}n=1,...,Na=1,...,A .
So the dataD include N observations of asset prices p, portfolio choices
y, all conditional probability distributions v, and the asset payoff structure
R, which satisfies Assumption 2.
Remark 1. No matter the domain of preference is subjective-objective two-
stage lotteries as in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) or a compound objective
lotteries as shown by Halevy (2007), the conditional distributions are ob-
jective. So assuming observation of conditional probability distribution
seems to be a tenable assumption. In the experiments of Ellsberg (1961) or
other experiments like Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014), the conditional
probabilities are objectively known to the subjects.
To test the ambiguity preference (2.1) based on finite observations in
dataset D, we extend the revealed preference method developed by Afriat
(1967), Varian (1982) and Matzkin and Richter (1991) to our setting.
Proposition 1 presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for finite
observations in datasetD to be consistent with such ambiguity preference.
Proposition 1. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a continuous, locally non-satiated utility function
U (y) = Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)
, ...
)
,
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where Φ and u satisfy Assumption 1, to rationalize the data D, i.e.
for all n = 1, ..., N
yn ∈ arg max
y∈RJ
U (y) s.t. pn · y ≤ pn · yn.
(ii) There exist real numbers (Uns ,M
n
s )
n=1,...,N
s=1,...,S > 0, (Φ
n)Nn=1, (ρ
n
a)
n=1,...,N
a=1,...,A >
0, and (λn)Nn=1 > 0 such that for all n,m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, s, s′ ∈
{1, 2, ..., S}, a, a′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., A} and j ∈ {j = 1, 2, ..., J} 5
Uns − Ums′ < Mms′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
,
with equality if
∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j =
∑J
j=1 rs′jy
m
j ;
Φn − Φm <
A∑
a=1
ρma
(
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
,
with equality if
∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s =
∑S
s=1 ν
m
a′sU
m
s ;
and
A∑
a=1
(
ρna
S∑
s=1
νnasM
n
s rsj
)
= λnpnj .
Proof. (i) implies (ii)
The first order conditions are ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J},
A∑
a=1
Φ
′
a
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νnasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
, ...
)(∑
s
νnasu
′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
rsj
)
= λpnj .
(2.2)
Since u and Φ are both strictly concave, the following inequalities hold
u
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
< u
(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
+u′
(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
,
(2.3)
5In this condition, the numbers (Uns )
n=1,...,N
s=1,...,S represent the utility levels, which are
not necessarily positive. However, the translation of any negative solution by a positive
constant will still be a solution. So requiring positivity of these numbers is without loss
of generality.
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and
Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νnasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
, ...
)
< Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νmasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
m
j
)
, ...
)
+
A∑
a=1
Φ′
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νmasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
m
j
)
, ...
)
×
(
S∑
s=1
νnasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
−
S∑
s=1
νma′su
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
m
j
))
. (2.4)
Denoting
Uns = u
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
,Mns = u
′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
,
Φn = Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νnasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
, ...
)
,
ρna = Φ
′
a
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νnasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
, ...
)
.
The conditions (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) can be rewritten as
Uns − Ums′ < Mms′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
, (2.5)
Φn − Φm <
A∑
a=1
ρma
(
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
, (2.6)
and
A∑
a=1
(
ρna
S∑
s=1
νnasM
n
s rsj
)
= λnpnj . (2.7)
(ii) implies (i)
Given the solution to inequalities in (ii), i.e. real numbers (Uns ,M
n
s )
n=1,...,N
s=1,...,S >
0, (Φn)Nn=1, (ρ
n
a)
n=1,...,N
a=1,...,A > 0 and (λ
n)Nn=1 > 0, we will modify the argument
in Matzkin and Richter (1991) to construct strictly increasing and strictly
concave utility indexes u(x) and Φ(..., ua, ...) to rationalize the observations.
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Step 1: construction of u(x)
Since we have only finite inequalities, we can choose small enough num-
ber δ0 such that
Uns − Ums′ < Mms′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
− δ0, (2.8)
for
∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j 6=
∑J
j=1 rs′jy
m
j .
Define a function g : R1 → R1 by
g(x) = (x2 + T )
1
2 − T 12 , (2.9)
where T is a positive real number.
It can be shown that the defined function g(x) is nonnegative valued,
differentiable, strictly convex, and has bounded derivative. And condition
(2.8) implies that we can choose a small enough number δ such that
Uns − Ums′ < Mms′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
− δg
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
,
(2.10)
for
∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j 6=
∑J
j=1 rs′jy
m
j .
Define functions uns (x) : R1 → R1 by
uns (x) = U
n
s +M
n
s
(
x−
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
− δg
(
x−
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
, (2.11)
where n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, s ∈ {1, 2, ..., S}.
It can be shown that the defined function uns (x) is strictly concave, and
satisfies uns
(∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j
)
= Uns .
Define a function u(x) : R1 → R1 by
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u(x) = min
s,n
{uns (x)}. (2.12)
The defined function u(x) is strictly concave, and we can choose δ small
enough that the function u(x) is strictly increasing. This is possible since
the defined function g(x) has bounded derivative and there are finite in-
equalities.
We claim that u(
∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j ) = U
n
s , since
u
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
= um
s′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
≤ uns
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j
)
= Uns (2.13)
The inequality in above equation can not be strict, otherwise it will
violate inequality (2.10).
Step 2: construction of index Φ(u):
We will sketch the construction, since it follows the same argument as
above.
Define a function G(u) : RA → R1 by
G(u) = (u21 + ...u
2
A + T )
1
2 − T 12 . (2.14)
Choose small enough positive real number  such that
Φn − Φm <
A∑
a=1
ρma
(
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
− G
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s , ...
)
, (2.15)
for
∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s 6=
∑S
s=1 ν
m
a′sU
m
s .
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Define functions φn(u) : RA → R1 by
φn(u) = Φn +
A∑
a=1
ρma
(
ua −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
− G
(
..., ua −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s , ...
)
,
(2.16)
where n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, a ∈ {1, 2, ..., A}.
It can be shown that the defined function φn(u) is strictly concave and
satisfies φn
(
...,
∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s , ...
)
= Φn.
Define a function Φ : RA → R1 by
Φ(u) = min
n
{φn(u)}. (2.17)
The defined function Φ(u) is strictly concave, and we can choose 
small enough such that Φ(u) is strictly increasing. It can be shown that
Φ
(
...,
∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s , ...
)
= Φn.
Step 3: rationalization
We claim that the constructed utility function rationalizes the observed
data, i.e. if piyi > piy and yi 6= y, then
Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
i
j
)
, ...
)
> Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)
, ...
)
.
(2.18)
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Φ(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)
, ...
)
1
= min
m
{
Φm +
A∑
a=1
ρma
( S∑
s=1
νiasu
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)− S∑
s
νm
a′sU
m
s
)
− G
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasu
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)− S∑
s
νa′sU
m
s , ...
)}
2
= min
m
{
Φm +
A∑
a=1
ρma
( S∑
s=1
νias min
s′ ,n
{
Un
s′ +M
n
s′
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
n
j
)
− δg( J∑
j=1
rsjyj −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
n
j
)}− S∑
s
νm
a′sU
m
s
)
− G
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasu
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)− S∑
s
νm
a
′
s
Ums , ...
)}
3
≤ Φi +
A∑
a=1
ρia
( S∑
s=1
νiasU
i
s +M
i
s
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
i
j
)
− δg( J∑
j=1
rsjyj −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
i
j
)− S∑
s
νasU
i
s
)
− G
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νasu
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj
)− S∑
s
νiasU
i
s, ...
)
4
< Φi +
A∑
a=1
ρia
( S∑
s=1
νiasU
i
s +M
i
s
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
i
j
)− S∑
s
νiasU
i
s
)
= Φi +
A∑
a=1
ρia
S∑
s=1
νiasM
i
s
( J∑
j=1
rsjyj −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
i
j
)
5
= Φi + λipi(y − yi)
6
≤ Φi
7
= Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasU
i
s, ...
)
8
= Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νiasu
( J∑
j=1
rsjy
i
j
)
, ...
)
.
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where 1 follows from the definition of function Φ, 2 from the definition
of function u, 3 from taking the minimum, 4 from positivity of functions
g and G, 5 from equation (2.7), and 6 from the budget constraint.
Remark 2. As in Matzkin and Richter (1991), we can prove the constructed
function is generically infinitely differentiable. And if we put further re-
strictions: Mns = M
m
s′ if
∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j =
∑J
j=1 rs′jy
m
j , and ρ
n
a = ρ
m
a′ if∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s =
∑S
s=1 ν
m
a′sU
m
s , then we can use the convolution methods in
Chiappori and Rochet (1987) to smooth our defined functions to be in-
finitely differentiable on the whole domain. So with finite observations,
differentiability is not testable, in the first statement the differentiability
of the objective function is not needed.
Remark 3. In the above testing, we assume the conditional probability is
observed, and varies across observations. The assumption of observing con-
ditional probability can be relaxed, in stead, we can require the existence
of these numbers in condition (ii); however, in this case, we need to assume
these probabilities are fixed across observations, otherwise the testability
will be lost.
The smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005) is a special case when
Φ(..., Eνau(xs), ...) =
A∑
a=1
µaφ
(
S∑
s=1
νasu (xs)
)
. (2.19)
Here the probability of ambiguity states is explicitly referred to. We
put the following restrictions on the functional form (2.19).
Assumption 1
′
(1) u is C2 on R++, is strictly concave and satisfies ∀x ∈ R++, u′ > 0;
(2) φ is C2 on R++, is strictly concave, and satisfies ∀w(x) ∈ R++,
φ
′
> 0;
(3) φ
(
u−1(.)
)
is strictly concave on R.
To test this functional form, we specify the following data set.
Data D
′
={pn,yn,µn,νna ,R}n=1,...,Na=1,...,A .
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So the data D
′
includes N observations of asset prices p, portfolio
choices y, the probability distribution over ambiguity states µ, all condi-
tional probability distributions v, and the asset payoff structure R, which
satisfies Assumption 2.
Remark 4. We assume the observation of both µ, the probability over
ambiguity states, and ν, the conditional probability over risk states. If
the domain of preference is compound objective lotteries, such assumption
seems to be reasonable. Within the framework of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963), it seems much less plausible to observe probability µ. In the fol-
lowing corollary, we state the necessary and sufficient conditions assuming
observation of µ; however, as pointed out in remark 3, we can require the
existence of these numbers when they are not observable.
Corollary 1 gives the corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions
for data D
′
to be consistent with this particular functional form.
Corollary 1. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a continuous, locally non-satiated utility function
U (y) =
A∑
a=1
µaφ
(
S∑
s=1
νasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjyj
))
,
where φ and u satisfy Assumption 1
′
, to rationalize the data D
′
, i.e.
for all i = 1, ..., N
yn ∈ arg max
y∈RJ
U (y) s.t. pn · y ≤ pn · yn.
(ii) There exist real numbers (Uns ,M
n
s )
n=1,...,N
s=1,...,S > 0, (Φ
n
a)
n=1,...,N
a=1,...,A , (ρ
n
h)
n=1,...,N
a=1,...,A >
0 and (λn)Nn=1 > 0 such that for all n,m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, s, s′ ∈
{1, 2, ..., S}, a, a′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., A} and j ∈ {j = 1, 2, ..., J}
Uns − Ums′ < Mms′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
n
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
m
j
)
,
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with equality if
∑J
j=1 rsjy
n
j =
∑J
j=1 rs′jy
m
j ;
Φna − Φma′ < ρma′
(
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
,
with equality if
∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s =
∑S
s=1 ν
m
a′sU
m
s ; and
A∑
a=1
(
µnaρ
n
a
S∑
s=1
νnasM
n
s rsj
)
= λnpnj .
Proof. We can modify the proof of Proposition 1 to prove this result. To
prove (i) implies (ii), use the strict concavity of function u, the strict con-
cavity of function φ, and the first order condition. To prove (ii) implies (i),
the construction of u(x) follows the same argument. We give a sketch of
the construction of φ(u).
Construction of index φ(u):
Choose a small enough positive real number  such that:
Φna −Φma′ < ρma′
(
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
− g
(
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s −
S∑
s=1
νma′sU
m
s
)
,
(2.20)
for
∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s 6=
∑S
s=1 ν
m
a′sU
m
s .
Define functions φna(u) : R1 → R1 by
φna(u) = Φ
n
a + ρ
n
a
(
u−
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s
)
− g
(
u−
S∑
s=1
νnasU
n
s
)
, (2.21)
where n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, a ∈ {1, 2, ..., A}.
It can be shown that the defined function φna(u) is strictly concave and
satisfies φna
(∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s
)
= Φna .
Define a function φ : R1 → R1 by
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φ(u) = min
a,n
{φna(u)}. (2.22)
The defined function φ(u) is strictly concave, and we can choose 
small enough such that φ(u) is strictly increasing. It can be shown that
φ
(∑S
s=1 ν
n
asU
n
s
)
= Φna .
We omit the remaining details of rationalization.
Remark 5. Bayer, Bose, Polisson, and Renou (2013) is a complete market
version of Corollary 1, so a special case of Proposition 1, and our conditions
can test observations from incomplete markets. Our conditions are stated
for strictly concave functions, but if the strict inequalities are changed to be
weak inequalities, they will become necessary and sufficient conditions for
testing weakly concave smooth ambiguity utility under incomplete markets.
2.3 Demand function tests
In the following demand function tests, we deviate from the literature, and
assume that both probability of ambiguity and probability of risk are ob-
servable, and contingent consumption can be traded contingent on both
states. If the domain of preference is compound objective lotteries, then
such assumption is tenable. As shown by experimental evidence in Halevy
(2007), the non-reduction of compound objective lotteries is also consis-
tent with the smooth ambiguity aversion, in which case both µ and ν are
objective probabilities. If the domain of preference is horse race-roulette
wheel two-stage lotteries, the the first stage subjective probability should
be elicited from subjects.
For both demand function tests, we assume the probabilities µ and
ν change across observations. When consumers can trade consumption
claims contingent on both ambiguity and risk states, their utility function
is defined over distribution of consumption over states of the world:
U(x;µ;ν) = Eµφ
(
Eνau(xas)
)
.6 (2.23)
6That probabilities µ and ν enter the objective function means probabilities change
over observations, and it should be noted that these are exogenous to consumers, not
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We are interested in consumers who are both risk and ambiguity averse,
and put the following regularity restrictions on the function (2.23):
Regularity Assumption 1
′′
(1) u is C2 on R++, is strictly concave and satisfies ∀x ∈ R++, u′ > 0;
(2) φ is C2 on R, is strictly concave, and satisfies ∀x ∈ R, φ′ > 0.
Because both of our demand function tests crucially depend on separa-
bility of the objective function, we first give the concepts of separability we
use. For n commodities, the set of these commodities is denoted by N , i.e.
N = {1, ..., n}. A partition of the set N is a class of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive subsets {N 1, ...,NT} such that N = N 1 ∪ ... ∪NT , and
N s ∩N t = ∅ for s 6= t. So a commodity bundle x = (x1, ..., xn) is corre-
spondingly partitioned into (x(1), ...,x(T )), where for each t, the sub-vector
x(t) is composed of xi, i ∈N t.
Definition 1. A utility function u(x) is strongly separable with respect to
partition {N 1, ...,NT} with T > 2, if u(x) = u(x(1), ...,x(T )) is of the form
u(x) = F
(
u1(x(1)) + ...+ uT (x(T ))
)
, (2.24)
where F (y) is a monotone-increasing function of one variable y, and for
each t = 1, ..., T , ut(x(t)) is a function of sub-vector x(t).
Definition 2. A utility function u(x) is weakly separable with respect to
partition {N 1, ...,NT} with T > 2, if u(x) = u(x(1), ...,x(T )) is of the form
u(x) = z
(
u1(x(1)), ..., uT (x(T ))
)
, (2.25)
where z(u1, ..., uT ) is a function of T variables, and for each t = 1, ..., T ,
ut(x(t)) is a function of subvector x(t) alone.
Remark 6. Both definitions follow Goldman and Uzawa (1964). However, in
Goldman and Uzawa (1964), their primitive definition of strong separability
is
∂ui(x)/uj(x)
∂xk
= 0, for all i ∈ N s, j ∈ N t, and k /∈ N s ∪N t (s 6= t), and
that of weak separability is
∂ui(x)/uj(x)
∂xk
= 0, for all i, j ∈ N t, and k /∈ N t.
Goldman and Uzawa (1964) prove that their primitive definitions imply
the functional forms in Definition 1 and Definition 2, respectively.
choice variables.
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Remark 7. The concepts of both strong and weak separability are ordinal,
and a strongly separable utility function is also weakly separable.
Under the assumption of complete contingent consumption, consumer’s
objective function (2.23) satisfies the property of strong separability across
both ambiguity states and risk states. Consumer’s optimization problem is
max
x∈RAS++
A∑
a=1
µaφ
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(xas)
)
, s.t. p · x ≤ I. (2.26)
Under the regularity assumption, solution to the problem (2.26) exists
and is unique. We assume the optimal consumption demands x(p; I;µ;ν)
are observable. We want to know what properties these demand functions
possess if they are generated from problem (2.26).
2.3.1 Functional form test
Goldman and Uzawa (1964) give the conditions characterized by Slutsky
terms for the observed demand functions to be consistent with a strongly
(weakly) separable utility function. Here we assume the contingent demand
functions satisfy the conditions for weak separability, the question we ask
is: when will a weakly separable utility function be of the particular form
(2.23)? Proposition 2 below gives the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the derived contingent demands to be compatible with this particular
functional form.
Proposition 2. Assume A > 2 and S > 2, and there exist complete con-
tingent claims, which can be rationalized by a well-defined, weakly separable
utility. Then this utility function is ordinally equivalent to a smooth ambi-
guity utility if and only if there exist strictly monotone functions f : R2++ →
R++, γ : R++ → R++, and G : R2 → R such that for a ∈ {1, ..., A} and
s ∈ {1, ..., S}, the observed contingent demands satisfy
xas = f(xa1, kas), (2.27)
S∑
s=1
νas
∫
γ(xa1)
f−1xa1(xas)
dxas = G
(
S∑
s=1
ν1s
∫
γ(x11)
f−1x11(x1s)
dx1s, Ka
)
, (2.28)
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where kas =def
νaspa1
νa1pas
, and Ka =def
µaνa1γ(xa1)p11
µ1ν11γ(x11)pa1
. And functions f and G
satisfy: x = f(x, 1), u(x) = G
(
u(x), 1
)
, and ∂
2G
∂xasxa1
= 0.
Remark 8. Condition (2.27) holds for each risk state s, conditional on
ambiguity state a. So it is a restriction on the relation between risk state
consumption demand xas and its relative risk neutral price kas.
Remark 9. Condition (2.28) relates the expected utility in state a (ex-
pressed in terms of integration of demands) to its relative ambiguity neutral
price Ka. The expected utility level depends on the absolute level of the
utility index u, as indicated by γ function; however, the relative ambiguity
neutral price is independent of the unit of u.
Lemma 1. When S > 2, a twice continuously differentiable utility function
is additively separable u(x) =
∑S
s=1 us(xs) if and only if
∂us/u1
∂ui
= 0 for
i, s ∈ {2, 3, ..., S}, and i 6= s.
This lemma is used in Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014), who contribute
it to Samuelson (1947). However, it should be noted that we only focus on
the case of one good per state, the additively separability is a special case of
strong separability in Definition 1, and the proof can be found in Goldman
and Uzawa (1964). Now we go to the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Necessity
Since the objective function (2.23) satisfies the regularity assumption,
the following first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for charac-
tering the optimal solution to problem (2.26):
F.O.C with respect to xas,
µaφ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(xas)
)
νasu
′
(xas) = λpas, (2.29)
F.O.C with respect to xas′ ,
µaφ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(xas)
)
νas′u
′
(xas′ ) = λpas′ , (2.30)
F.O.C with respect to xa′s,
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µa′φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νa′su(xa′s)
)
νa′su
′
(xa′s) = λpa′s, (2.31)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
From equations (2.29) and (2.30), we have
νasu
′
(xas)
νas′u
′(xas′ )
=
pas
pas′
. (2.32)
From equations (2.29) and (2.31), we have
µaφ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(xas)
)
νasu
′
(xas)
µa′φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νa′su(xa′s)
)
νa′su
′(xa′s)
=
pas
pa′s
. (2.33)
Equation (2.32) characterizes the marginal rate of substitution between
consumptions within the same ambiguity state, and equation (2.33) char-
acterizes the marginal rate of substitution between consumptions across
ambiguity states.
Rearrange terms in equation (2.32), we have
u
′
(xas) =
νa1pas
νaspa1
u
′
(xa1). (2.34)
Define kas =
νaspa1
νa1pas
, and substitute into equation (2.34), we have
xas = u
′−1
(
u
′
(xa1)
kas
)
= f(xa1, kas). (2.35)
Monotonicity of function f follows from concavity of u (or monotonicity
of u
′
). Note that this functional form holds contingent on each ambiguity
states; however, the function f itself is invariant across ambiguity states.
To derive equation (2.28), define u
′
(x) = γ(x), then concavity of u
implies that γ(x) is a decreasing function of x.
From equations (2.34) and (2.35), we have
u(xas) =
∫
γ(xa1)
f−1xa1(xas)
dxas. (2.36)
From equation (2.33), we have
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φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(xas)
)
=
µ1ν1su
′
(x1s)pas
µaνasu
′(xas)p1s
φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
ν1su(x1s)
)
. (2.37)
Use the relation in equation (2.34), and substitute u
′
(x1s) and u
′
(xas)
into above equation (2.37), we have
φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(xas)
)
=
µ1ν11γ(x11)pa1
µaνa1γ(xa1)p11
φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
ν1su(x1s)
)
. (2.38)
Use equation (2.36), and define Ka =
µaνa1γ(xa1)p11
µ1ν11γ(x11)pa1
, we get
S∑
s=1
νas
∫
γ(xa1)
f−1xa1(xas)
dxas = φ
′−1
φ
′( S∑
s=1
ν1s
∫ γ(x11)
f−1x11 (x1s)
dx1s
)
Ka

= G
(
S∑
s=1
ν1s
∫
γ(x11)
f−1x11(x1s)
dx1s, Ka
)
. (2.39)
Denote
S∑
s=1
νas
∫ γ(xa1)
f−1xa1 (xas)
dxas by u(xa), then the follow holds
u(x) = G
(
u(x), 1
)
. (2.40)
Since φ
′
is strictly monotone, the function G will be strictly monotone.
If we take derivative w.r.t xas on both sides of equation (2.39), we have
∂G
∂xas
= G2
∂Ka
∂xas
= νasu
′
(xas), (2.41)
which is a function of xas only.
So we have
∂2G
∂xas∂xa1
= 0 (2.42)
Sufficiency
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We assume that contingent claim demand functions satisfy income-
Lipschitz condition, and the Slutsky matrix of contingent claim demands
satisfies the conditions for weak separability as shown by Goldman and
Uzawa (1964), so there exists a weakly separable function
Φ
(
..., ua
(
xa1, ..., xaS;µ;ν
)
, ...;µ;ν
)
, (2.43)
which can rationalize observed contingent consumption.
So the observed contingent claim demands solves the following problem:
max
x∈RAS++
Φ
(
..., ua
(
xa1, ..., xaS;µ;ν
)
, ...;µ;ν
)
s.t. p · x ≤ I. (2.44)
The question is whether it takes the smooth ambiguity utility form.
Step one: additive separability of u
First, we show that the condition xas = f(xa1, kas) implies that ua
is additively separable across risk states conditional on certain ambiguity
state.
From the first order condition for problem (2.44), we have
∂ua/∂xa1
∂ua/∂xas
=
pa1
pas
. (2.45)
Since xas = f(xa1, kas), and f(xa1, kas) is a strictly monotone function
of kas, we have
νaspa1
νa1pas
= kas = f
−1
xa1
(xas), (2.46)
which implies that the first order condition (2.45) can be rewritten as
∂ua/∂xa1
∂ua/∂xas
=
νa1
νas
f−1xa1(xas), (2.47)
which implies that
∂(∂ua/∂xa1
∂ua/∂xas
)
∂xi
= 0 (i 6= s). (2.48)
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The result from Lemma 1 implies that we can assume u takes the form
ua(xa;µ;ν) =
S∑
s=s
uas(xas;µ;ν). (2.49)
The first order condition (2.45) now can be rewritten as
u
′
a1(xa1;µ;ν)
u′as(xas;µ;ν)
=
pa1
pas
. (2.50)
Combine with equation (2.46), we have
piasu
′
a1(xa1;µ;ν)
pia1u
′
as(xas;µ;ν)
= kas = f
−1
xa1
(xas), (2.51)
which must be independent of ν and µ.
Denoting
tas(xas;µ;ν) =
u
′
as(xas;µ;ν)
νas
. (2.52)
We have
∂
∂ν
(
ta1(xa1;µ;ν)
tas(xas;µ;ν)
)
= 0, (2.53)
∂
∂µ
(
ta1(xa1;µ;ν)
tas(xas;µ;ν)
)
= 0. (2.54)
These imply that
∂ ln ta1(xa1;µ;ν)
∂ν
=
∂ ln tas(xas;µ;ν)
∂ν
, (2.55)
∂ ln ta1(xa1;µ;ν)
∂µ
=
∂ ln tas(xas;µ;ν)
∂µ
. (2.56)
Taking derivative with respect to xas on both sides of the above equa-
tions yields
∂2 ln tas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas∂ν
= 0, (2.57)
∂2 ln tas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas∂µ
= 0. (2.58)
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These imply that
ln tas(xas;µ;ν) = t
1
as(xas) + t
2
as(µ;ν). (2.59)
Define
τ 1as(xas) = exp
(
t1as(xas)
)
, (2.60)
τ 2as(µ;ν) = exp
(
t2as(µ;ν)
)
. (2.61)
We have
tas(xas;µ;ν) = τ
1
as(xas)τ
2
as(µ;ν). (2.62)
Due to equations (2.53) and (2.54), τ 2as(µ;ν) must be the same across
risk states, and can be denoted τ 2a (µ;ν).
We have
u
′
as(xas;µ;ν) = τ
2
a (µ;ν)νasτ
1
as(xas). (2.63)
Since when kas = 1, xas = f(xa1, 1) = xa1, we must have τ
1
a1 = τ
1
as = τ
1
a .
Define
ua(xas) =
∫
τ 1a (xas)dxas. (2.64)
Finally since
f(xa1, kas) = u
′−1
a
(
u
′
a(xa1)
kas
)
(2.65)
is strictly increasing in kas, ua is strictly concave.
Step two: additive separability of φ
First, we want to show that the condition (2.28) implies that Φ is ad-
ditively separable across ambiguity states.
From the previous construction, we have
ua(xa1, ...xaS;µ;ν) = τ
2
a (µ;ν)
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas). (2.66)
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The objective function can be rewritten as
Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas), ...;µ;ν
)
. (2.67)
The first order condition across ambiguity states would be
∂Φ
∂Ua
νasu
′
a(xas)
∂Φ
∂U
a
′ νa′su
′
a′ (xa′s)
=
pas
pa′s
. (2.68)
Since the contingent consumption is consistent with a utility function
which is weakly separable across ambiguity states, from the proof in step
one,
νasu
′
a(xas)
νa1u
′
a(xa1)
=
pas
pa1
, (2.69)
which implies
S∑
s=1
νas
∫ γ(xa1)
f−1xa1 (xas)
dxas is function of xa1,...,xaS only, indepen-
dent of contingent demands in other ambiguity states.
Since function G is strictly monotone, by condition (2.28), we have
Ka = G
−1
U(x1)
(
U(xa)
)
. (2.70)
The first order condition (2.68) can be rewritten as
∂Φ
∂Ua
νa1u
′
a(xa1)
∂Φ
∂U1
ν11u
′
1(x11)
=
µ1ν11γ(x11)
µaνa1γ(xa1)
Ka. (2.71)
It implies that
∂
∂Φ
∂Ua
νa1u
′
a(xa1)
∂Φ
∂U1
ν11u
′
1(x11)
∂xit
= 0, for i 6= 1, a. (2.72)
Thus we can assume Φ takes the form
Φ
(
...,
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas), ...;µ;ν
)
=
A∑
a=1
φa
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
. (2.73)
So the first order condition (2.68) will be
32
φ
′
1
(∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν
)
ν1su
′
1(x1s)
φ′a
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
νasu
′
2(xas)
=
p1s
pas
. (2.74)
Equivalently,
µaγaφ
′
1
(∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν
)
ν1sνasu
′
1(x1s)
µ1γ1φ
′
a
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
ν1sνasu
′
a(xas)
= Ka = G
−1
U1
(Ua), (2.75)
which must be independent of pia′ (a
′ 6= a or 1) and µ.
The above equation (2.75) can be reduced to
µaγaφ
′
1
(∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν
)
u
′
1(x1s)
µ1γ1φ
′
a
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
u′a(xas)
= Ka = G
−1
U1
(Ua). (2.76)
Denote
Ha
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
=
φ
′
a
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
u
′
(xas)
µaγa
. (2.77)
We have
∂
(
H1(
∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν)
Ha(
∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν)
)
∂νa′
= 0, (2.78)
∂
(
H1(
∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν)
Ha(
∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν)
)
∂µ
= 0. (2.79)
Equivalently,
∂ lnH1
(∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν
)
∂νa′
=
∂ lnHa
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
∂νa′
, (2.80)
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∂ lnH1
(∑
ν1su1(x1s);µ;ν
)
∂µ
=
∂ lnHa
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
∂µ
. (2.81)
Take derivative with respect to xas, we have
∂2 lnHa
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
∂xas∂νa′
= 0, (2.82)
∂2 lnHa
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
∂xas∂µ
= 0, (2.83)
which implies that
lnHa
(∑
νasug(xas);µ;ν
)
= τ 1a
(∑
νasua(xas)
)
+τ 2a
(
µ,ν−a
)
. (2.84)
Let
Γ1a
(∑
νasua(xas)
)
= exp
(
τ 1a
(∑
νasua(xas)
))
, (2.85)
Γ2a
(
ν−a,µ
)
= exp
(
τ 2a
(
µ,ν−a
))
. (2.86)
Then
Ha
(∑
νasua(xas);µ;ν
)
= Γ1a
(∑
νasua(xas)
)
Γ2a
(
µ,ν−a
)
. (2.87)
Due to equations (2.78) and (2.79), Γ2a (µ,ν−a) must be independent of
ν−a, and be the same for all a = 1, 2..., A. So it can be denoted by Γ2(µ).
And from the proof in step one, we have
u
′
a(xas)
u′a(xa1)
=
νa1pas
νaspa1
=
1
f−1xa1(xas)
. (2.88)
So the equation (2.28) can be rewritten as
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S∑
s=1
νas
∫
u
′
a(xas)
u′a(xa1)
γ(xa1)dxas = G
(
S∑
s=1
ν1s
∫
u
′
1(x1s)
u
′
1(x11)
γ(x11)dx1s, Ka
)
.
(2.89)
Take derivative w.r.t xas on both sides of the equation (2.89), we have
νas
u
′
a(xas)
u′a(xa1)
γ(xa1) =
∂G
∂xas
. (2.90)
Since ∂
2G
∂xas∂xa1
= 0, the left-hand side of the above equation should be
independent of xa1. Therefore, we have
γ(xa1) = u
′
a(xa1). (2.91)
When Ka = 1,
∑
ν1su(x1s) =
∑
νasu(xas). (2.92)
Equation (2.68) implies
µaγ(xa1)Γ
2(µ)µ1γ(x11)Γ
1
1
(∑
ν1su(x1s)
)
µ1γ(x11)Γ2(µ)µaγ(xa1)Γ1a
(∑
νasu(xas)
) = 1. (2.93)
Therefore
Γ11
(∑
ν1su(x1s)
)
= Γ1a
(∑
νasu(xas)
)
. (2.94)
So
Γ11 = Γ
1
a = Γ
1. (2.95)
Define
φ(u) =
∫
Γ1(u)du. (2.96)
Since the first order condition implies
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µaγ(xa1)φ
′
1
(∑
ν1su(x1s)
)
u
′
(x1s)
µ1γ(x11)φ
′
a
(∑
νasu(xas)
)
u′(xas)
=
µap1sνasγ(xa1)
µ1pasν1sγ(x11)
. (2.97)
Use the condition λ(xa1) = u
′
(xa1) and let s = 1, the above equation
will be reduced to
µaφ
′
1
(∑
ν1su(x1s)
)
µ1φ
′
a
(∑
νasu(xas)
) = µap1sνasγ(xa1)
µ1pasν1sγ(x11)
. (2.98)
Substitute φ
′
a
(∑
νasu(xas)
)
= Γ2(µ)µaΓ
1
(∑
νasu(xas)
)
, we have
Γ1
(∑
ν1su(x1s)
)
Γ1
(∑
νasu(xas)
) = µap1sνasγ(xa1)
µ1pasν1sγ(x11)
. (2.99)
So ∑
νasu(xas) = φ
′−1
(
φ
′
(
∑
ν1su(x1s))
µap1sνasγ(xa1)
µ1pasν1sγ(x11)
)
. (2.100)
which implies that φ is strictly concave.
2.3.2 Demand derivative test
In the functional form test, we assume the Slutsky matrix derived from con-
tingent consumption demands is consistent with a weakly separable utility,
and then give the necessary and sufficient conditions for these contingent
consumption demands to be rationalized by some smooth ambiguity utility
function. These necessary and sufficient conditions are expressed by the
relation between contingent demand and relative risk neutral price, and the
relation between contingent expected utility and relative ambiguity neutral
price.
In this section, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions on Slut-
sky terms. Notice that the objective function is not just weakly separable,
but also strongly separable. The Slutsky conditions we derive will charac-
terize strong separability, stationarity of utility indices, and homogeneity
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in probability.
Given the regularity assumption, the optimal solution to problem (2.26)
is determined by F (x, λ,p, I,µ,ν) = 0, where
F (x, λ,p, I,µ,ν) =
DxU(x;µ;ν)− λp = 0I − px = 0 . (2.101)
Under Assumption 1
′′
, the Hessian matrix D2xxU(x;µ;ν) is negative
definite, so that Dx,λF (x, λ,p, I,µ,ν) = 0 is invertible.
Define the inverse matrix as[
K −ζ
−ζT b
]
=
[
D2xxU(x;µ;ν) −p
−pT 0
]−1
, (2.102)
where K is a symmetric AS × AS matrix and ζ is a AS × 1 vector.
Defining
Σ = λK. (2.103)
Apply the implicit function theorem, we have
Dp,I,µ,ν(x, λ) = −(Dx,λF )−1Dp,I,µ,νF . (2.104)
Therefore we have
Dpx = Σ− ζxT , (2.105)
DIx = ζ, (2.106)
Dµx = −KD2µxU(x;µ;ν), (2.107)
Dνx = −KD2νxU(x;µ;ν). (2.108)
The symmetric matrix Σ =
(
σas,a′s′
)
AS×AS has rank AS − 1, and satis-
fies Σp = 0.
The following proposition gives necessary and sufficient conditions for
the contingent demands to be rationalized by some smooth ambiguity pref-
37
erence. These conditions involve restrictions on the terms in matricesDpx,
DIx, Dµx, and Dνx.
Proposition 3. When A > 2 and S > 2, contingent consumption demands
can be rationalized by a state independent smooth ambiguity utility function
if and only if the following conditions hold:
σas,a′ t
ζasζa′ t
=
σas′ ,a′ t′
ζas′ζa′ t′
= H(x), (2.109)
for some function H(x), a 6= a′;
σas,as′
ζasζas′
=
σat,at′
ζatζat′
= Ha(x), (2.110)
for some function Ha(x);
∂xas
∂µa′
=
S∑
s=1
σas,a′spa′s
µa′
; (2.111)
∂xat
∂νas
− ∂xat
∂νas′
= (σat;as − σat;as′ )
pas
pias
at xas = xas′ ; (2.112)
xas = xas′ only if
pas
νas
=
pas′
νas′
; (2.113)
xas = xas′ = xa′s = xa′s′ only if
pas
µaνas
=
pa′s
µa′νa′s
. (2.114)
Proof. Necessity
Condition (2.109) for strong separability across ambiguity states, and
condition (2.110) for strong separability across risk states conditional on
each ambiguity state follow from Goldman and Uzawa (1964).
Condition (2.113) follows from stationarity of index u, and condition
(2.114) follows from stationarity of index φ.
Now, let’s focus on terms in matrix D2µxU(x;µ;ν), which has dimen-
sion of AS × A. In the first column of this matrix, the first S terms are
non-zero with typical element λp1s
µ1
, and the remaining terms are zeros. In
the ath column, the terms from a1 to aS are non-zeros with typical element
λpas
µa
, and the remaining terms are zeros.
So the matrix −KD2µxU(x;µ;ν) would have dimension of AS × A
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with first-row first-column element
S∑
s=1
σ11,1sp1s
µ1
, first-row second-column el-
ement
S∑
s=1
σ11,2sp2s
µ2
, first-row last-column element
S∑
s=1
σ11,AspAs
µA
; second-row
first-column element
S∑
s=1
σ12,1sp1s
µ1
. The typical element of this matrix is
S∑
s=1
σ
as,a
′
s
p
a
′
s
µ
a
′ . Therefore we have the following restriction:
∂xas
∂µa′
=
S∑
s=1
σas,a′spa′s
µa′
. (2.115)
Next, let’s look at the matrix D2νxU(x;µ;ν), which has dimension of
AS × AS. Since ∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂x11
= µ1φ
′
(∑S
s=1 ν1su(x1s)
)
ν11u
′
(x11), in the first
row of DνxU(x;µ;ν), the first S elements are nonzero, and the other ele-
ments are zero since µ1φ
′
(∑S
s=1 ν1su(x1s)
)
ν11u
′
(x11) is not function of νas
for a 6= 1. For the non-zero elements: the first row-first column element
is µ1φ
′′
(∑S
s=1 ν1su(x1s)
)
ν11u
′
(x11)u(x11) + µ1φ
′
(∑S
s=1 ν1su(x1s)
)
u
′
(x11),
and the first row-sth column element is µ1φ
′′
(∑S
s=1 ν1su(x1s)
)
ν11u
′
(x11)u
′
(x1s),
where s 6= 1.
So the matrices Dνx, K and D
2
νxU(x;µ;ν) have the following struc-
ture with corresponding typical elements;
Dνx =

∂x11
∂ν11
∂x11
∂ν12
. . . ∂x11
∂ν1S
. . . ∂x11
∂νa1
∂x11
∂νa2
. . . ∂x11
∂νaS
. . .
∂x12
∂ν11
∂x12
∂ν12
. . . ∂x12
∂ν1S
. . . ∂x12
∂νa1
∂x12
∂νa2
. . . ∂x12
∂νaS
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
∂xAS
∂ν11
∂xAS
∂ν12
. . . ∂xAS
∂ν1S
. . . ∂xAS
∂νa1
∂xAS
∂νa2
. . . ∂xAS
∂νaS
. . .
 ,
(2.116)
K =

σ11;11 . . . σ11;1S . . . σ11;a1 . . . σ11;aS . . .
σ12;11 . . . σ12;1S . . . σ12;a1 . . . σ12;aS . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
σAS;11 . . . σAS;1S . . . σAS;a1 . . . σAS;aS . . .
 , (2.117)
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D2νxU(x;µ;ν) =

∂2U
∂x11∂ν11
. . . ∂
2U
∂x11∂ν1S
. . . ∂
2U
∂x11∂νa1
. . .
∂2U
∂x12∂ν11
. . . ∂
2U
∂x12∂ν1S
. . . ∂
2U
∂x12∂νa1
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
∂2U
∂xAS∂ν11
. . . ∂
2U
∂xAS∂ν1S
. . . ∂
2U
∂xAS∂νa1
. . .

=

µ1φ
′′
ν11u
′
(x11)u(x11) + µ1φ
′
u
′
(x11) . . . . . .
µ1φ
′′
ν12u
′
(x12)u(x11) . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
0 . . . . . .
 .
(2.118)
We define a new matrix which has dimension of AS×A(S−1) as follows:
M =

1 0 0 0 . . .
−1 1 0 0 . . .
0 −1 1 0 . . .
0 0 −1 1 . . .
0 0 0 −1 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . . .

. (2.119)
The defined matrix M has full column rank. By matrix multiplication,
we have:
D2νxU(x;µ;ν)M =

µ1φ
′
u
′
(x11) 0 . . . 0 . . .
−µ1φ′u′(x12) µ1φ′u′(x12) . . . 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 . . .

=

λp11
ν11
0 . . . 0 . . .
−λp12
ν12
λp12
ν12
. . . 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 . . .
 , (2.120)
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KD2νxU(x;µ;ν)M = K

λp11
ν11
0 . . . 0 . . .
−λp12
ν12
λp12
ν12
. . . 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 . . .

=

σ11;11
p11
ν11
− σ11;12 p12ν12 σ11;12
p12
ν12
− σ11;13 p13ν13 . . .
σ12;11
p11
ν11
− σ12;12 p12ν12 σ12;12
p12
ν12
− σ12;13 p13ν13 . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
 ,
(2.121)
DνxM =

∂x11
∂ν11
− ∂x11
∂ν12
∂x11
∂ν12
− ∂x11
∂ν13
. . . ∂x11
∂ν1S−1
− ∂x11
∂ν1S
. . .
∂x12
∂ν11
− ∂x12
∂ν12
∂x12
∂ν12
− ∂x12
∂ν13
. . . ∂x12
∂ν1S−1
− ∂x12
∂ν1S
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
∂xAS
∂ν11
− ∂xAS
∂ν12
∂xAS
∂ν12
− ∂xAS
∂ν13
. . . ∂xAS
∂νAS−1
− ∂xAS
∂ν1S
. . .
 .
(2.122)
Therefore we have the following restriction:
∂xat
∂νas
− ∂xat
∂νas′
= (σat;as − σat;as′ )
pas
νas
= (σat;as − σat;as′ )
pas′
νas′
. (2.123)
Sufficiency
If conditions (2.109) and (2.110) are satisfied, from Goldman and Uzawa
(1964), we can assume that the utility function has the following form:
U(x;µ;ν) =
A∑
a=1
φa
(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
, (2.124)
which implies
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
= φ
′
a
(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
u
′
as(xas;µ;ν). (2.125)
Condition (2.112) uniquely determines the matrix Dνx(p, I,µ,ν)M
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at xas = xas′ . Since Σ has rank AS − 1, and Σx = 0 only if x =
cp for some constant c. All solutions to equation Dνx(p, I,µ,ν)M =
−KD2νxU(x;µ;ν)M must have the form
D2νxU(x;µ;ν)M =

c11p11 + λ
p11
ν11
c12p11 . . .
c11p12 − λp12ν12 c12p12 + λ
p12
ν12
. . .
c11p13 c12p13 − λp13ν13 . . .
c11p14 c12p14 . . .
. . . . . . . . .
c11pas c12pas . . .
. . . . . . . . .
c11pAS c12pAS . . .

. (2.126)
So generally, we have the following solution
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νas∂xas
− ∂
2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νat∂xas
= caspas + λ
pas
νas
, (2.127)
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νa′ t∂xas
− ∂
2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νa′ t′∂xas
= ca′ tpas for s 6= t, t
′
. (2.128)
Given the objective function has the form,
U(x;µ;ν) =
A∑
a=1
φa
(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
. (2.129)
We have the following F.O.C
u
′
as(xas;µ;ν)
u
′
as′ (xas′ ;µ;ν)
=
pas
pas′
, (2.130)
φ
′
a
(∑S
s=1 uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
u
′
as(xas;µ;ν)
φ
′
a′
(∑S
s=1 ua′s(xa′s;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
u
′
a′s(xa′s′ ;µ;ν)
=
pas
pa′s
. (2.131)
Because
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∂2U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂νas∂xas
=
1
νas
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νas∂xas
− 1
ν2as
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
, (2.132)
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂νas′∂xas
=
1
νas
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νas′∂xas
. (2.133)
Then we have
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂νas′∂xas
− ∂
2U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂νat∂xas
= cas′
pas
νas
. (2.134)
Therefore
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂ν
as
′ ∂xas −
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂νat∂xas
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νar
∂ν
as
′ ∂xar −
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νar
∂νat∂xar
=
νarpas
νaspar
. (2.135)
It follows from equations (2.130) and (2.131) that
pas
par
=
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xar
⇐⇒ νarpas
νaspar
=
∂(U(x;µ;ν)/νas)
∂xas
∂(U(x;µ;ν)/νar)
∂xar
. (2.136)
Hence we have
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂ν
as
′ ∂xas −
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νas
∂νat∂xas
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νar
∂ν
as
′ ∂xar −
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
νar
∂νat∂xar
=
∂(U(x;µ;ν)/νas)
∂xas
∂(U(x;µ;ν)/νar)
∂xar
. (2.137)
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Since we have,
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
= φ
′
a
(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas
, (2.138)
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νas′∂xas
=
∂φ
′
a
(∑S
s=1 uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
∂νas′
∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas
+ φ
′′
a
(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas
×
S∑
s=1
∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂νas′
+ φ
′
a
(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν
)
∂2uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂νas′∂xas
. (2.139)
The nominator in the left hand side of equation (2.137) is(
∂φ
′
a(
∑S
s=1 uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν)
∂νas′
− ∂φ
′
a(
∑S
s=1 uas(xas;µ;ν);µ;ν)
∂νat
)
× ∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas
+
(
S∑
s=1
∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂νas′
−
S∑
s=1
∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂νat
)
φ
′′
a(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν))
× ∂uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂xas
+
(
∂2uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂νas′∂xas
− ∂
2uas(xas;µ;ν)
∂νat∂xas
)
φ
′
a(
S∑
s=1
uas(xas;µ;ν)). (2.140)
We would have
∂2(
uas(xas;µ;ν)
νas
)
∂ν
as
′ ∂xas
∂(
uas(xas;µ;ν)
νas
)
∂xas
−
∂2(
uas(xas;µ;ν)
νas
)
∂νat∂xas
∂(
uas(xas;µ;ν)
νas
)
∂xas
=
∂2(
uar(xar ;µ;ν)
νar
)
∂ν
as
′ ∂xar
∂(
uar(xar ;µ;ν)
νar
)
∂xar
−
∂2(
uar(xar ;µ;ν)
νar
)
∂νat∂xar
∂(
uar(xar ;µ;ν)
νar
)
∂xar
. (2.141)
Define
Has =
∂(uas
νas
)
∂xas
. (2.142)
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Then equation (2.141) implies that
∂ lnHas(xas)
∂νas′
− ∂ lnHas(xas)
∂νat
=
∂ lnHar(xar)
∂νas′
− ∂ lnHar(xar)
∂νat
. (2.143)
Take derivatives with respect to xas, we have
∂2 lnHas(xas)
∂νas′∂xas
=
∂ lnHas(xas)
∂νat∂xas
. (2.144)
We can also derive such equation with respect to probability in ambi-
guity state a
′
(i.e. νa′s).
The general solution to this partial differential equation (2.144) should
be
lnHas(xas) = f(xas,
S∑
s=1
ν1s, ...,
S∑
s=1
νas, ...
S∑
s=1
νAs) + g(xas) + h(ν)
= f(xas) + g(xas) + h(ν). (2.145)
So we have
uas(xas;µ;ν) = h(ν)νasua(xas;µ). (2.146)
Equations (2.127) and (2.128) imply that
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νat∂xas
− ∂
2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νar∂xas
= catpas, (2.147)
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νat∂xas
− ∂
2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νar′∂xas
= catpas. (2.148)
Then we have
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νar∂xas
− ∂
2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νar′∂xas
= 0. (2.149)
Due to equation (2.146), we have
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∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
= φ
′
a
(
h(ν)
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ;ν
)
h(ν)νas
∂uas(xas;µ)
∂xas
.
(2.150)
Take derivative of equation (2.150) with respect to νar, we have
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂νar∂xas
=
∂φ
′
a
(
h(ν)
∑S
s=1 νasua(xas;µ);µ;ν
)
∂νar
h(ν)νas
∂uas(xas;µ)
∂xas
+ φ
′′
a
(
h(ν)
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ;ν
)
h(ν)νas
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂xas
∂h(ν)
∂νar
×
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ)
+ φ
′
a
(
h(ν)
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ;ν
)
∂h(ν)
∂νar
νas
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂xas
. (2.151)
Equation (2.149) implies that
∂h(ν)
∂νar
=
∂h(ν)
∂νar′
, (2.152)
∂φ
′
a
(
h(ν)
∑S
s=1 νasua(xas;µ);µ;ν
)
∂νar
=
∂φ
′
a
(
h(ν)
∑S
s=1 νasua(xas;µ);µ;ν
)
∂νar′
.
(2.153)
Then it means h is not function of ν, and φa is not function of ν.
Then the objective function can be written as
A∑
a=1
φa
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ
)
. (2.154)
Condition (2.111) uniquely determines the matrixDµx(p, I,µ,ν). Since
the matrix Σ has rank AS−1 and Σx = 0 only if x = cp for some constant
c, all solutions to equation Dµx = −KD2µxU(x;µ;ν) must have the form
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D2µxU(x;µ;ν) =

c1p11 + λ
p11
µ1
. . . cap11 . . .
c1p12 + λ
p12
µ1
. . . cap12 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
c1p1S + λ
p1S
µ1
. . . cap1S . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
c1pa1 . . . capa1 + λ
pa1
µa
. . .
c1pa2 . . . capa2 + λ
pa2
µa
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
c1paS . . . capaS + λ
paS
µa
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .

. (2.155)
Therefore we have the following equations:
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂µa′∂xas
= ca′pas if a
′ 6= a, (2.156)
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂µa′∂xas
= capas + λ
pas
µa
if a
′
= a. (2.157)
The same trick like above will imply that
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
µa
∂µa′∂xas
=
ca′pas
µa
. (2.158)
Equation (2.158) implies
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
µa
∂µ
a
′ ∂xas
∂2
U(x;µ;ν)
µa
∂µ
a
′ ∂xar
=
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xar
. (2.159)
Since the objective function has the form (2.154), we have
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∂U(x;µ;ν)
∂xas
= φ
′
a
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ
)
νas
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂xas
, (2.160)
∂2U(x;µ;ν)
∂µa′∂xas
=
∂φ
′
a
(∑S
s=1 νasua(xas;µ);µ
)
∂µa′
νas
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂xas
+ φ
′′
a
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ
)
νas
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂xas
×
S∑
s=1
νas
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂µa′
+ φ
′
a
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas;µ);µ
)
νas
∂2ua(xas;µ)
∂µa′∂xas
. (2.161)
Equation (2.159) implies that
∂2ua(xas;µ)
∂xas∂µ
a
′
∂ua(xas;µ)
∂xas
=
∂2ua(xar;µ)
∂xar∂µ
a
′
∂ua(xar;µ)
∂xar
. (2.162)
Following the previous trick, we have
ua(xas;µ) = f(µ)ua(xas). (2.163)
The objective function can be written as
A∑
a=1
φa
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas);µ
)
. (2.164)
Then the following will be obtained
∂ φa
µa
∂xas
=
∂
φa(
∑S
s=1 νasua(xas);µ)
µa
∂u
νas
∂ua(xas)
∂xas
, (2.165)
∂2 φa
µa
∂µa′∂xas
=
∂2
φa(
∑S
s=1 νasua(xas);µ)
µa
∂µa′∂u
νas
∂ua(xas)
∂xas
, (2.166)
∂2 φi
µi
∂µa′∂xis
=
∂2
φi(
∑S
s=1 νisui(xis);µ)
µi
∂µa′∂u
νis
∂ui(xis)
∂xis
. (2.167)
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Then the following holds
∂2 φa
µa
∂µ
a
′ ∂xas
∂2
φi
µi
∂µ
a
′ ∂xis
=
∂ φa
µa
∂xas
∂
φi
µi
∂xis
. (2.168)
Then by the same trick, we can show that
φa
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas);µ
)
= µaφ
(
S∑
s=1
νasua(xas)
)
. (2.169)
Then it can be shown that ua(x) = ua′ (x) = u(x).
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Chapter 3
The identification of smooth
ambiguity preference
3.1 Introduction
The question in this chapter is: if the observed asset demand functions
are generated by some ambiguity preference, can the underlying ambigu-
ity preference be uniquely recovered? In Chapter 2, we explicitly construct
ambiguity preferences which rationalize the observations if the observations
pass the revealed preference test. However, such construction is not unique,
since finite observations cannot trace out individual indifference curves. To
uniquely identify underlying ambiguity preference in incomplete markets,
we assume the demand functions are given. Suppose the observations from
demand functions pass the revealed preference tests, we establish the con-
ditions under which we can uniquely recover the ambiguity preference.
Before we proceed to the identification of ambiguity preference, let’s
first revisit the identification of risk preference in Green, Lau, and Pole-
marchakis (1979) and Dybvig and Polemarchakis (1981). We write the
optimization problem in its general form to incorporate the pure risk case:
suppose the individual makes portfolio choice, at prices of assets p, the
optimization problem of the individual is
max
y∈RJ
U(Ry)
s.t. py = 1.
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Under strict quasi-concavity assumption and Assumption 2, a solution
to the optimization problem, y(p), exists and is unique; it defines the
demand function for assets,
y : P → RJ .
There exists an open set of prices, P 0 ⊂ P , for which the solution
to the optimization problem satisfies y(p) ∈ Y . Importantly, the demand
function is invertible: given y ∈ Y , there is a unique p(y) ∈ P 0, such that
y = y
(
p(y)
)
. We restrict attention to the demand function for assets
y : P 0 → Y .
The demand for assets satisfies necessary and sufficient first order con-
ditions
DU(Ry) = λp, λ > 0;
py = 1.
As a consequence, it identifies the family of marginal rate of substitution
of assets functions
mjk : Y → (0,∞)
defined by
mjk(y) =
∂U(Ry)
∂yj
∂U(Ry)
∂yk
.
3.2 Identification under pure risk
The probability measure over states of risk is
ν ∈∆(S),
and the utility function of the individual is
U = Eνu.
Assumption 3
(1) u is analytic on R+, is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
51
(2) prob{rj ≥ 0} =1, prob{rj = 0} 6= 1, rj is linearly independent with
return vectors of other assets, and Erlj < +∞ for all natural number
l.
Assumption 3
′
(1) u is C2 on R++, is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(2) prob{rj ≥ 0} =1, prob{rj = 0} 6= 1, rj is linearly independent with
return vectors of other assets, and Erlj < +∞ for l = 1, 2.
Assumption 3
′′
(1) u isC∞ on R++, is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and u(n) =
∂nu
∂xn
6= 0, at some x ∈ (0,∞), n = 1, ...;
(2) prob{rj ≥ 0} =1, prob{rj = 0} 6= 1, rj is linearly independent with
return vectors of other assets, and Erlj < +∞ for l = 1, 2.
At prices of assets p ∈ P o, the optimization problem of the individual
is
max
y∈RJ
Eνu(Ry)
s.t. py = 1.
The demands for assets satisfies necessary and sufficient first order condi-
tions
Eνu
′
(Ry)R = λp, λ > 0;
py = 1.
As a consequence, the demand for assets identifies the family of marginal
rates of substitution
mjk(y) =
Eνu
′
(Ry)rj
Eνu
′(Ry)rk
> 0.
Lemma 2 (Green, Lau and Polemarchakis, 1979). Suppose that
(1) the utility index u, and asset return rj for j = 1, ..., J satisfy As-
sumption 3;
(2) the probability measure over states of risk, ν ∈∆(S), is known.
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Then, the demand for assets identifies the cardinal index for risk u up to a
positive affine transformation.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we normalize u(0) = 0, and u
′
(0) = 1.
Differentiation of the functional equation
Eνu
′
(Ry)rj = mjk(y)Eνu
′
(Ry)rk, (3.1)
with respect to yk yields
Eνu
′′
(Ry)rjrk =
∂mjk(y)
∂yk
Eνu
′
(Ry)rk +mjk(y)Eνu
′′
(Ry)r2k. (3.2)
At y=(0,...,0), we have
u
′′
(0)(Erjrk − Er2k) =
∂mjk(y)
∂yk
Eνrk. (3.3)
Repeat the above differentiation with respect to yj, and also evaluate
at y = (0, ..., 0), we have
u
′′
(0)(Erjrk − Er2j) = −
∂mjk(y)
∂yj
Eνrk. (3.4)
Hold’s inequality can be used to show that Erjrk − Er2k = 0 and
Erjrk−Er2j = 0 cannot hold at the same time, so we can uniquely recover
u
′′
(0). Higher-order differentiations will recover higher-order derivatives of
u at 0, which will recover index u given the assumptions on u.
Remark 10. Green, Lau, and Polemarchakis (1979) do not require a risk-
free asset. Instead, the cardinal risk index is analytic at x = 0.
Lemma 3 (Dybvig and Polemarchakis, 1981). Suppose that
(1) the utility index u, and asset return rj for j = 1, ..., J satisfy As-
sumption 3
′
;
(2) there is an asset that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of risk;
(3) the probability measure over states of risk, ν ∈∆(S), is known.
Then, the demand for assets identifies the cardinal index for risk u up to a
positive affine transformation.
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Proof. Differentiation of the functional equation
Eνu
′
(Ry)rj = mjk(y)Eνu
′
(Ry)rk, (3.5)
with respect to yk yields
Eνu
′′
(Ry)rjrk =
∂mjk(y)
∂yk
Eνu
′
(Ry)rk +mjk(y)Eνu
′′
(Ry)r2k. (3.6)
For j = 1,
Eνu
′′
(Ry)rk =
∂mjk(y)
∂yk
Eνu
′
(Ry)rk +mjk(y)Eνu
′′
(Ry)r2k, (3.7)
which, evaluated at the portfolio y = (x, 0, ..., 0), yields
u
′′
(x) =
∂mjk(x, 0, ..., 0)
∂yk
u
′
(x) +mjk(x, 0, ..., 0)u
′′
(x)Eνr
2
k. (3.8)
Since mjk(x, 0, ..., 0)u
′′
(x) < 0, this identifies the risk-aversion of the
individual,
− u
′′
(x)
u′(x)
=
∂mjk(x,0,...,0)
∂yk
mjk(x, 0, ..., 0)Eνr2k − 1
, x ∈ (0,∞), (3.9)
or, equivalently, the cardinal risk index, u, up to an affine transformation.
To see this, notice that the right hand side is observable, and we integrate
both sides to get lnu
′
(x) + lnB, where B is an integration constant. Expo-
nentiate and integrate again, we get Bu(x) + C,where C is an integration
constant, which is positive affine transformation of u(x).
Remark 11. The argument does not require full knowledge of the distribu-
tion of payoff, (R,ν), only of the second moment of the payoff of a risky
asset.
Lemma 4 (Polemarchakis,1983). Suppose that
(1) the utility index u, and asset return rj for j = 1, ..., J satisfy As-
sumption 3
′′
;
(2) there is an asset that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of risk;
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(3) the cardinal risk index u is known.
Then, the demand for assets identifies all moments of the distribution of
payoffs of assets.
Proof. Without loss of generality, u is smooth and un(1) 6= 0 at x = 1.
As previously, only, here, with u(1)(x) = u
′
(x) and u(2)(x) = u
′′
(x),
Eνu
(2)(Ry)rjrk =
∂mjk(y)
∂yk
Eνu
(1)(Ry)rk+mjk(y)Eνu
(2)(Ry)r2k, (3.10)
which, evaluated at y = (1, 0, ..., 0), and with u(1) = 1, yields
Eνu
(2)(1)rjrk =
∂mjk(y)
∂yk
+mjk(y)u
(2)(1)Eνr
2
k. (3.11)
Since mjk(y) > 0, while u
2(1) 6= 0, this identifies
Eνr
2
k and Eνrjrk,
the second moments of the distribution of payoffs of assets. Higher order
derivatives identify higher moments; at each step the coefficients of the
moments to be identified do not vanish.
Remark 12. Instead of the cardinal risk index, u, it suffices to know Eνr
2
k,
the second moment of the distribution of returns of a risky asset.
Remark 13. Knowing second moment of the return of one risky asset is
necessary for above recovery argument. One example is this: an investor
with a CARA cardinal utility index, u(x) = −e−ρx demands a risky asset
with normally distributed payoffs, r2 ∼ N(µ, σ2) against a risk-free asset
with payoff r1 = r according to y2 =
µ−r
ρσ2
; it follows that simultaneous iden-
tification of the cardinal risk aversion index and the distribution of payoffs
assets, without any, even partial, knowledge of either, is not possible.
3.3 Identification under uncertainty
The family of conditional probability measures over states of risk is
ν : A→∆(S),
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and the utility function of the individual is
U = Φ(..., wa, ...),
where u is a cardinal risk index, wa = u
−1(Eνau) is the certainty equivalent
of the distribution of wealth at a state of ambiguity, and Φ is an ordinal
utility function over the distribution of certainty equivalent wealth across
states of uncertainty. The utility function satisfies Assumption 1.
At prices of assets p ∈ P o, the optimization problem of individual is
max
y∈RJ
U = Φ(..., wa, ...)
s.t. wa(Ry) = u
−1(Eνau(Ry)),
py = 1.
The demand for assets satisfies necessary and sufficient first order con-
ditions
∑
a
∂Φ
∂wa
Eνau
′
(Ry)R
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) = λp, λ > 0,
py = 1.
As a consequence, the demand for assets identifies the family of marginal
rates of substitution
mjk(y) =
∑
a
∂Φ
∂wa
Eνau
′
(Ry)rj
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
))
∑
a
∂Φ
∂wa
Eνau
′ (Ry)rk
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) > 0.
3.3.1 Identification with an ambiguity-free asset
The probability distribution νa conditional on each ambiguity state a will
generate a distribution of return for each asset. We say one asset is
ambiguity-free if the its conditional distributions are equal across ambi-
guity states.
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Definition 3. Ambiguity-free asset
An asset is ambiguity-free if its return distributions conditional on each
ambiguity state are the same across states of ambiguity.
Example 1. Suppose there are 3 states of risk, i.e. S = 3, and 2 states of
uncertainty, i.e. A = 2. Assume the asset pays (1, a, a) contingent on risk
states. The probability distributions conditional on two uncertainty states
are (1
2
, 0, 1
2
) and (1
2
, 1
2
, 0). Then this asset is ambiguity-free.
Since the existence of an ambiguity-free asset is important for our iden-
tification argument, it deserves a bit more discussion. Does there exist an
ambiguity-free asset given any conditional probabilities? The risk-free asset
is one, but it’s trivial.1 The existence of a risky ambiguity-free asset is not
guaranteed for arbitrary conditional probabilities. The reasoning is this:
if A conditional probabilities over S-dimension return vector generate the
same return distribution, then they must have the same mean; however, if
A > S, the existence of such S-dimension return vector is not generic.
The existence of a risky ambiguity-free asset relies on underlying con-
ditional probabilities. If we restrict the space of conditional probabilities,
the existence of such asset is not a problem. One restriction which gen-
erates an ambiguity-free asset is that we focus on such probability space:
P = {νa : ν11 = ... = νa1 = ... = νA1}, that is, all conditional probabilities
in this probability space put the same probability on the first state. Then
any return vector (a, b, ..., b) is ambiguity-free and risky for a 6= b. The
restricted probability space P is not generic in (non-restricted) probability
space, however, such space is big enough for us to work on, and it is widely
used in experimental work. For example, in Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv
(2014), the composition of one color balls is publicly announced, and the
composition of other two color balls is unknown. This falls in our setting,
and one ambiguity-free asset can be traded.
Proposition 4. Suppose that
(1) the objective function satisfies Assumption 1, and asset return satis-
fies Assumption 2;
1In the remaining of this chapter, when we refer to an ambiguity-free asset, we will
implicitly mean it is ambiguity-free and risky, even though we do not explicitly emphasize
its riskiness property.
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(2) there is an asset j = 1 that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of the
world;
(3) there is an asset j = 2 that is ambiguity-free: its payoff distribution
is invariant to the states of ambiguity;
(4) the family of conditional probability measures over states of risk, ν :
A→∆(S) is known;
(5) the matrix of expected marginal utility,
[
..., Eνau
′
(Ry)R
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) , ...] has
full row rank A at each portfolio y.
Then, the demand for assets identifies the cardinal index for risk, u, up to
a positive affine transformation, as well as the ordinal utility function Φ,
up to a monotonically increasing transformation.
Proof. Step 1−recovering risk index:
Restrict attention to portfolios y = (y1, y2, 0, ..., 0), and let y˜ = (y1, y2)
be the associated truncated portfolio.
Since the distribution of payoffs of assets 1 and 2 are invariant across
states of ambiguity, there exists a probability measure, ν˜ ∈ ∆(S), and a
matrix of payoffs of assets over states of risk R˜ = (1#S, r˜2), such that,
the distribution of payoffs of assets generated by (νa,Ry), for any state of
ambiguity, coincides with the distribution generated by (ν˜, R˜y˜).
As a consequence,
m12(y˜) =
Eν˜u
′
(R˜y˜)
Eν˜u
′(R˜y˜)r˜2
> 0. (3.12)
Identification of the cardinal risk index, u, then follows as in Lemma 3.
Step 2−recovering uncertainty index:
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The first order conditions for an optimum,
∑
a
∂Φ
∂wa
Eνau
′
(Ry)R
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) = λp, λ > 0, (3.13)
can be written in matrix form,
[Φ1, ...,Φa, ...ΦA]
 caj
 = [λp1, ..., λpj, ...λpJ ], (3.14)
where Φa =
∂Φ
∂wa
, caj =
Eνau
′
(Ry)rj
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) , and matrix C has dimension A
times J .
Since we have recovered index u and conditional distribution of asset
return is known, the matrix C is computable. If matrix C has full row
rank, then
[Φ1, ...,Φa, ...ΦA] = [λp1, ..., λpj, ...λpJ ]C
T [CCT ]−1. (3.15)
So we can trace out the marginal rate of substitution Φa
Φ′a
. Under as-
sumption 1, Φ is strictly quasi-concave, continuously differentiable, and has
strictly positive gradient everywhere on RA+, following Mas-Colell (1977),
knowing the marginal rate of substitution Φa
Φ′a
will identify function Φ up to
monotonically increasing transformation.
In Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), the smooth ambiguity
utility functional form is U = Eµφ
(
u−1
(
Eνau(xs)
))
, which is a special case
of the above utility functional form, so the identification follows directly
from Proposition 4.
Corollary 2. Suppose that
(1) the objective function satisfies Assumption 1
′
, and asset return satis-
fies Assumption 2;
(2) there is an asset j = 1 that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of the
world;
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(3) there is an asset j = 2 that is ambiguity-free: its payoff distribution
is invariant to the states of ambiguity;
(4) the family of conditional probability measures over states of risk, ν :
A→∆(S) is known;
(5) the payoffs EµEνa(r3)
2 and Eµ(Eνar3)
2 of an ambiguous asset j = 3
are known and satisfy (EµEνar3)
2 6= Eµ(Eνar3)2.
Then, the demand for assets identifies the risk index u and uncertainty
index φ up to positive affine transformation.
Proof. The identification of index u follows the same argument in Propo-
sition 4, we sketch the recovery of index φ.
The marginal rate of substitution between risk-free asset 1 and ambigu-
ous asset 3 gives
Eµφ
′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′(Ry)r1
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) =
m13(y)Eµφ
′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′(Ry)r3
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) . (3.16)
Take derivative on both sides with respect to y3, and evaluate at y =
(x, 0, ..., 0), we get
[(EµEνar3)
2 − Eµ(Eνar3)2]
φ
′′
(x)
φ′(x)
=
[EµEνa(r3)
2 − Eµ(Eνar3)2]
u
′′
(x)
u′(x)
+ (EµEνar3)
2∂m13(x, 0, ..., 0)
∂y3
. (3.17)
Given risk index u recovered, this will identify uncertainty index φ
uniquely up to a positive affine transformation.
Remark 14. The coefficient of φ
′′
(x)
φ′ (x) is the variance of random variable
Eνar3 evaluated by ambiguity probability measure µ, and nonzero of the
coefficient requires ambiguity on the mean. The full row rank condition
implies the non-vanishing of the coefficient, but this condition is much
weaker than full row rank condition.
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Remark 15. The above recovery argument entails knowing some moments
of assets evaluated by both µ and ν: EµEνar3, EµEνa(r3)
2, and Eµ(Eνar3)
2.
If the domain of preference is compound objective lotteries, such moments
can be computed directly from the known objective probabilities. However,
if the domain is subjective-objective two stage lotteries within Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) framework, these payoff moments are not directly ob-
servable, and should be elicited from subjects.
In the above recovery arguments, we only observe individual portfolio
choice; however, in reality, individual makes joint decision on consumption
and portfolio. In this case, individual optimization problem can be written
as
max
y∈RJ
U = Φ
(
c0, φ
−1(Eµφ(u−1(Eνau(Ry)))))
s.t. p0c0 + py = 1.
Assumption 1
′′
(1) u is C2 on R++, is strictly concave and satisfies ∀x ∈ R++, u′ > 0;
(2) Φ is C1 on R2++, is strictly concave, and satisfies ∀c ∈ R2++, Φi > 0
for all i = 1, 2;
(3) φ−1
(
Eµφ(u
−1(Eνau(x)))
)
is strictly concave on R++.
The demand for assets satisfies necessary and sufficient first order condi-
tions
Φ1 = λp0, (3.18)
Φ2
Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′ (Ry)R
u′ (u−1(Eνau(Ry)))
φ′
(
φ−1
(
Eµφ(u−1(Eνau(Ry)))
)) = λp, λ > 0, (3.19)
p0c0 + py = 1. (3.20)
Corollary 3. Suppose that
(1) the objective function satisfies Assumption 1
′′
, and asset return sat-
isfies Assumption 2;
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(2) there is an asset j = 1 that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of the
world;
(3) there is an asset j = 2 that is ambiguity-free: its payoff distribution
is invariant to the states of ambiguity;
(4) the family of conditional probability measures over states of risk, ν :
A→∆(S) is known;
(5) the payoffs EµEνa(r3)
2 and Eµ(Eνar3)
2 of an ambiguous asset j = 3
are known and satisfy (EµEνar3)
2 6= Eµ(Eνar3)2.
Then, the demand for consumption and assets identifies the cardinal index
for risk, u, as well as the cardinal index for uncertainty φ, up to a positive
affine transformation, the ordinal index for time preference, Φ, up to a
monotonically increasing transformation.
Proof. Step 1−recovering risk index:
First order conditions trace out the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween asset 1 and asset 2,
Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
))
Eνau
′
(Ry)r1
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
))
Eµφ
′ (u−1(Eνau(Ry))) Eνau′ (Ry)r2
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) = m12(c0,y). (3.21)
Since the return distribution of asset 1 and 2 is ambiguity free, at y˜ =
(y1, y2, 0, ..., 0), we have
m12(c0, y˜) =
Eν˜u
′
(R˜y˜)
Eν˜u
′(R˜y˜)r˜2
> 0. (3.22)
Then recovery of u follows from Lemma 3.
Step 2−recovering uncertainty index:
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The marginal rate of substitution between risk-free asset 1 and ambigu-
ous asset 3 gives
Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′(Ry)r1
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) =
m13(c0,y)Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′(Ry)r3
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) . (3.23)
Take derivative on both sides with respect to y3, and evaluate at y =
(x, 0, ..., 0), we get
[(EµEνar3)
2 − Eµ(Eνar3)2]
φ
′′
(x)
φ′(x)
=
[EµEνa(r3)
2−Eµ(Eνar3)2]
u
′′
(x)
u′(x)
+ (EµEνar3)
2∂m13(c0, x, 0, ..., 0)
∂y3
.
(3.24)
Given risk index u recovered, this will identify uncertainty index φ
uniquely up to a positive affine transformation.
Step 3−recovering time index:
The marginal rate of substitution between risk-free asset 1 and con-
sumption c0 gives
Φ1
Φ2Eµφ
′ (u−1(Eνau(Ry))) Eνau′ (Ry)r2
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) = m01(c0,y). (3.25)
Evaluate at y = (x, 0, ..., 0), we have
Φ1(c0, x)
Φ2(c0, x)
= m01(c0, x, 0, ..., 0)EµEνar1. (3.26)
It will recover Φ up to monotonically increasing transformation.
Remark 16. The functional form Φ
(
c0, φ
−1(Eµφ(u−1(Eνau(xs))))) con-
tains one important special case where the three preference parameters−
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, risk aversion and ambiguity aver-
sion are separated as in Hayashi and Miao (2011), which shows that such
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separation will explain the historical data better.
Remark 17. As in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, knowledge of the second moment
of the distribution of payoffs of an asset invariant across states of ambiguity
permits identification of the risk index u, as well as identification of the
payoffs of assets invariant over states of ambiguity.
Example 2. Identification of risk and uncertainty aversion
Suppose there are one riskless asset with payoff r, one ambiguity free as-
set with payoff r1, r1 ∼ N(µ1, σ21) and one ambiguous asset with payoff
r2, r2 ∼ N(µ2, σ22), where individual has ambiguity on the mean of r2 ,
and µ2 ∼ N(θ, σ20). It is assumed that payoffs of assets are independent.
Individual is endowed with risk preference u(x) = − e−ρx
ρ
, and ambiguity
preference φ = − e−Au
A
. Individual will demand the ambiguity free asset
α1 =
µ1−r
ρσ21
, and the ambiguous asset α2 =
θ−r
ρσ22+Aσ
2
0
. It follows that risk
aversion index u can be recovered from ambiguity-free asset demand α1
if we know its return distribution; and ambiguity aversion index φ can
be recovered from ambiguous asset demand α2 if we know its conditional
distribution and ambiguity.
Remark 18. The above argument identifies cardinal risk index u and un-
certainty index φ once knowing certain moments of asset returns under
ambiguity probability measure µ. One question is: suppose we know con-
ditional distribution of asset return, can we recover without reference to
ambiguity probability measure µ? The above example shows that this is
not the case: even we know payoffs of the riskless asset r, and payoffs of
the ambiguity-free risky asset µ1, σ1, and all conditional distribution of
ambiguous asset θ, σ2, we can not identify risk index u and uncertainty
index A uniquely.
The above identification argument requires observing individual asset
demand. An equivalent way to establish recoverability of risk and uncer-
tainty preference is to know individual portfolio indifference correspondence
I(y) =
{
x ∈ RJ : Eµφ
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Rx)
))
= Eµφ
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
))}
.2
Under the same assumption as above on asset return and individual
2We illustrate the argument using the this special functional form, but the argument
here can recover more general utility function.
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belief, risk index u and uncertainty index φ can be identified from individual
portfolio indifference correspondence.
Corollary 4. Suppose that
(1) the objective function satisfies Assumption 1
′
, and asset return satis-
fies Assumption 2;
(2) there is an asset j = 1 that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of the
world;
(3) there is an asset j = 2 that is ambiguity-free: its payoff distribution
is invariant to the states of ambiguity;
(4) the family of conditional probability measures over states of risk, ν :
A→∆(S) is known;
(5) the payoffs EµEνa(r3)
2 and Eµ(Eνar3)
2 of an ambiguous asset j = 3
are known and satisfy (EµEνar3)
2 6= Eµ(Eνar3)2.
Then, the portfolio indifference correspondence identifies the cardinal in-
dex for risk u,and cardinal index for uncertainty φ, up to a positive affine
transformation.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix.
Remark 19. Also, the coefficient of φ
′′
φ′ is the variance of random variable
Eνar3 under ambiguity probability measure µ, and the required informa-
tion on distribution of asset return is the same as in Corollary 2.
Remark 20. Under the same assumptions on asset return and individual be-
lief, both observing individual asset demand and knowing individual port-
folio indifference correspondence give the identification result. This should
not be surprising, since we can trace out individual asset demand from
knowledge of his indifference correspondence.
3.3.2 Identification without any riskless asset
The previous recovery argument requires the existence of one riskless asset
and one ambiguity-free asset. Is the identification possible without such
assumption? We will relax the assumption gradually, and establish the
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conditions for identification. In this section, we establish recoverability
without any riskless asset, but assume the existence of ambiguity-free as-
sets. Without one riskfree asset, it requires the underlying risk index u
being analytic at x = 0.
Assumption 4
(1) u is analytic on R+, and is strictly increasing and concave;
(2) Φ is C1 on RA+, is strictly quasi-concave, and satisfies ∀ w(x) ∈ RA+,
Φa > 0 for all a = 1, ..., A;
(3) Φ
(
..., u−1
(
Eν(a)u(xs)
)
, ...
)
is strictly quasi-concave on RS+.
Proposition 5. Suppose that
(1) the objective function satisfies Assumption 4, and asset return satis-
fies Assumption 2;
(2) there are two assets j = 1, 2 that are ambiguity-free: their payoff
distributions are invariant to the states of ambiguity;
(3) the family of conditional probability measures over states of risk, ν :
A→∆(S) is known;
(4) the matrix of expected marginal utility,
[
...,
Eν(a)u
′
(Ry)R
u′
(
u−1
(
Eν(a)u(Ry)
)) , ...]
has full row rank A at each portfolio y.
Then, the demand for assets identifies the cardinal index for risk, u, up to
a positive affine transformation, as well as the ordinal utility function Φ,
up to a monotonically increasing transformation.
Proof. Step 1−recovering risk index:
Restrict attention to portfolios y = (y1, y2, 0, ..., 0), and let y˜ = (y1, y2)
be the associated truncated portfolio.
Since the distribution of payoffs of assets 1 and 2 are invariant across
states of ambiguity, there exists a probability measure, ν˜ ∈ ∆(S), and
a matrix of payoffs of assets over states of risk R˜ = (r˜1, r˜2), such that,
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the distribution of payoffs of assets generated by (νa,Ry), for any state of
ambiguity, coincides with the distribution generated by (ν˜, R˜y˜).
As a consequence,
m12(y˜) =
Eν˜u
′
(R˜y˜)
Eν˜u
′ ˜(R(˜y)r˜2
> 0. (3.27)
Identification of the cardinal risk index, u, then follows as in Lemma 2.
Step 2−recovering uncertainty index:
Once the risk aversion index u is recovered, the recovery of Φ follows
the same argument in Proposition 4.
Remark 21. Without one riskless asset, the marginal rate of substitution
between two ambiguity-free assets identifies the risk aversion index u, how-
ever, it requires u being analytic.
Remark 22. The argument in Proposition 5 can be used to restore the
recovery result in Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 with no riskless asset. We
omit the details.
3.3.3 Identification without any ambiguity-free asset
In this section, we first assume the existence of one riskfree asset, and
show that risk and uncertainty preference can be identified without any
ambiguity-free asset if we can observe both individual consumption and
portfolio choices, and the underlying utility is additively separable. Then
we give the identification result when neither one riskfree asset nor one
ambiguity-free asset is available.
When individual preference is is additively separable across time, at
price of consumption p0 and prices of assets p, the individual optimization
problem for joint choice of consumption and portfolio is
max
c0∈R+,y∈RJ
U = u(c0) + βu
(
φ−1
(
Eµφ(u
−1(Eνau(Ry)))
))
s.t. p0c0 + py = 1.
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Assumption 5
(1) u is C2 on R++, is strictly concave and satisfies ∀x ∈ R++, u′ > 0;
(2) φ is C2 on R++, is strictly concave, and satisfies ∀x ∈ R++, φ′ > 0;
(3) u
(
φ−1
(
Eµφ(u
−1(.))
))
is strictly concave on R++.
Solutions to the optimization problem, c0(p0,p) and y(p0,p), exist and
are unique. The demand for consumption and assets satisfies necessary and
sufficient first order conditions, which will identify m0j(c0,y), the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption c0 and asset j, and mjk(c0,y),
the marginal rate of substitution between asset j and asset k.
Proposition 6. Suppose that
(1) the objective function is additively separable, and satisfies Assumption
5, and asset return satisfies Assumption 2;
(2) there is an asset that is risk-free: r1 = 1 across states of the world;
(3) the payoffs EµEνa(r2)
2 and Eµ(Eνar2)
2 of an ambiguous asset j = 2
are known and satisfy (EµEνar2)
2 6= Eµ(Eνar2)2.
Then, the demand for consumption and assets identities the cardinal index
for risk u, and the cardinal index for uncertainty φ, up to a positive affine
transformation.
Proof. Step 1−recovering discount factor:
At c = c0 and y = (c0, 0, ..., 0), we have
u
′
(c0)
βu′(c0)
= m01(c0, c0, 0, ..., 0). (3.28)
Thus discount factor is recovered as
β =
1
m01(c0, c0, 0, ..., 0)
. (3.29)
Step 2−recovering risk index:
At c = c0 and y = (x, 0, ..., 0), we have
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u
′
(c0)
βm01(c0, x, 0, ..., 0)
= u
′
(x). (3.30)
Integrate both sides with respect to x, we will recover risk index u up
to positive affine transformation.
Step 3−recovering uncertainty index:
Marginal rate of substitution between assets 1 and 2 gives
Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′(Ry)r1
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
))
= m12(c0,y) · Eµφ′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) Eνau′(Ry)r2
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(Ry)
)) . (3.31)
Take derivative with respect to y2, and evaluate at c = c0 and y =
(x, 0, ..., 0), we have
[(EµEνar2)
2 − Eµ(Eνar2)2]
φ
′′
(x)
φ′(x)
=
[EµEνa(r2)
2−Eµ(Eνar2)2]
u
′′
(x)
u′(x)
+ (EµEνar2)
2∂m12(x, 0, ..., 0)
∂y2
. (3.32)
The assumption that (EµEνar2)
2 6= Eµ(Eνar2)2 guarantees that the
coefficient of φ
′′
(x)
φ′ (x) does not vanish, so φ can be recovered up to a posi-
tive affine transformation. Notice that the recovered φ is invariant to any
positive affine transformation of u.
Remark 23. In the above argument, the requirement on the asset payoffs
is relaxed, instead of ambiguity free,the distribution of asset payoffs can be
ambiguity state dependent; however, we strengthen the underlying utility
functions to restore the recovery result.
Remark 24. In terms of knowledge of the distribution of asset return, the
requirement is not more stringent−knowing three moments evaluated by µ
and ν, i.e. EµEνar2, EµEνa(r2)
2, and Eµ(Eνar2)
2 suffices.
We can equivalently establish recoverability of risk and uncertainty in-
dex from knowledge of individual consumption-portfolio indifference corre-
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spondence
I(c0,y) =
{
(c,x) ∈ R+ × RJ :u(c) + βu
(
φ−1
(
Eµφ(u
−1(Eνau(Rx)
))
= u(c0) + βu
(
φ−1
(
Eµφ(u
−1(Eνau(Ry)
))}
.
However, we omit the details.
The last question is: can the identification result be obtained without
any riskless and ambiguity-free asset? When all assets are subject to am-
biguity, the next result shows that risk index u and ambiguity index φ
are recoverable if the underlying objective function is additively separable
and analytic, we can observe both consumption and portfolio choice, and
observe the whole distribution of the asset returns.
Assumption 6
(1) u is analytic on R+, is strictly concave and satisfies ∀x ∈ R+, u′ > 0;
(2) φ is analytic on R+, is strictly concave, and satisfies ∀x ∈ R+, φ′ > 0;
(3) u(φ−1(Eµφ(u−1(.)))) is strictly concave on R+.
Corollary 5. Suppose that
(1) the objective function is additively separable and satisfy Assumption
6, and asset return satisfies Assumption 2;
(2) the probability measure over states of ambiguity µ is known;
(3) the family of conditional probability measures over states of risk, ν :
A→∆(S) is known.
Then, the demand for consumption and assets identities the cardinal index
for risk u, and the cardinal index for uncertainty φ,up to a positive affine
transformation.
Remark 25. Without riskless asset, the assumption on underlying utility
function is much stronger; besides, instead of certain moments of asset
return, we need to know the whole distribution for identification.
Remark 26. The above recovery argument requires only one asset, this does
not mean the relative asset prices provides no more information (actually
they do); however, for recovery one risky asset suffices.
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Appendix A.
Proof of Corollary 4:
Proof. Step 1−recovering risk index:
Consider, in portfolio space RJ , the plane Λ1 = {y ∈ RJ : yj = 0, j =
3, ..., J}. For any point y = (y1, y2, 0, ..., 0) in the plane Λ1, from the implicit
function theorem, in some neighborhood ℵ1 of (y1, y2, 0, ..., 0), y1 can be
written as a unique twice continuously differentiable function y1 = f(y2)
such that
Eµφ
(
u−1
(
Eνau(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)
))
= φ, (A1)
everywhere on ℵ1. This is the parametric expression of individual indiffer-
ence curve passing through y in the plane Λ1, and therefore is observable.
Totally differentiate the above equation (A1) with respect to y2, we
have
Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Euνa(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)
)) Eνau′(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)(f ′(y2)r1 + r2)
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)
)) = 0.
(A2)
Since the payoffs of asset 1 and 2 are invariant to ambiguity states, the
above equation (A2) gives
Eνau
′
(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)(f
′
(y2)r1 + r2) = 0. (A3)
We get
f
′
(y2) = −Eνau
′
(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)r2
Eνau
′(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)r1
. (A4)
Further totally differentiate equation (A3) with respect to y2 , we have
Eνau
′′(
f(y2)r1+y2r2
)
(f
′
(y2)r1+r2)
2+Eνau
′(
f(y2)r1+y2r2
)
f
′′
(y2)r1 = 0.
(A5)
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We have
f
′′
(y2) = −Eνau
′′
(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)(f
′
(y2)r1 + r2)
2
Eνau
′(f(y2)r1 + y2r2)r1
. (A6)
At (y1, y2, 0, ..., 0) with y2 = 0,
− u
′′
(y1)
u′(y1)
=
f
′′
(0)
Eνa(f
′(0) + r2)2
. (A7)
Since individual indifference correspondence is observable, so are f
′
()
and f
′′
(). Integration like in the above Proposition 4 will identify risk index
u uniquely up to a positive affine transformation.
Step 2−recovering uncertainty index:
Consider, in portfolio space RJ , another plane Λ2 = {y ∈ RJ : yj =
0, j = 2, 4, ..., J}. For any point y = (y1, 0, y3, 0, ..., 0) in the plane Λ2, by
the implicit function theorem, in some neighborhood ℵ2 of (y1, 0, y3, 0, ..., 0),
y1 can be written as a unique twice continuously differentiable function
y1 = f(y3) such that:
Eµφ
(
u−1
(
Eνau(f(y3)r1 + y3r3)
))
= φ, (A8)
everywhere on ℵ2. As the parametric form of individual indifference curve
passing through y in the plane Λ2, it is observable.
Totally differentiate the above equation (A8) with respect to y3, we
have
Eµφ
′ (
u−1
(
Euνa(f(y3)r1 + y3r3)
)) Eνau′(f(y3)r1 + y3r3)(f ′(y3)r1 + r3)
u′
(
u−1
(
Eνau(f(y3)r1 + y3r3)
)) = 0.
(A9)
At (y1, 0, y3, 0, ..., 0) with y3 = 0, we have f
′
(0) = −EµEνar3.
Further differentiate equation (A9) with respect to y3, and evaluate at
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(y1, 0, y3, 0, ..., 0) with y3 = 0, we get
[Eµ(Eνar3 − EµEνar3)2]
φ
′′
(y1)
φ′(y1)
=
[Eµ(Eνar3−EµEνar3)2 − EµEνa(r3 − EµEνar3)2]
u
′′
(y1)
u′(y1)
+ f
′′
(0). (A10)
Given risk index u recovered, the right hand side is observable, and is
invariant to any positive affine transformation of risk index u. Integration
will identify uncertainty index φ uniquely up to a positive affine transfor-
mation.
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Chapter 4
Bounding risk and ambiguity
aversion
4.1 Introduction
The standard framework for understanding consumer choice under uncer-
tainty is expected utility theory due to von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944), Savage (1954), and Anscombe and Aumann (1963). The implica-
tion of expected utility theory for individual choice and market equilibrium,
and its comparative statics crucially rely on the shape of expected utility
index, see Gollier (2001) for detailed discussion. Varian (1988), in particu-
lar, uses the revealed preference approach introduced by Afriat (1967) and
Diewert (1973) to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions consistent
with different shapes of consumer’s risk preference, i.e. whether the ab-
solute (relative) risk aversion is increasing or decreasing with wealth. If
the observed data passes these conditions, they can give both absolute and
relative risk aversion a lower bound and an upper bound. Such a nonpara-
metric approach does not specify any functional form about the consumer’s
utility function.
However, experimental evidence shows that consumers may not max-
imize expected utility when they do not know the objective probability
distribution. The decision theory literature has developed different util-
ity models under ambiguity to accommodate such behavior observed in
experiments. The smooth ambiguity model due to Klibanoff, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2005) has drawn more and more attention. Collard, Mukerji,
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Sheppard, and Tallon (2011), Ju and Miao (2012) show that the smooth
ambiguity model has the potential to explain the equity premium puzzle.
Guerdjikova and Sciubba (2015) shows that the ambiguity aversion matters
for survival in the financial market. These papers also show that the im-
plication of the smooth ambiguity model crucially depends on the shape of
the risk and ambiguity aversion and their magnitudes. However, currently
there is very little work on testing the shape of the risk and ambiguity
aversion and estimating their magnitudes.
In this paper, I will revisit Varian (1988), and rewrite Varian’s condi-
tions in terms of Afriat numbers, which can be used to test the portfolio
choice from incomplete markets. Then I will extend Varian’s argument to
ambiguity case: to use the nonparametric method to derive the necessary
and sufficient conditions to be compatible with different shapes of risk and
ambiguity aversion; if the data passes these conditions, bounds on the risk
and ambiguity aversion can be derived.
4.2 Bounding risk aversion under pure risk
First, I consider the pure risk case, where the probability distribution over
these states is objectively known, represented by a vector pi ∈ RS++. As-
sume the consumer has expected utility, and his utility index u(x) is strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable.
4.2.1 Varian’s bound
Varian (1988) assumes complete contingent consumption xs for each state,
and the consumer’s maximization problem is
max
x∈RS++
U(x) =
S∑
s=1
pisu (xs) s.t. p · x ≤ I. (4.1)
Varian (1988) assumes the analyst has access to one observation (p,x,pi)
only, and assume the consumptions in each state are different, i.e. xs 6= xs′
for s 6= s′ . When will such choice data be consistent with strictly con-
cave expected utility maximization? Proposition 7 gives the necessary and
sufficient conditions.
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Proposition 7. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The single observation (p,x,pi) is generated from strictly concave
expected utility maximization.
(ii) There exist numbers Us, s=1...S, satisfying the following Afriat in-
equalities:
Us < Us′ +
ps′
pis′
(xs − xs′ ), where s 6= s
′
.
(iii) Any two pairs of {(xs, pspis ) : s ∈ S} satisfy,
(
ps
pis
− ps′
pis′
)(xs′ − xs) > 0, ∀ s,s
′ ∈ {1,...,S}, and s 6= s′ .
Green and Srivastava (1986) derive similar conditions for concave ex-
pected utility maximization for multiple observations where there are mul-
tiple goods in each state. Chiappori and Rochet (1987), and Matzkin and
Richter (1991) give necessary and sufficient conditions for strictly concave
rationality for multiple observations. Neither of their arguments works
for strictly concave expected utility rationalizing one observation. Kubler
and Schmedders (2010) give a proof for rationalizing one observation un-
der complete markets. In Proposition 8 below, I modify their proof to
construct strictly concave expected utility to rationalize one observation in
incomplete markets, then this proposition will follow directly.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the argument in Proposition 8.
For a general utility function, at least two observations are needed to
refute utility maximization hypothesis; however, under expected utility, the
stationarity of risk aversion index u(x) generates further restrictions on the
data. And just one observation can refute the expected utility hypothesis.
Example 3. Suppose there are 2 states with equal probabilities, i.e. pi1 =
pi2 =
1
2
. Suppose consumer’s portfolio choice under price p = (1, 1) is
x = (1, 2). It can be verified that there is no solution for inequalities in
condition (ii), nor does the data satisfy condition (iii), so such choice can
not be rationalized by a strictly concave expected utility; however, it is
consistent with a concave expected utility.
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Note that the testable restriction in Example 1 comes from stationarity
of index u rather than its concavity. As in the case of any general utility
function, concavity does not have testable implication under linear budget
constraint.1 To see this, suppose the utility index is state dependent, then
consumer’s expected utility can be written as
∑S
s=1 us(xs), where us(xs)
is concave for each s. In this case, one observation can never refute the
hypothesis of maximizing
∑S
s=1 us(xs).
Remark 27. Under one observation from complete markets, condition (iii)
in Proposition 7 is quantifier free, and can be be checked against the data
(p,x,pi) directly. This is not true under multiple observations or incom-
plete markets.
In Varian (1988), the question asked is: what further conditions must
the single observation (p,x,pi) be satisfied if it’s consistent with decreas-
ing (increasing) absolute (relative) risk aversion? Now let’s number the
states of nature in the way such that x1 < x2 < ... < xS. Denote by
rA(x) = −u
′′
(x)
u′ (x) the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, and
rR(x) = −xu
′′
(x)
u′ (x) the relative risk aversion. When the average risk aversion
in an economy is considered, it is assumed that there are n consumers and
denote by Xs the aggregate consumption in state s, i.e. Xs =
∑n
i=1 x
i
s.
Denote by RA(Xs) = (
∑n
i=1
1
rAi (x
i
s)
)−1 the average absolute risk aversion,
and RR(Xs) = (
∑n
i=1
1
rRi (x
i
s)
)−1 the average relative risk aversion.
As pointed out by Varian (1988), the decreasing (increasing) absolute
risk aversion is equivalent to the requirement that log u
′
(x) is a convex
(concave) function of x, and the increasing (decreasing) relative risk aver-
sion is equivalent to log u
′
(x) being a concave (convex) function of log x.
Varian (1988) gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for expected
utility displaying such properties, and shows that such properties can be
aggregated across individuals under complete Arrow security markets.
Theorem 1 (Varian, 1988). Suppose the single observation (p,x,pi) sat-
isfies the conditions in the Proposition 7. Then the following results hold:
(i) Decreasing absolute risk aversion is equivalent to the following Varian
1Concavity does have testable implication under nonlinear budget constraint, see
Cherchye, Demuynck, and Rock (2014).
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Ratio Condition:
log ps
pis
− log ps+1
pis+1
xs+1 − xs ≤ r
A(xs) ≤
log ps−1
pis−1
− log ps
pis
xs − xs−1 .
(ii) Decreasing relative risk aversion is equivalent to the following Varian
Relative Ratio Condition:
log ps
pis
− log ps+1
pis+1
log xs+1 − log xs ≤ r
R(xs) ≤
log ps−1
pis−1
− log ps
pis
log xs − log xs−1 .
(iii) Suppose each consumer has decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
decreasing average absolute risk aversion is equivalent to the following
Varian Aggregate Ratio Condition:
log ps
pis
− log ps+1
pis+1
Xs+1 −Xs ≤ R
A(Xs) ≤
log ps−1
pis−1
− log ps
pis
Xs −Xs−1 .
(iv) Suppose each consumer has decreasing relative risk aversion, then
decreasing average absolute risk aversion is equivalent to Varian Ag-
gregate Relative Ratio Condition:
log ps
pis
− log ps+1
pis+1
logXs+1 − logXs ≤ R
R(Xs) ≤
log ps−1
pis−1
− log ps
pis
logXs − logXs−1 .
Remark 28. In the above proposition, all the conditions are stated for
decreasing absolute (relative) risk aversion; however, if the inequalities are
reversed, they will become necessary and sufficient conditions for increasing
absolute (relative) risk aversions.
Remark 29. Conditions (iii) and (iv) show that consumers’ preferences can
be aggregated. This is not surprising, since it is well known that under
complete market there exists a representative consumer (Dybvig and Ross
(2003)).
One possible extension is to consider incomplete markets, i.e. fewer
assets than states of the nature. Assume there are J assets, and asset
j has payoff rsj in state s which is nonnegative. I assume that the payoff
vectors of these J assets are linearly independent, i.e. there is no redundant
asset. Denote by Pj the price of asset j, and yj the amount of asset j bought
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by the consumer. Then the consumption in state s will be xs =
∑S
j=1 rsjyj.
The non-arbitrage of asset prices implies the existence of ”implicit
Arrow−Debreu prices” (ps)Ss=1 such that
S∑
s=1
rsjps = Pj. (4.2)
Since there are less assets than the states of nature, the payoff matrix
has rank J , so the above equations (4.2) have multiple solutions. If any
such implied prices (ps)
S
s=1 and (xs)
S
s=1 satisfy conditions in Proposition 7,
then they (after being normalized by probabilities) can serve as marginal
utilities in consumer’s first-order conditions. And the data (p,x) can be
used to bound consumer’s risk aversion as in Theorem 1.
Corollary 6. The single portfolio choice (P ,y,pi) is compatible with ex-
pected utility displaying decreasing absolute (relative) risk aversion, if and
only if there exist prices (ps)
S
s=1 satisfying equations (4.2) and the pair
(ps, xs)
S
s=1 satisfies conditions in Proposition 7 and the ratio conditions in
(i) and (ii) of Theorem 1.
Remark 30. The aggregation result cannot be obtained under incomplete
market, since the equations (4.2) have multiple solutions, and the implied
Arrow−Debreu prices (or marginal utilities) will be different across con-
sumers. Under complete markets, such prices are unique.
4.2.2 Afriat’s bound
Varian’s bounds on absolute (relative) risk aversion are based on the ”cyclic
monotonicity” properties of one single observation data, which are equiv-
alent to Afriat’s inequalities under complete markets. The equivalence of
Afriat inequalities and ”cyclic monotonicity” still holds for multiple obser-
vations under incomplete markets. I assume that the consumption levels
differ across states s and dates t, i.e.
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j 6=
∑J
j=1 rs′jy
t
′
j for either
s 6= s′ or t 6= t′ .
Proposition 8. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The observations (P t,yt,pit)t=1...T are generated from strictly concave
expected utility maximization.
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(ii) There exist numbers (U ts)
t=1...T
s=1...S, (M
t
s)
t=1...T
s=1...S > 0, and (λ
t)t=1...T > 0,
satisfying the following conditions:
U ts < U
t
′
s′ +M
t
′
s′ (
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j ),
S∑
s=1
pitsM
t
srsj = λ
tP tj .
(iii) There exist numbers (M ts)
t=1...T
s=1...S > 0, and (λ
t)t=1...T > 0, such that:
(M ts −M t
′
s′ )(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j) > 0,
S∑
s=1
pitsM
t
srsj = λ
tP tj .
Proof. I prove this proposition by showing that (i) implies (ii), (ii) implies
(iii), and (iii) implies (i).
(i) implies (ii):
Since utility function is strictly concave, and the consumption levels are
different across states and dates, the following conditions hold:
u(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j) < u(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j ) + u
′
(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j )(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j ). (4.3)
The first order condition for maximization is:
S∑
s=1
pitsu
′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j)rsj = λ
tP tj . (4.4)
Put U ts = u(
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j), M
t
s = u
′
(
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j), and substitute into
above equations (4.3) and (4.4) to get the conditions in (ii).
(ii) implies (iii):
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For any pair of {U ts,M ts : s = 1, ..., S, t = 1, ..., T},
U ts < U
t
′
s′ +M
t
′
s′ (
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j ), (4.5)
U t
′
s′ < U
t
s +M
t
s(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j). (4.6)
Adding the above two inequalities gives the conditions in (iii).
(iii) implies (i):
Denote by xts =
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j the consumption in state s at observation
t. I number the observations across states and observations such that x1 <
... < xi < ... < xTS, where xi = x
t
s for some s ∈ {1, ...S}, and t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Then condition (iii) in Proposition 8 implies that M1 > ... > Mi > ... >
MTS, where Mi = M
t
s for some s ∈ {1, ...S}, and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. It can
be shown that Mi is the super-gradient of some strictly increasing and
concave utility at the observation xi. I will construct a strictly increasing
and strictly concave function u(x) on the whole domain.
On the interval [xi, xi+1], define
u(x) =
(x− xi)2
2(xi+1 − xi)Mi+1 − (
xi+1 − xi
2
)
(
1− x− xi
xi+1 − xi
)2
Mi + ci, (4.7)
where ci is some constant.
Since the numbers Mi, i ∈ {1, ..., TS}, are strictly positive and strictly
decreasing, the constructed function u(x) has the following properties:
u(x) is strictly increasing, since u
′
(x) = x−xi
xi+1−xiMi+1 +(1− x−xixi+1−xi )Mi >
0;
u(x) is strictly concave, since u
′′
(x) = 1
xi+1−xi (Mi+1 −Mi) < 0;
Mi is the super-gradient of u(x) at xi, since u
′
(xi) = Mi.
The value of constants ci can be chosen such that successive pieces
of the graph of the constructed function are connected. Then the whole
function would be continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave with
derivative Mi at xi. It can be shown that this function will rationalize the
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observation.
Unlike the conditions in Proposition 7, the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions in Proposition 8 are not quantifier free, i.e. they require the exis-
tence of suitable unknown numbers. But the conditions in Proposition 8
are linear in the unknowns, and can be solved by linear programming with
efficient algorithms.
Example 4. The restrictions in Proposition 8 are not vacuous with even
one observation: Suppose there are 3 states with equal probabilities, i.e.
pi1 = pi2 = pi3 =
1
3
. There are two asset with payoffs r1 = (1, 1, 1) and
r2 = (0, 0, 6). Suppose at price P1 = 1 and P2 = 3, the consumer chooses
y1 = 1 and y2 = 1. Then it can be verified that no strictly concave expected
utility can rationalize such choice.
If the observed portfolio choice is generated by some strictly concave
expected utility, the Afriat numbers {U ts,M ts, λt : s = 1, ..., S, t = 1, ..., T}
should satisfy the conditions in Proposition 8. What further conditions
should these Afriat numbers satisfy if the observed data is compatible with
particular shapes of risk aversion? Proposition 9 gives the necessary and
sufficient conditions.
Proposition 9. Suppose the observations (P t,yt,pit)t=1,...,T are generated
from strictly concave expected utility maximization, i.e. there exist numbers
U ts, M
t
s > 0 and λ
t > 0 satisfying the conditions in Proposition 8. Then
the following results hold:
(i) Decreasing absolute risk aversion is equivalent to the following Afriat
Ratio Condition:
logMi+1 − logMi
xi − xi+1 ≤ r
A(xi) ≤ logMi − logMi−1
xi−1 − xi .
(ii) Decreasing relative risk aversion is equivalent to the following Afriat
Relative Ratio Condition:
logMi+1 − logMi
log(xi)− log(xi+1) ≤ r
R(xi) ≤ logMi − logMi−1
log(xi−1)− log(xi) .
Proof. As pointed out by Varian (1988), decreasing (increasing) absolute
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risk aversion is equivalent to the requirement that log u
′
(x) is a convex
(concave function) function of x, since
d log u
′
(x)
dx
=
u
′′
(x)
u′(x)
= −rA(x). (4.8)
Also, decreasing (increasing) relative risk aversion is equivalent to the
requirement that log u
′
(x) is a convex (concave function) function of log(x),
since
d log u
′
(x)
d log(x)
= x
u
′′
(x)
u′(x)
= −rR(x). (4.9)
Here, I only prove (i), since the proof of (ii) will follow the same line.
Necessity:
Since log u
′
(x) is a convex function of x, it must satisfy the following
inequalities:
log u
′
(xi+1) ≥ log u′(xi) + d log u
′
(xi)
dxi
[xi+1 − xi], (4.10)
log u
′
(xi−1) ≥ log u′(xi) + d log u
′
(xi)
dxi
[xi−1 − xi]. (4.11)
From inequality (4.10),
d log u
′
(xi)
dxi
≤
log u
′
(xi+1)
u′ (xi)
xi+1 − xi . (4.12)
From inequality (4.13),
d log u
′
(xi)
dxi
≥
log u
′
(xi)
u′ (xi−1)
xi − xi−1 . (4.13)
Therefore
log u
′
(xi+1)
u′ (xi)
xi − xi+1 ≤ r
A(xi) ≤
log u
′
(xi)
u′ (xi−1)
xi−1 − xi . (4.14)
Since the observed data is rationalized by some strictly concave ex-
pected utility function, then from Afriat inequality,
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u
′
(xi) = Mi. (4.15)
Then the following must hold
logMi+1 − logMi
xi − xi+1 ≤ r
A(xi) ≤ logMi − logMi−1
xi−1 − xi . (4.16)
Sufficiency:
Pick a set of numbers rAi satisfying the Afriat Ratio Condition.
Define the function
u(x) =
∫ x
0
M(x)dx =
∫ x
0
exp[logM(x)]dx, (4.17)
where
logM(x) = max
i
{logMi − rAi (x− xi)}. (4.18)
Suppose the Afriat numbers satisfy the Afriat inequalities and Afriat
Ratio Condition. Then I will show the constructed overall utility index
U(z) will rationalize the data (P t,yt,pit)t=1,...,T , and exhibit decreasing
absolute risk aversion.
From the construction, logM(x) is differentiable with respect to x at
the observation xi, since it is assumed x1 < ... < xTS. The following holds:
d logM(xi)
dx
=
M
′
(xi)
M(xi)
= −rAi . (4.19)
The first derivative of U(z) at ytj is
∑S
s=1 pi
t
sM(
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j)rsj.
I claim that M(xi) = M(
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j) = Mi, since
logM(xi) = max
h∈{1,...,TS}
{logMh − rh(xi − xh)}
= logMm − rm(xi − xm)
≥ logMi − ri(xi − xi)
= logMi
And the above inequality cannot be strict, otherwise it will violate the
84
Afriat Ratio Condition.
Since the Afriat numbers satisfy the conditions
∑S
s=1 pi
t
sM
t
srsj = λ
tP tj
in Proposition 8, then the following condition hold:
S∑
s=1
pitsM(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j)rsj = λ
tP tj . (4.20)
The second derivative of U(y) at yj is
S∑
s=1
pitsM
′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j)r
2
sj = −
S∑
s=1
pitsr
t
sM(
J∑
j=1
rsjz
t
j)r
2
sj < 0. (4.21)
Thus U(y) is a concave function. So the satisfaction of the first-order
conditions is a sufficient condition for the observed choice to solve the
maximization problem.
Finally, the absolute risk aversion at xi is given by
rA(xi) = −u
′′
(xi)
u′(xi)
= rAi , (4.22)
which is a decreasing sequence in i by construction.
The proof of sufficiency modifies the argument of Varian (1988). Actu-
ally a simpler proof can be given using the following construction:
Define the function around xi,
logM(x) = −rAi x+ logMi + rAi xi. (4.23)
It can be checked that such function will rationalize the observation and
display decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Remark 31. Afriat’s bounds for risk aversion are defined in terms of Afriat
numbers; however, Afriat’s bounds are equivalent to Varian’s bounds. Un-
der complete markets, Ms =
ps
pis
; under incomplete markets, the right hand
side is the implied Arrow−Debreu prices. Under complete markets, the
aggregation result would be obvious.
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4.3 Estimating risk and ambiguity aversion:
Afriat’s bounds
Under the smooth ambiguity model, a consumer will solve the following
maximization problem:
max
y∈RJ
A∑
a=1
µaφ
(
S∑
s=1
νasu
(
J∑
j=1
rsjyj
))
s.t. P · y ≤ I (4.24)
where νa and µ are probabilities for risk and ambiguity, respectively.
Lemma 5. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The observations (P t,yt,νt,µt)t=1,...,T are generated from strictly con-
cave smooth ambiguity utility maximization.
(ii) There exist real numbers (U ts,M
t
s)
t=1,...,T
s=1,...,S > 0, (Φ
s
a)
s=1,..,S
a=1,...,A, (ρ
t
a)
t=1,...,T
a=1,...,A >
0 and (λt)t=1,...,T > 0 such that for all s, s′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., S}, a, a′ ∈
{1, 2, ..., A}, t, t′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}
U ts − U t
′
s′ < M
t
′
s′
(
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j −
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j
)
,
Φta − Φt
′
a′ < ρ
t
′
a′
(
S∑
s=1
νtasU
t
s −
S∑
s=1
νt
′
a
′
s
U t
′
s
)
,
and
A∑
a=1
µta
(
ρta
S∑
s=1
νtasM
t
srsj
)
= λtP tj .
(iii) There exist real numbers (U ts,M
t
s)
t=1,...,T
s=1,...,S > 0, (ρ
t
h)
t=1,...,T
a=1,...,A > 0 and
(λt)t=1,...,T > 0 such that for all s, s′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., S}, a, a′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., A},
t, t
′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}
(M ts −M t
′
s′ )(
J∑
j=1
rs′jy
t
′
j −
J∑
j=1
rsjy
t
j) > 0,
(ρta − ρt
′
a′ )(
S∑
s=1
νt
′
a′sU
t
′
s −
S∑
s=1
νtasU
t
s) > 0,
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and
A∑
a=1
µta
(
ρta
S∑
s=1
νtasM
t
srsj
)
= λtP tj .
Remark 32. These conditions are necessary and sufficient for the observed
asset demands to be rationalized by some state independent, strictly con-
cave smooth ambiguity preference. Note that these conditions are applica-
ble to one observation, where the restrictions will be across different risk
and ambiguity states.
Example 5. This example shows that the above conditions are not vacuous
with even one observation: Suppose there are 3 states, and the consumer
has ambiguity over the probability distribution. Suppose there are two
equally possible probability distributions: ν1 = (
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
) and ν2 = (
1
6
, 2
6
, 1
2
).
There are two assets with payoffs r1 = (1, 1, 1) and r2 = (0, 0, 6). Suppose
at price P1 = 1 and P2 = 3, the consumer chooses y1 = 1 and y2 = 1.
Then it can be verified that such choice is not consistent with any strictly
concave smooth ambiguity utility.
From now on, I will assume that the observed consumption and price
data can be rationalized by some smooth ambiguity preference, i.e. there
exist Afriat numbers (U ts,M
t
s)
t=1,...,T
s=1,...,S > 0, (Φ
t
h)
t=1,...,T
a=1,...,A, (ρ
t
a)
t=1,...,T
a=1,...,A > 0 and
(λt)t=1,...,T satisfying the restrictions in Lemma 5.
Denote by xts =
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j the consumption in state s at observation t,
uta =
∑S
s=1 ν
t
asU
t
s the expected utility under probability νa at observation t.
Number the consumption across risk states and observations such that x1 <
... < xi < ... < xTS, where xi = x
t
s for some s ∈ {1, ..., S} and t ∈ {1, ..., T},
then condition (iii) in Lemma 5 implies that M1 > ... > Mi > ... > MTS,
where Mi = M
t
s for some s ∈ {1, ..., S} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Similarly,
number the expected utility across ambiguity states and observations such
that u1 < ... < ui < ... < uTA, where ui = u
t
a for some a ∈ {1, ..., A}
and t ∈ {1, ..., T}, it follows that ρ1 > ... > ρi > ... > ρTA, where ρi = ρta
for some a ∈ {1, ..., A} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Denote by aA(u) = −φ
′′
(u)
φ′ (u) the
absolute ambiguity aversion, and aR(u) = −uφ
′′
(u)
φ′ (u) the relative ambiguity
aversion.
As in Varian (1988), the question asked is: what further conditions must
be satisfied if the observed data (P t,yt,νt,µt)t=1,...,T is compatible with
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various hypotheses about the behavior of risk and ambiguity aversion?
Proposition 10. Suppose the observations (P t,yt,νt,µt)t=1,...,T are gen-
erated from a strictly concave smooth ambiguity utility, i.e. there exist real
numbers (U ts,M
t
s)
t=1,...,T
s=1,...,S > 0, (Φ
t
a)
t=1,...,T
a=1,...,A, (ρ
t
a)
t=1,...,T
a=1,...,A > 0 and (λ
t)t=1,...,T >
0 satisfying the conditions in Lemma 5. Then the following results hold:
(i) Decreasing absolute risk aversion is equivalent to the following Afriat
Ratio Condition i:
logMi+1 − logMi
xi − xi+1 ≤ r
A(xi) ≤ logMi − logMi−1
xi−1 − xi .
(ii) Decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion is equivalent to the following
Afriat Ratio Condition ii:
log ρi+1 − log ρi
ui − ui+1 ≤ a
A(ui) ≤ log ρi−1 − log ρi
ui − ui−1 .
(iii) Decreasing relative risk aversion is equivalent to the following Afriat
Relative Ratio Condition i:
logMi+1 − logMi
log(xi)− log(xi+1) ≤ r
R(xi) ≤ logMi − logMi−1
log(xi−1)− log(xi) .
(iv) Decreasing relative ambiguity aversion is equivalent to the following
Afriat Relative Ratio Condition ii:
log ρi+1 − log ρi
log(ui)− log(ui+1) ≤ a
R(ui) ≤ log ρi−1 − log ρi
log(ui)− log(ui−1) .
Proof. Necessity:
The conditions for decreasing absolute (relative) risk aversion follow
from the argument in Proposition 9. And such argument applies to ambigu-
ity aversion: decreasing (increasing) relative ambiguity aversion is equiva-
lent to log φ
′
(u) being a convex (concave) function of log u. In the following,
I only show the condition for decreasing relative ambiguity aversion.
Since log φ
′
(u) is a convex function with respect to log u, the following
inequalities hold:
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log φ
′
(ui+1) ≥ log φ′(ui) + d log φ
′
(ui)
d log(ui)
[log(ui+1)− log(ui)], (4.25)
log φ
′
(ui−1) ≥ log φ′(ui) + d log φ
′
(ui)
d log(ui)
[log(ui−1)− log(ui)]. (4.26)
So it gives
log φ
′
(ui+1)
φ′ (ui)
log(ui)− log(ui+1) ≤ a
R(ui) ≤
log φ
′
(ui−1)
φ′ (ui)
log(ui)− log(ui−1) . (4.27)
Using the fact that xts =
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j, U
t
s = u(
∑J
j=1 rsjy
t
j), and ρ
t
a =
φ
′
(
S∑
s=1
νasu(
∑J
j=1 rjsy
t
j)), the above inequality can be rewritten as
log ρi+1 − log ρi
log(ui)− log(ui+1) ≤ a
R(ui) ≤ log ρi−1 − log ρi
log(ui)− log(ui−1) . (4.28)
Sufficiency:
Once the observed portfolio choices satisfy the conditions in the theo-
rem, the above ratio conditions give an upper and a lower bound on risk
and ambiguity aversion at each level of contingent consumption. Thus
these ratio conditions are necessary for decreasing (or increasing) absolute
(or relative) risk and ambiguity aversion.
However, such conditions are also sufficient conditions. If the Afriat
numbers satisfy the ratio conditions, I can construct increasing and con-
cave functions u(x) and φ(u) that exhibit decreasing (or increasing) abso-
lute (or relative) risk and ambiguity aversion. In this proof, I construct a
smooth ambiguity utility displaying decreasing absolute risk aversion and
decreasing relative ambiguity aversion, and other cases can be constructed
similarly.
Pick a set of numbers rAi and a
R
i satisfying the Afriat Ratio Condition
i and Afriat Relative Ratio Condition ii respectively.
Define the function
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u(x) =
∫ x
0
M(x)dx =
∫ x
0
exp[logM(x)]dx, (4.29)
where
logM(x) = max
i
{logMi − rAi (x− xi)}. (4.30)
Define the function
φ(u) =
∫ u
0
ρ(u)du =
∫ u
0
exp[log ρ(u)]du, (4.31)
where
log ρ(u) = max
i
{log ρi − aRi (log u− log ui)}. (4.32)
Then we will show the constructed overall utility index U(z) will ratio-
nalize the data (P t, yt, νt, µt)t=1,...,T , and exhibits decreasing absolute risk
aversion and decreasing relative ambiguity aversion.
From the construction, the above functions are differentiable at xi and
ui respectively, and we have
d logM(xi)
dx
=
M
′
(xi)
M(xi)
= −rAi , (4.33)
d log ρ(ui)
d log u
= ui
ρ
′
(ui)
ρ(ui)
= −aRi . (4.34)
The first derivative of U(y) at yj is
∑A
a=1 µaρ(ua)
∑S
s=1 νasM(xs)rsj.
It can be proved that ρ(ui) = ρi and M(xi) = Mi.
Since the Afriat numbers satisfy the conditions
∑A
a=1 µaρa
∑S
s=1 νasMsrsj =
Pj in the Lemma 5, then the following condition holds:
A∑
a=1
µaρ(ua)
S∑
s=1
νasM(xs)rsj = Pj. (4.35)
The second derivative of U(y) at yj is < 0.
Thus U(y) is a concave function. So the satisfaction of the first-order
conditions is a sufficient condition for the observed choice to solve the
maximization problem.
Finally, the absolute risk aversion at yj is given by
rA(xs) = −u
′′
(xs)
u′(xs)
= rAs , (4.36)
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which is a decreasing sequence by construction.
And the relative ambiguity aversion is given by
aR(ua) = −uaφ
′′
(ua)
φ′(ua)
= aRa , (4.37)
which is a decreasing sequence by construction.
Remark 33. It is not possible to aggregate consumers’ preferences in or-
der to bound the average risk and ambiguity aversions. This can be seen
from equation (4.35): the marginal utility will contain both risk attitude
Ms and ambiguity attitude ρa, and the number of equations is much less
than the number of the unknowns. And it should be noted that the loss
of aggregation is not due to incomplete markets: suppose fully complete
Arrow securities (contingent on both risk and ambiguity states) are traded,
it is still not possible to uniquely pin down ρa and Mas ( in this case, state
consumption is contingent on both risk and ambiguity states) from AS
prices.
4.4 Conclusion
The revealed preference test is based on finite observations. The construc-
tion of strictly increasing and strictly concave functions rationalizing the
observations is not unique, since only finite data are available. Kubler,
Selden, and Wei (2014) give two demand function tests for the expected
utility model, Dybvig and Polemarchakis (1981) give an argument on recov-
ering the expected utility uniquely from asset demands, and their argument
is extended in Chapter 3 to recover ambiguity preference. One interesting
open question is what is the corresponding Slutsky condition on demand
function for decreasing or increasing absolute (relative) risk and ambiguity
aversion? Is it possible to uniquely identify such preference from demand
functions?
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Chapter 5
Risk and ambiguity aversion:
empirical evidence
5.1 Introduction
Despite the importance of individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion
in determining individual decision making and equilibrium implications,
the identification and estimation of individual risk aversion and ambiguity
aversion have not been tackled until recently. And there is rare evidence on
the shape of individual ambiguity preferences, except few evidence from ei-
ther lab experiment or pure thought experiment using variants of Ellsberg’s
urns.
This chapter intends to investigate systematically the nature of house-
hold ambiguity preference using household survey data on consumption and
portfolio choice and on stock return expectation. To derive explicitly the
approximate solution, I assume that both relative risk aversion and relative
ambiguity aversion are constant. One important desirable property of such
a utility function is that the preference representation is invariant to the
measurement unit of the risk aversion index, which does not hold gener-
ally under smooth ambiguity model. I also assume that the distribution
of the risky asset return is log-normal, and that households have ambigu-
ity on the mean with second-order belief being normally distributed. The
assumption of ambiguity on the mean is assumed to achieve identification,
and is justified by empirical evidence that the volatility of a stock return
is more predictable than its mean.
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The key theoretical result on identification is Proposition 11. It shows
that if an individual’s consumption and portfolio choice, as well as expec-
tations of risky asset return, are observed, then individual time preference,
relative risk aversion, and relative ambiguity aversion can be uniquely iden-
tified from a special panel dataset, where the individual in one period only
holds riskfree asset, and in the other period holds both riskless and risky
assets. However, the required panel data is very rare; instead I assume the
same time preference across individuals, and use cross-section data to re-
cover individual risk and ambiguity aversion (Corollary 7). The assumption
of homogeneous time preference is justified in the empirical section.
Individual subjective expectations required in the identification argu-
ment are pinned down by the data from a household questionnaire and
historical data from the Italy stock market. Although the effort to elicit
individual belief quantitatively in household survey questionnaire began in
the 1990s, there are few surveys that measure individual ambiguous belief. 1
Since I assume individual has no ambiguity on the variance of stock return,
the variance is approximated by historical volatility of Italy stock return.
In Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), house-
holds were asked two questions about their expectations regarding stock
market performance in Italy expressed on a probability scale, in 2008 and
2010 respectively.2 Given the assumption on household expectation and
ambiguous belief, the unconditional distribution of expected stock return
would be log-normal, and its mean and variance can be recovered from data
on two expectation questions. Then the ambiguity can be decomposed from
the recovered variance given the historical stock return volatility, which is
assumed to be known to households.
I examine whether constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant
relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA) are a good approximation, and test the
ambiguous belief assumption against the subjective expectation hypothesis
(in Savage’s sense). CRRA and CRAA assumption puts strong restriction
on observable choices: the saving rate out of wealth is independent of wealth
1Manski (2004) provides an extensive survey on using household expectation data
over various events including stock market return.
2In the most recent wave SHIW2012, households are also asked to give their expec-
tations on Italy stock market return, however, the questions changed and the results are
not directly comparable with data in 2008 and 2010 waves. So in this chapter, I only
use expectation data in 2008 and 2010, where the same questions were asked.
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level, and the risky asset share out of saving is independent of saving level.
These restrictions will be tested using SHIW2008 and SHIW2010 data.
If households are not ambiguity averse, and have subjective expectation,
the evidence from data that saving rate is invariant to wealth and risky
asset share is invariant to saving suggests households are CRRA expected
utility maximizers. Lemma 8 shows that the CRRA model implies an
over-identification restriction, based on which I can distinguish the two
models. Another way to distinguish these two models is to test whether
the recovered relative ambiguity aversion is zero, since the expected utility
model is a special case when the ambiguity aversion is zero.
Once I have confirmed that constant relative risk aversion and relative
ambiguity aversion are a reasonable assumption, and recovered individual
relative risk and ambiguity aversion from their consumption and portfolio
choice, I can answer some interesting and important questions: will individ-
ual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion be correlated? how will individual
risk aversion and ambiguity aversion be influenced by their characteristics,
and how will individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion influence their
consumption and portfolio choice?
My empirical analysis is based on SHIW2008 and SHIW2010, a ro-
tating panel data set, which contains detailed information on household
socio-demographic characteristics, consumption expenditure, saving, port-
folio allocation among various financial assets, and expectations of stock
market performance. Firstly, I recover household belief regarding mean
and variance of log-normal return from their answer to questions about
stock market performance expectations. In contrast to the widely used ho-
mogeneous expectation assumption, household expectations display quite
a lot of heterogeneity in terms of both mean and variance. This can hap-
pen when households have private information on stock market, or they
process publicly available information in different ways. Household expec-
tations are very pessimistic in the sense that the expected mean return is
very low, and the expected simple excess return is barely positive. Even
among households holding risky assets, a large proportion hold negative
simple excess return expectation. The recovered household belief also re-
veals that households are subject to a lot of ambiguity, which is measured
by the difference between recovered variance and historical volatility.
The analysis confirms that constant relative risk aversion and ambigu-
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ity aversion can be a good first approximation. I test the hypothesis using
both cross-sectional regression and first difference panel regression. In the
cross-sectional test, households’ risky asset shares out of saving are hardly
variant to saving level. The conclusion is both statistically and economi-
cally significant. The saving rate out of wealth is significantly related with
wealth level even after controlling endogeneity of wealth and the effect of
other variables, however, when I concentrate on the population expecting
positive excess return, the effect of wealth on saving rate is not different
from zero. The panel test based on first difference gives strong support for
the predictions that the effect of saving on risky asset share and the effect
of wealth on consumption rate are not significant.
The recovery of risk and ambiguity aversion is conducted first based on
a small panel required in Proposition 11, assuming that the riskfree interest
rate is invariant across two years. The recovered risk aversion and ambi-
guity aversion are quite heterogeneous across households. The relative risk
aversion is much small than 1, and the relative ambiguity aversion is around
3 or larger. However, household time preferences are very homogeneous,
and are consistent with existing micro evidence. Without loss of generality,
I assume the same time preference across households, and recover house-
hold risk and ambiguity aversion from cross-sectional data. The picture
from cross-sectional data is similar to that from panel data. t test cannot
reject the hypothesis that both relative risk aversion and ambiguity aver-
sion are significantly different from zero. The over-identification test rejects
the CRRA expected utility model, in favor of the ambiguity model. Fur-
ther analysis shows that household risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are
not correlated. Household characteristics can hardly explain the variation
of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion across households. Quantitatively,
both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion have a significant effect on their
consumption and portfolio choice; but ambiguity aversion mainly affects
household portfolio rather than consumption choice.
Contributions and related literature
The most important contribution of this chapter is to simultaneously iden-
tify individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion within a simple frame-
work using household survey data. According to my knowledge, this is
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the first paper to use real data to recover household risk and ambiguity
aversion. The difficulty lies in too many parameters for the model to iden-
tify, including individual first-order and second-order beliefs. This chapter
solves the difficulty by imposing some reasonable parametric restrictions
on underlying preference and belief and taking advantage of high quality
household survey data.
This chapter is most closely related to the experimental approach to
eliciting and estimating individual ambiguity aversion. Ahn, Choi, Gale,
and Kariv (2014) perform a portfolio-choice experiment, where partici-
pants could choose three Arrow securities subject to a budget constraint.
The payoff of the three Arrow securities is contingent on the realization of
three states, where the probability of one state is objectively given, and
the relative probabilities of the other states are ambiguous. Ahn, Choi,
Gale, and Kariv (2014) estimate individual risk aversion and ambiguity
aversion from their portfolio choice under kinked specification (α-Maxmin
model) and smooth specification (smooth ambiguity aversion model) re-
spectively. They also estimate a third parameter−pessimism, under a gen-
eralized kinked specification. Their main conclusion is that individual pref-
erences exhibit considerable heterogeneity; a majority of subjects conforms
to subjective expected utility hypothesis; most of the remaining subjects
exhibit statistically significant ambiguity aversion or seeking and/or pes-
simism, but no subject displays extreme ambiguity aversion as supposed
in the maxmin model; the estimated absolute risk aversion is much lower
than the standard single-parameter estimates; ambiguity aversion and risk
aversion are not correlated.
This chapter provides insight into the functional form of risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion. The previous literature assumes a particular func-
tional form and derives the implication of ambiguity aversion; however,
the functional form is taken for granted, and has never been tested. This
chapter provides empirical evidence on the shape of individual risk and
ambiguity utility function. Constant relative risk aversion and relative am-
biguity aversion can be a good approximation, and possess one desirable
property-it is independent of the unit of risk aversion index, which does
not hold generally under smooth ambiguity aversion model.
This chapter also contributes to testing the implication of ambiguity
aversion, and distinguishing different models. The current literature mainly
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uses the experimental approach. Halevy (2007) exploits the tight associa-
tion between ambiguity attitude and the reduction of compound lotteries
axiom to design a lab experiment to compare the performance of sub-
jective expected utility, maxmin expected utility, recursive non-expected
utility and recursive expected utility. Participants are presented four urns,
of which one represents pure risk, one represents pure ambiguity, and the
other two represent objective compound lotteries. Their reservation values
for these four urns are elicited through Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Becker,
DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) mechanism. Different models will have
strong prediction on the ranking of reservation values of these four urns.
The result confirms the tight association between ambiguity neutrality and
the reduction of compound lotteries. The population are heterogeneous,
and there is no unique theory to explain the average decision maker. His re-
sult also reveals two choice patterns when participants show non-ambiguity
neutrality and the reduction of compound lotteries is violated. Bossaerts,
Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) design an experiment, where
participants trade bond and three Arrow securities. The payoff of the
three Arrow securities depends on the realization of three states, where
the probability of one state is given, and the relative probabilities of the
other two states are ambiguous. The equilibrium asset price is determined
by a continuous open-book double auction. Ambiguity aversion will pro-
duce different implication for portfolio choice and equilibrium asset price
compared to risk aversion. Specifically, under α-maxmin model, there ex-
ists an open set of price for which ambiguity averse subjects will not hold
ambiguous assets, and the ranking of state price/probability ratios can be
anomalous. Their experiment result confirms the prediction, and their re-
sult also supports the kinked ambiguity aversion model rather than smooth
one. Using similar experimental design, Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014)
present evidence in favor of kinked ambiguity aversion model in portfolio
choice setting.
Another contribution of this chapter is to provide insight into how in-
dividual risk and ambiguity aversion are correlated with each other, how
they are differentially influenced by individual characteristics, and how
they influence individual consumption and portfolio choice. Dimmock,
Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenburg (2013) measure household ambi-
guity aversion from custom-designed questions based on Ellsberg urns in
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a large representative survey of U.S. households to test the effects of am-
biguity aversion on household portfolio choice. They show that ambiguity
aversion is negatively associated with stock market participation and with
the fraction of wealth allocated to stocks, and the effect is large. Borghans,
Golsteyn, Heckman, and Meijers (2009) design an experiment to examine
the gender difference in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Participants
are presented four urns filled with balls of two different colors, of which the
first urn represents pure risk, and from the second to fourth urn, ambiguity
is increased. Participants are asked to bet on one color and give the min-
imum price at which they would be willing to sell the bet. They measure
ambiguity aversion by the difference in reservation prices between urn four
and urn one. They show that woman are more risk-averse than men, and
over an initial range, men reduce their valuation of ambiguous urns more
than women, after that, men and women equally value marginal changes in
ambiguity. They also shows that psychological characteristics account for
some of the interpersonal variation in risk aversion, but not the difference
in ambiguity aversion.
The chapter is related to recovering individual belief using expectation
data on stock market performance. Hurd, Rooij, and Winter (2011) assume
the stock return is log-normally distributed, and use stock market expecta-
tion data from Dutch household survey to estimate the mean and variance.
They find that households’ expectations are heterogeneous, and they are
correlated with stock ownership. On average, stock market expectations
are much more pessimistic about gains than the historical record of actual
gains.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 presents a sim-
ple parametric portfolio choice model under the framework of smooth am-
biguity aversion, where an explicit approximate solution is derived. Section
5.3 gives the key identification result, and sets out the empirical strategy.
Section 5.4 describes the data I use. Section 5.5 reports and discusses the
estimation and recovery results. Section 5.6 contains a robustness check of
my results. Section 5.7 concludes and discusses possible future work. Ap-
pendix A establishes identifiability for the case relative risk aversion being
larger than 1, and Appendix B derives the economic meaning of relative
risk aversion and relative ambiguity aversion.
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5.2 Economic model
5.2.1 Expected utility model
As in previous chapters, I consider a one-good two-period economy: pe-
riod 0 and period 1, where uncertainty will be revealed in period 1. The
consumer is endowed with initial wealth I and CRRA preference
u(c) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ, (5.1)
where ρ is the relative risk aversion index. There is one good to consume
and two assets for the consumer to save for tomorrow, of which one asset
is risky, and the other is risk-free. Unlike in previous chapters, here I
assume a continuum of states. The risky asset has a return factor ν˜ for
each dollar with ln(ν˜) ∼ N(µ, σ2), and the riskless asset has a return
factor R for each dollar with ln(R) = r. The consumer’s problem is to
decide how much to consume today and how much to save for tomorrow,
and how much of saving is invested in the risky asset. I suppose the only
risk is from the asset return, and abstract away from individual background
risk−individual wealth is given. This will simplify the solution to individual
decision problem.
Let c0 be the first period consumption, and α be the share of saving
(I − c0) invested in the risky asset, then the second-period consumption
will be
c1 =
(
R + (ν˜ −R)α
)
(I − c0). (5.2)
If individual knows exactly the distribution of the asset return, and
maximizes his expected utility, then he will solve the following problem:
max
{c0,α}
u(c0) + βEν˜u(c1)
s.t. c1 =
(
R + (ν˜ −R)α)(I − c0). (5.3)
From log-normal approximation, see Campbell and Viceira (2002), the
following is obtained:
ln
(
R + (ν˜ −R)α
)
≈ r + α
(
ln(ν˜)− ln(R)
)
+ α
σ2
2
− α2σ
2
2
. (5.4)
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Then second-period expected utility is
Eν˜u(c1) = E
[
(I − c0) exp
(
r + α
(
ln(ν˜)− ln(R))+ ασ2
2
− α2 σ2
2
)]1−ρ
1− ρ
=
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
C(α)
)
Eν˜ exp
(
(1− ρ)α ln(ν˜)
)
, (5.5)
where
C(α) = (1− ρ)(r + ασ2
2
− α2σ
2
2
− αr). (5.6)
From the above assumption on asset returns, it follows
(1− ρ)α ln(ν˜) ∼ N
(
(1− ρ)αµ, (1− ρ)2α2σ2
)
. (5.7)
For a normal random variable z ∼ N(µ, σ2), E exp(z) = exp (µ+ σ2
2
)
.
Thus,
Eν˜u(c1) =
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
C(α)
)
exp
(
(1− ρ)αµ+ α2 (1− ρ)
2σ2
2
)
=
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)(r + α(µ− r) + ασ2
2
− α2ρσ
2
2
))
.
(5.8)
Then, the individual’s optimization problem becomes
max
{c0,α}
c1−ρ0
1− ρ + β
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)(r + α(µ− r) + ασ2
2
− α2ρσ
2
2
))
.
(5.9)
So the optimal solution is:
α =
µ− r + σ2
2
ρσ2
, (5.10)
c0 = κw,where κ =
[
1 + β
1
ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
r +
(µ− r + σ2
2
)2
2ρσ2
))]−1
.
(5.11)
Remark 34. Equations (5.10) and (5.11) generate interesting comparative
statics:
1. Risky asset demand is positively related to the simple excess return
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(or equity premium) µ− r + σ2
2
, and inversely related to the risk aversion
ρ.
2. First period consumption is inversely related to time preference β,
and positively related to risk aversion ρ.
5.2.2 Smooth ambiguity model
However, in reality individuals are not so sophisticated at knowing the
exact probability distribution of future events, in fact, they are ambiguous.
This is especially true in the financial market−even complicated statistical
models cannot predict the return of assets. I suppose investors know the
variance σ2, but have ambiguity over the mean of the risky asset µ, i.e. µ is
a random variable µ˜ for individuals. The assumption of ambiguity about
the mean is justified: firstly, the mean of asset returns is more difficult to
predict than the variance, see Epstein and Schneider (2010); secondly, as
shown in Chapter 3, ambiguity about the mean is one sufficient condition
for identifying ambiguity aversion index uniquely; thirdly, under ambiguity
about the mean, the unconditional distribution of the asset return can be
easily derived, which enables me to recover individual belief. I assume that
the mean return µ˜ is normally distributed, i.e. µ˜ ∼ N(θ, σ20), where σ20
represents the ambiguity, i.e. the larger σ20, the more ambiguous is the
individual. Then the compound distribution of the risky asset return ν˜
would be also log-normal, i.e. lnν˜ ∼ N(θ, σ2 + σ20).
I assume that the individual is endowed with smooth ambiguity pref-
erence, as in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Let the monotone
and concave function
φ(u) =
u1−A
1− A, (5.12)
represent ambiguity aversion, where concavity of φ(u) indicates how am-
biguity averse the individual is. As in the risk aversion case, define −φ
′′
φ′
as absolute ambiguity aversion, and −uφ
′′
φ′ as relative ambiguity aversion.
Smooth ambiguity preference models the individual’s decision as he evalu-
ates the consumption bundle c by φ−1
[
Eφ
(
Eu(c)
)]
, where
φ−1 =
(
(1− A)φ) 11−A . (5.13)
The ambiguity aversion function φ(u) is defined on positive u, which as-
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sumes ρ < 1. For ρ > 1, the ambiguity aversion is defined to be φ(u) =
− (−u)1+A
1+A
, the corresponding result will be relegated to the appendix A.
The following lemma shows how demand for the risky asset depends on
its equity premium Eµ˜Eν˜ ν˜ − R, which is evaluated by the unconditional
(or average) probability.
Lemma 6. If an individual is both risk averse and ambiguity averse, then
the necessary and sufficient condition for him to hold positive amount of
the risky asset is Eµ˜Eν˜ ν˜ −R > 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, I assume the individual has one unit of
wealth to invest between the risk-free asset and the risky asset. The return
would be R+ (ν˜ −R)α. Maximizing φ−1
{
Eµ˜
[
φ
(
Eν˜u
(
R+ (ν˜ −R)α))]}
is equivalent to maximizing Eµ˜
[
φ
(
Eν˜u
(
R + (ν˜ − R)α))], which is an
increasingly monotone transformation.
Take a quadratic Taylor expansion at α = 0, the following obtains
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u
(
R + (ν˜ −R)α)) = φ(u(R))+ φ′(u(R))u′(R)(Eµ˜Eν˜ ν˜ −R)α
+
φ
′′
(
u(R)
)
u
′2(R)Eµ˜(Eν˜ ν˜ −R)2 + φ′
(
u(R)
)
u
′′
(R)Eµ˜Eν˜(ν˜ −R)2
2
α2.
(5.14)
For the individual to have an incentive to hold positive amount of the
risky asset, i.e. Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u
(
R+ (ν˜ −R)α))− φ(u(R)) > 0, the following
condition is needed
Eµ˜Eν˜ ν˜−R > −
[φ′′(u(R))
φ′
(
u(R)
) u′(R)Eµ˜(Eν˜ ν˜ −R)2
2
+
u
′′
(R)
u′(R)
Eµ˜Eν˜(ν˜ −R)2
2
]
α,
(5.15)
where the right hand side is positive given that the individual is both risk
averse and ambiguity averse.
Remark 35. Equation (5.15) shows how much equity premium an indi-
vidual requires for him to hold α units of the risky asset, whose return
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distribution is ambiguous. The required equity premium depends on indi-
vidual risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, ambiguity of asset return, and the
magnitude of α. A risk loving and/or ambiguity loving individual would
like to hold some positive amount of the risky asset even if his subjective
equity premium is negative.
Remark 36. Equation (5.15) also shows that generally, the required equity
premium is not independent of the unit of risk aversion index u, the mean-
ing of which is not clear. However, when the relative ambiguity aversion
i.e. −
φ
′′
(
u(R)
)
φ′
(
u(R)
) u′(R) on the right hand side of (5.15), is constant, such
dependence disappears, and the result is much easier to interpret.
Under above model specification, the consumer will solve the following
maximization problem:
max
{c0,α}
u(c0) + βφ
−1
(
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
))
s.t. c1 =
(
R + (ν˜ −R)α
)
(I − c0). (5.16)
Substitute the budget constraint into the objective function, then the
problem becomes
max
{c0,α}
u(c0) + βφ
−1
{
Eµ˜φ
[
Eν˜u
((
R + (ν˜ −R)α)(I − c0))]}. (5.17)
The log-normal approximation of portfolio return would be
ln
(
R+(ν˜−R)α
)
≈ r+α
(
ln(ν˜)−ln(R)
)
+α
σ2 + σ20
2
−α2σ
2 + σ20
2
. (5.18)
Then the expected second-period utility conditional on µ˜ is
Eν˜u(c1) = Eν˜u
((
R + (ν˜ −R)α)(I − c0))
=
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
F (α)
)
exp
(
(1− ρ)α(µ− r)
)
, (5.19)
where
F (α) = (1− ρ)(r + ασ2 + σ20
2
− α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
)
. (5.20)
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Determination of α
Given φ, it can be shown that
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)
=
(
(I−c0)1−ρ
1−ρ
)1−A
exp
(
G(α)
)
1− A Eµ˜ exp
(
(1−A)(1−ρ)αµ˜
)
,
(5.21)
where
G(α) = (1− A)(1− ρ)
(
r + α
σ2 + σ20
2
− α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
− αr
)
. (5.22)
Given the assumption that µ˜ ∼ N(θ, σ20),
(1− A)(1− ρ)αµ˜ ∼ N
(
(1− A)(1− ρ)αθ, (1− A)2(1− ρ)2α2σ20
)
. (5.23)
It gives
Eµ˜ exp
(
(1−A)(1−ρ)αµ˜
)
= exp
(
(1−A)(1−ρ)αθ+α2 (1− A)
2(1− ρ)2σ20
2
)
.
(5.24)
Substitute equation (5.24) into equation (5.21), the following is ob-
tained:
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)
=
(
(I−c0)1−ρ
1−ρ
)1−A
exp
(
(1− A)(1− ρ)H(α)
)
1− A , (5.25)
where
H(α) = r+α(θ−r+ σ
2 + σ20
2
)−α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
+α2
(1− A)(1− ρ)σ20
2
. (5.26)
So the second-period utility is
φ−1
[
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)]
=
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)K(α)
)
, (5.27)
where
K(α) = r+α(θ−r)+ασ
2 + σ20
2
−α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
+α2
(1− A)(1− ρ)σ20
2
. (5.28)
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In the individual maximization problem, the choice of risky asset share
α is uncorrelated with the choice of first-period consumption c0. So with-
out loss of generality, to solve the following maximization problem will
determine his portfolio choice:
max
{α}
φ−1
[
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)]
. (5.29)
First order condition:
θ − r + σ
2 + σ20
2
−
(
(ρσ2 + σ20)− (1− A)(1− ρ)σ20
)
α = 0. (5.30)
Then the optimal solution is
α =
θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
ρ(σ2 + σ20) + (1− ρ)Aσ20
. (5.31)
Determination of c0
max
{c0,α}
u(c0) + βφ
−1
[
Eµ˜φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)]
. (5.32)
F.O.C w.r.t c0,
c−ρ0 = β(I − c0)−ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)K(α)
)
. (5.33)
Therefore,
c0 = κI, (5.34)
where
κ =
{
1 + β
1
ρ exp
[
1− ρ
ρ
(
r +
(θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
)2
2
(
ρ(σ2 + σ20) + (1− ρ)Aσ20
))]}−1. (5.35)
Remark 37. Note when the individual is ambiguity neutral, i.e. A = 0, the
optimal solution (5.31) and (5.35) will coincide with the optimal choice
of CRRA expected utility maximizer using the compound distribution.
Smooth ambiguity aversion model characterizes individual ambiguity aver-
sion by relaxing the reduction of first-order and second-order belief when
they evaluate ambiguous asset.
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Remark 38. Equations (5.31) and (5.35) generate interesting comparative
statics:
1. Demand for the risky asset is positively related to equity premium
θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
, and inversely related to ambiguity aversion A; however,
unlike in pure risk case, the effect of risk aversion ρ on risky asset demand
is indeterminate, depending on the magnitude of σ2, σ20, and A.
2. The first period consumption is inversely related to time preference
β, and positively related to ambiguity aversion A; unlike in pure risk case,
the effect of risk aversion ρ on first period consumption is indeterminate.
5.3 Econometric strategy
5.3.1 Identification of preference parameters
Suppose individual belief information can be elicited out: θ−the mean of
normal distribution of risky asset mean return, σ0−the variance of nor-
mal distribution of risky asset mean return and σ−the variance of risky
asset return, I will show that all parameters of individual preference: time
preference β, risk aversion ρ, and ambiguity aversion A can be identified
uniquely. At first glance, there are two equations that determine α, κ,
and three variables β, ρ, and A, and it seems these parameters cannot be
uniquely identified. Actually it can if there is panel data, where under the
same riskfree asset return, in one period he only holds risky free asset, and
in the other period he holds both riskless and risky assets. Proposition 11
gives the key identification result.
Proposition 11. Assume the individual has constant relative risk aversion
and constant relative ambiguity aversion preference. Assume the subjective
distribution of the risky asset return is log-normal with ambiguous mean
being normally distributed. Suppose
1. at time s, with asset returns (ν˜s, R), the individual has consumption
rate κs, and only invests in the riskfree asset;
2. at time t, with asset return (ν˜t, R), the individual has consumption
rate κt, and invests αt of saving in the risky asset.
Then individual time preference β, relative risk aversion ρ, and relative
ambiguity aversion A can be uniquely identified.
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Proof. Step 1−Identification of relative risk aversion ρ
Given the risky asset share equation
α =
θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
ρ(σ2 + σ20) + (1− ρ)Aσ20
, (5.36)
and the consumption rate equation
κ =
{
1+β
1
ρ exp
[
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
r+
(θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
)2
2
(
ρ(σ2 + σ20) + (1− ρ)Aσ20
))]}−1, (5.37)
the consumption rate equation can be expressed as
κ =
{
1 + β
1
ρ exp
[
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
r +
α(θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
)
2
)]}−1
. (5.38)
Suppose, in period s, the individual only demands the riskfree asset,
and his consumption and asset choice are observed, with consumption rate
being κs, then the following is obtained:
κs =
[
1 + β
1
ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)
ρ
r
)]−1
. (5.39)
So
β
1
ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)
ρ
r
)
=
1− κs
κs
. (5.40)
Suppose, in period t, the individual demands both the riskless and risky
assets, with the risky asset share being αt, then,
κt =
[
1 +
1− κs
κs
exp
(
(1− ρ)
ρ
αt(θt − r + σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
)]−1
. (5.41)
In the above equation (5.41), the only unknown parameter is risk aver-
sion ρ, and it can be recovered as
ρ =
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
ln 1−κ
t
κt
− ln 1−κs
κs
+
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
. (5.42)
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Step 2−Identification of time preference β
When demand for the risky asset is zero, from consumption rate equa-
tion (5.39), β can be identified as
β = (
1− κs
κs
)ρ exp
(
(ρ− 1)r
)
, (5.43)
once ρ has been identified.
Step 3−Identification of relative ambiguity aversion A
The risky asset share equation (5.36) gives
αt(1− ρ)Aσ20t = (θt − r +
σ2t + σ
2
0t
2
)− αtρ(σ2t + σ20t). (5.44)
So ambiguity aversion can be identified as
A =
(θt − r + σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)− αtρ(σ2t + σ20t)
αt(1− ρ)σ20t
, (5.45)
where the right hand side has been known (either observable or identified
in Step 1 and Step 2).
Remark 39. The identification argument in Chapter 3 can recover indi-
vidual ambiguity preference nonparametrically, but requires observing the
whole demand functions. The identification Proposition 11 is a parametric
special case of Chapter 3, and requires a few observations to recover indi-
vidual preference, which enables me use household survey data to achieve
identification.
When I apply the above identification strategy to data, one problem I
encounter is that even when I have a panel data, the observation of both
zero and nonzero demand for the risky asset under an invariant interest
rate is rare. In this case, instead of identifying individual time preference,
I assume homogeneous time preference across households and take a value
consistent with micro-data evidence, and I focus on recovering the other
two parameters−relative risk aversion ρ and relative ambiguity aversion A,
which are more interesting. I will make a clear justification for such an
assumption in the following empirical part.
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Corollary 7. Assume the individual has constant relative risk aversion
and constant relative ambiguity aversion preference. Assume the subjective
distribution of the risky asset return is log-normal with ambiguous mean
being normally distributed. Suppose at time t, with asset return (ν˜t, R), the
individual has consumption rate κt, and invests αt of saving in the risky
asset. If individual time preference β is known, then individual relative risk
aversion and relative ambiguity aversion can be uniquely identified as
ρ =
ln β + r +
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
ln 1−κ
t
κt
+ r +
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
, (5.46)
A =
(θt − r + σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)− αtρ(σ2t + σ20t)
αt(1− ρ)σ20t
. (5.47)
5.3.2 Recovery of individual belief
In the model, I assume that the return of the risky asset ν˜ for each dollar
follows a log-normal distribution, i.e. ln(ν˜) ∼ N(µ, σ2), and that the indi-
vidual is ambiguous on the mean of expected return µ˜ , which is assumed
to be a normal random variable i.e. µ˜ ∼ N(θ, σ20). Then the unconditional
distribution of risky asset return ν˜ is also log-normal ln(ν˜) ∼ N(θ, σ2 +σ20).
Individual belief parameters θ, σ2, and σ20 are recovered in the following
way.
Individuals are assumed to have access to historical stock market data,
and base their belief on this data. I assume the individual has no ambi-
guity on the variance of the risky asset return, so I calculate the variance
of historical stock returns (after taking ln transformation), and use it to
approximate σ2.
In the survey data I use, individuals answer questions about proba-
bilities of future stock market returns. Future stock market returns are
assumed to be log-normal, and individuals perceive the distribution of fu-
ture stock market returns with its unconditional (or average) probability.
Then both θ and σ2 + σ20 can be estimated from the data.
Specifically, belief information is elicited out from two questions in the
questionnaire:
a. On a scale from 0 to 100, what is the likelihood that if you invest in
the Italian stock market today it will yield a profit in a year’s time?
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b. (If you give a figure for question a) What is the likelihood the invest-
ment will earn more than 10%?
Denote belief from question a) and question b) by pa and pb. Before I use
the households’ reported belief data to recover the subjective distribution
of the risky asset return, I need to check the quality of the belief data,
since such data are more subjective than the data of wealth variables, and
it relies on whether households can think in a probabilistic way. I will do
the following check:
Consistency check: If households think in a probabilistic way, then
both pa and pb should satisfy the weak consistency condition as probability
i.e. pa ≥ pb. A more demanding requirement is the strict consistency
condition i.e. pa > pb.
As will be seen in the next sections, the belief data passes this test very
well, and I will use these data to recover individual belief in two different
ways.
Face value approach
Firstly, I take the household expectation data at its face value, and believe
that households truthfully report what they think without any error. Such
face value approach would be objected by the argument that the survey
does not give any incentive to household to truthfully reveal their belief;
however, households do not have incentive to truthfully report the value of
other variables like consumption, portfolio and income either. Just as the
reported household consumption, portfolio and income are useful for our
understanding their decision making, I believe that the reported household
expectation data contains information of their perception over the stock
return distribution. In the analysis of the next section, I do the consistency
check, and find that more than 90% households report consistent belief. So
it indicates that households think these questions carefully, rather than
give random answers. Given pa and pb, then I have the following recovery
result:
Lemma 7. Suppose the individual subjective distribution of the risky asset
return is log-normal with the ambiguous mean being normally distributed.
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Given pa and pb, then individual belief can be uniquely recovered as
θ =
ln 1.1
Φ−1(1− pa)− Φ−1(1− pb)Φ
−1(1− pa), (5.48)
σ20 =
ln 1.1
Φ−1(1− pb)− Φ−1(1− pa) − σ
2. (5.49)
Proof. Based on the questions about stock expectation return, I have
pa = P (ν˜ ≥ 1), (5.50)
pb = P (ν˜ ≥ 1.1). (5.51)
From the above two equations, I have
pa = P (ln ν˜ ≥ ln 1), (5.52)
pb = P (ln ν˜ ≥ ln 1.1), (5.53)
i.e.
pa = P (
ln ν˜ − θ
σ2 + σ20
≥ −θ
σ2 + σ20
), (5.54)
pb = P (
ln ν˜ − θ
σ2 + σ20
≥ ln 1.1− θ
σ2 + σ20
). (5.55)
Since ln ν˜−θ
σ2+σ20
is a standard normal variable, the equations (5.54) and
(5.55) give the result in the lemma, where Φ is the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.
Market data approach
In the above face value approach, I do not allow any report or measurement
error, and do not put any restriction on household second order belief-
i.e. their expectation on the mean return, except assuming it’s normally
distributed, so households’ expected stock equity premium can be far away
from historical realization. However, households probably answer these
questions by rounding rather than exactly, and it’s possible that there are
measurement errors. Besides, although households do not know exactly
the probability distribution of stock market return, usually they do have
a rough idea about the equity premium from stock market, i.e. they do
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not totally ignore the information of market data on the expected equity
return. So my second approach to household belief data is to allow error in
the belief data, and put restrictions on household second order belief such
that the perceived mean equity return matches the market data.
Specifically, I assume the true values p∗a and p
∗
b are proportional to pa
and pb by a common factor λ, i.e. p
∗
a=λpa and p
∗
b=λpb. So the magnitude of
λ reflects how much the reported value deviates from its true value. Then if
λ = 1, the reported belief data is exact without error; if λ > 1, households
report their belief in a conservative way. I assume the error factor λ is the
same across pa and pb, one motivation is if pa and pb satisfy consistency
conditions, then λpa and λpb will also satisfy these conditions.
I assume households are ambiguous on the mean of the log-normal dis-
tribution, and their perceived unconditional mean equity return equals the
historical realization, which is denoted by Eˆ. Under these assumptions,
knowing pa, pb and Eˆ suffices to recover the three parameters θ, σ
2
0 and λ,
since the following three equations hold:
λpa = P (
ln ν˜ − θ
σ2 + σ20
≥ −θ
σ2 + σ20
), (5.56)
λpb = P (
ln ν˜ − θ
σ2 + σ20
≥ ln 1.1− θ
σ2 + σ20
), (5.57)
Eˆ = θ +
σ2 + σ20
2
. (5.58)
The unknown can be expressed implicitly by the following equations:
θ =
ln 1.1
Φ−1(1− λpa)− Φ−1(1− λpb)Φ
−1(1− λpa), (5.59)
σ20 =
ln 1.1
Φ−1(1− λpb)− Φ−1(1− λpa) − σ
2, (5.60)
ln 1.1
2
= EˆΦ−1(1− λpb)− (Eˆ − ln 1.1)Φ−1(1− λpa). (5.61)
Since Φ−1 function is nonlinear with respect to λ, I can not express the
solution explicitly. I will use numerical methods to get the solution.
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5.3.3 Testing constant relative risk and ambiguity aver-
sion
One testable implication of constant relative risk aversion and constant
relative ambiguity aversion is that the consumption rate out of wealth
is independent of wealth level, and the portfolio share out of saving is
independent of saving level. To test the constant relative risk aversion
and constant relative ambiguity aversion assumption, I run the following
regression:
lnκit = a1 + b1xit + d1 ln Iit + µit, (5.62)
lnαit = a2 + b2xit + d2 ln sit + ηit, (5.63)
where lnκit is the ln of saving rate, lnαit is the ln of risky asset share, xit is
a vector of individual specific control variables including their age, gender,
education etc, ln Iit is individual wealth level, and ln sit is individual saving
level. The parameters of interest are d1 and d2, which, according to the
theory, should be 0.
However, if there exist unobservable individual characteristics υi and νi
affecting consumption and portfolio choice, then the true regressions would
be
lnκit = a1 + b1xit + d1 ln Iit + υi + µit, (5.64)
lnαit = a2 + b2xit + d2 ln sit + νi + ηit. (5.65)
If risk aversion or ambiguity aversion are related to wealth/saving level,
but not observable, then it will be part of µi and ηi, which will cause
an endogeneity problem. One approach to dealing with the endogeneity
problem is to find an instrument, which is correlated with wealth but not
correlated with unobservable preference, and run a two stage regression or
use the GMM method to estimate the model.
If the unobservable preference heterogeneity is fixed over time, another
approach is to use panel data to difference the fixed effect. Under this
approach, I need to control the variation of belief since across periods in-
dividuals will change their belief, and hence change their consumption and
portfolio choice, even though they are not related to wealth level. To test
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the assumption of constant relative risk aversion and constant relative am-
biguity aversion, I first difference the fixed effect, then run the following
regression:
4 lnκit = a1 + b14xit + d14 lnwit +4µit, (5.66)
4 lnαit = a2 + b24xit + d24 ln sit +4ηit. (5.67)
Since I have a rotating panel from SHIW2008 and SHIW2010, I will test
constant relative risk and ambiguity aversion using both the instrumental
variable method and the first difference method.
5.3.4 Distinguishing two models
Testing over-identification restrictions
Note that the fact that the consumption rate is invariant to wealth level
and the risky asset share is invariant to saving level cannot distinguish the
CRRA expected utility model from the smooth ambiguity model in this
chapter. One can interpret this as evidence that individuals have ambi-
guity on the distribution of risky asset return, and are ambiguity averse;
alternatively, one can interpret it as evidence that individuals are expected
utility maximizers with CRRA utility functions. Then how could the two
models be distinguished from each other based on the data? The following
lemma shows that CRRA preference puts over-identification restrictions on
recovered risk aversion ρ, which is a means of distinguishing between these
two models.
Lemma 8. Assume the individual has constant relative risk aversion, and
the risky asset return is log-normally distributed. Suppose
1. at time s, with asset returns (ν˜s, R), the individual has consumption
rate κs, and only invests in the riskfree asset;
2. at time t, with asset return (ν˜t, R), the individual has consumption
rate κt, and invests αt of saving in the risky asset.
Then relative risk aversion ρ will be over-identified.
Proof. I only sketch the proof, since it is similar to the proof of Proposition
11.
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From Section 5.2, under expected utility theory, a CRRA expected util-
ity maximizer will make the following choice:
α =
µ− r + σ2
2
ρσ2
, (5.68)
κ =
{
1 + β
1
ρ exp
[
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
r +
(µ− r + σ2
2
)2
2ρσ2
)]}−1
. (5.69)
In period s, observing κs =
[
1 + β
1
ρ exp
(
(1−ρ)
ρ
r
)]−1
,
β
1
ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)
ρ
r
)
=
1− κs
κs
. (5.70)
In period t, observing κt and αt,
κt =
{
1 + β
1
ρ exp
[
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
r + αt
(µt − r + σ
2
t
2
)
2
)]}−1
. (5.71)
From κt, risk aversion can be recovered as
ρκ =
αt(µt−r+σ
2
t
2
)
2
ln 1−κ
t
κt
− ln 1−κs
κs
+
αt(µt−r+σ
2
t
2
)
2
. (5.72)
From αt, risk aversion can be recovered as
ρα =
µt − r + σ
2
t
2
αtσ2t
. (5.73)
If subjective expected utility theory holds, then relative risk aversion ρ
identified from α and κ, i.e. ρα and ρκ should be the same. The testable
implication is to test the equality. When I use cross-sectional data rather
than panel data to identify relative risk aversion, I assume homogeneous
time preference across individuals, and take a value consistent with micro
evidence.
Corollary 8. Assume the individual has constant relative risk aversion,
and the risky asset return is log-normally distributed. Suppose at time
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t, with asset return (ν˜t, R), the individual has consumption rate κ
t, and
invests αt of saving in the risky asset. If individual time preference β is
known, then risk aversion ρ will be over-identified as
ρα =
µt − r + σ
2
t
2
αtσ2t
, (5.74)
and
ρκ =
ln β + r +
αt(µt−r+σ
2
t
2
)
2
ln 1−κ
t
κt
+ r +
αt(µt−r+σ
2
t
2
)
2
. (5.75)
Testing ambiguity aversion restriction
As remarked, when the individual shows ambiguity neutrality, i.e. A = 0,
he will act as a subjective expected utility maximizer using compound
(or unconditional) probability. So another way to distinguish between the
subjective expected utility model and the smooth ambiguity model is to
test whether the recovered ambiguity aversion A equals zero or not. If the
recovered ambiguity aversion A is significantly different from 0, this will
cast doubt on the subjective expected utility theory.
5.3.5 Factors affecting risk aversion and ambiguity
aversion
What factors affect individual risk attitude and ambiguity attitude? Can
individual characteristics like age, gender, education, marital status etc, ac-
count for large heterogeneity in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion across
individuals? To answer this question, I will run the following regressions:
ρi = α1 + β1zi + i, (5.76)
Ai = α2 + β2zi + ξi, (5.77)
where zi is a vector of control variables including gender, age, number of
household members, education, and wealth.
116
5.4 Data description
I use the data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
collected by the Bank of Italy every two years, which contains detailed in-
formation on the socioeconomic characteristics, income, saving, and port-
folios of more than 8000 Italian households. SHIW is a rotating panel with
around half of households interviewed in the next wave. This analysis uses
two waves of the survey: SHIW2008 and SHIW2010. These two waves are
used mainly because they contain questions about household expectations
about stock market performance which are consistent and comparable.
SHIW2008 and SHIW2010 cover 7977 and 7951 households respectively,
and the number of panel households (interviewed in both waves) is 4621.3
5.4.1 Construction of key variables
All wealth variables in the survey refer to the household as a whole and are
self-reported, end of year, market value measured in Euro.
Consumption: refers to household expenditure on nondurable goods
over the whole year. Due to the nature of durable goods, I do not consider
durable goods in most of the analysis; however, a robustness check including
durable goods will be performed.
Riskfree asset: includes deposits (bank accounts, certificates of deposit,
repos, and post office savings certificates) and Italian government securities
(T-bills, T-certificates, T-bonds, zero coupons, and other).
Risky financial asset: includes bonds issued by Italian firms or banks,
Italian investment funds (money market or liquidity funds, bond funds,
balanced funds, equity funds, index funds etc), shares of listed or unlisted
companies and equity in partnerships, managed portfolios, foreign secu-
rities issued by non-residents, loans to cooperatives, and other financial
assets (options, futures, royalties etc). 4
Saving: is the sum of riskfree assets and risky financial assets.
3In SHIW2010, based on randomization (birth year of household head being odd or
even), only half of the households are asked to answer these questions.
4In the analysis, I exclude the value of business equity and the value of real estate
from risk financial assets. First of all, the inclusion of business equity and real estate
would be inconsistent with household belief data, which is concerned with the return
from the stock market. Secondly, both business equity and real estate are more than a
standard asset, and the associated risk with them is unclear.
117
Household wealth: is the sum of consumption expenditure and saving.
5.4.2 Individual belief
In SHIW2008 and SHIW2010, all interviewed households are asked to ex-
press their expectations about investment returns from the Italian stock
market:
a. On a scale from 0 to 100, what is the likelihood that if you invest in
the Italian stock market today it will yield a profit in a year’s time?
b. (If you give a figure for question a) What is the likelihood the invest-
ment will earn more than 10%?
These two questions can determine the whole distribution of a two-
parameter probability distribution, which is assumed to be log-normal in
this chapter. However, not all interviewed households answered these ques-
tions and answered in a consistent way. In SHIW2008, 2245 out of 7977
(28.1%) households answer both questions; however, among households
holding risky assets, 706 out of 1291 (54.7%) households answer both ques-
tions. In SHIW2010, 1347 out of 4135−after randomization (32.6%) house-
holds answer both questions; among households holding risky assets, 405
out of 762−after randomization (53.1%) households answer both questions.
Households holding risky assets are more likely to report their expectations
about stock market performance; this is probably because such households
are more rich and well-educated, are accustomed to probabilistic thinking,
and track the stock market more often.
In the analysis, I only keep strictly consistent answers, where the prob-
ability of the first question is larger than that of the second, i.e. pa >
pb.
5 In SHIW2008, 1734 out of 7977 (21.7%) households report consistent
beliefs; among households holding risky assets, the ratio increases to 40.9%
(528 out of 1291). In SHIW2010, 1120 out of 4135 (27.1%) households
give reasonable answers; among households holding risky assets, the ratio
increases to 45.1% (344 out of 762). Among 4621 panel households, only
315 households report consistent expectations in both interviews.
5By strictly consistent I mean pa > pb; by weakly consistent I mean pa >= pb.
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Consistency check: although relatively few households answer both
questions, however, conditional on reporting their beliefs in both ques-
tions, most households give consistent answers: in SHIW2008, 1734 out
of 2245 (77.2%) households show strict consistency, and 2079 out of 2245
(92.6%) households show weak consistency; in SHIW2010, 1120 out of 1347
(83.1%) households show strict consistency, and 1292 out of 1347 (95.9%)
households show weak consistency; and this is also true among households
holding risky assets.
To use household expectation data, I make following adjustment: re-
place extreme values with less extreme ones. In the case pa = 100, house-
holds express they are very confident on positive return, we replace it with
pa = 99. In the case pb = 0, households don’t think it’s possible to have
more than 10% return, I replace it with pb = 1. I expect such a small
adjustment would not incur a loss of generality.
5.4.3 Descriptive analysis
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables and the
sample size, where the upper panel includes all sample households, and the
lower panel is based on households holding risky assets. Some patterns in
the data deserve mentioning.
First of all, across groups, households holding risky assets have a higher
level of consumption, saving and wealth, but a lower consumption rate
than average households in both 2008 and 2010. This fact is consistent
with other existing evidence on household consumption and saving behav-
ior, which shows households with risky assets are generally more rich. In
terms of their expectations, in both 2008 and 2010, households holding
risky assets are more optimistic, i.e. higher mean of both pa and pb than
average households, and their expectations are more dispersed, i.e. a higher
standard deviation of both pa and pb.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
SHIW 2008 SHIW 2010
All sample households All sample households
mean Std.Dev. Observation mean Std.Dev. Observation
Consumption 22.190 11.642 7977 23.676 13.763 7951
Riskfree asset 17.332 60.351 7977 17.376 53.471 7951
Saving 24.386 78.302 7977 27.999 94.199 7951
Wealth 46.576 82.646 7977 51.675 100.325 7951
Consumption rate 0.701 0.257 7977 0.695 0.261 7951
Consistent belief - - 1734 - - 1120
pa 25.654 21.785 1734 23.498 20.544 1120
pb 8.329 13.176 1734 6.457 10.796 1120
Holding risky asset Holding risky asset
mean Std.Dev. Observation mean Std.Dev. Observation
Consumption 31.538 16.328 1291 33.731 18.678 1484
Riskfree asset 35.917 84.757 1291 33.896 58.153 1484
Risky asset 43.592 102.905 1291 56.916 157.472 1484
Saving 79.509 139.129 1291 90.813 176.365 1484
Wealth 111.047 145.006 1291 124.544 184.382 1484
Consumption rate 0.416 0.206 1291 0.404 0.195 1484
Risky asset share 0.535 0.281 1291 0.567 0.276 1484
Consistent belief - - 528 - - 344
pa 31.169 23.945 528 29.401 23.054 344
pb 11.258 15.934 528 8.407 12.735 344
Note: The unit of consumption, riskfree asset, risky asset, saving, and wealth is 1000 Euros.
Consumption refers to expenditure in nondurable goods. Risky assets refer to risky financial as-
sets, i.e. firm or bank bonds, investment funds, stock shares and other financial assets, excluding
business equity and real estate. Consistent belief refers to belief with strict consistency, i.e. pa
> pb. In SHIW 2010, based on head of household’s birth year being even or odd, only half of the
interviewed households are asked to report their expectation of stock market performance.
Secondly, across time, the levels of consumption, saving and wealth,
and the proportion of households holding risky assets, have increased from
2008 to 2010; however, the consumption rate (for both general households
and households with risky assets) and the risky asset share (for households
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with risky assets) keep relatively stable across these two years. Before 2008,
when the financial crisis occurred, more than 25% of Italian households had
risky assets; however, following financial crisis, only 16.2% of households
held risky assets in 2008, so the effect of the financial crisis is obvious. This
increases to 18.7% in 2010, indicating better economic prospects. In terms
of household belief, people are more pessimistic in 2010, i.e. there is a lower
mean of both pa and pb, which holds for both the general population and
the one with risky asset. This is probably because households form their
expectations based on their previous experience.
5.5 Result and interpretation
5.5.1 Recovering individual belief
Distribution of individual belief
I assume that households have no ambiguity about the variance of stock
returns, and they forecast the variance based on historical data. In the
analysis, I take the variance of stock log-normal return to be σ2=0.02. For
the return of the riskfree asset, let R = 0.983.6 As mentioned in Section
5.4, I make small adjustments to household belief data with extreme values
to make the computation possible: in SHIW2008, 13 reported pa = 1.00 are
replaced with pa = 0.99, 39 reported pa = 0.01 are replaced with pa = 0.02,
587 reported pb = 0 are replaced with pb = 0.01; in SHIW2010, 8 reported
pa = 1.00 are replaced with pa = 0.99, 29 reported pa = 0.01 are replaced
with pa = 0.02, and 445 reported pb = 0 are replaced with pb = 0.01.
Table 5.2 reports the summary statistics of recovered household beliefs, i.e.
the mean and variance of the log-normal distribution, both in 2008 and in
2010, where the upper half includes all the sample households who report
consistent beliefs, and the lower half concentrates exclusively on households
holding positive risky financial assets.
6The data on Italy stock and bond return are based on the analysis in Dimson,
Marsh, and Staunton (2011).
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Table 5.2: Distribution of recovered household belief
Individual belief in 2008 Individual belief in 2010
All sample households All sample households
θ σ20 + σ
2 Eν˜ θ σ20 + σ
2 Eν˜
5% -0.718 0.046 -0.543 -0.718 0.041 -0.543
10% -0.336 0.058 -0.205 -0.383 0.053 -0.267
25% -0.230 0.085 -0.124 -0.230 0.079 -0.160
50% -0.117 0.119 -0.041 -0.117 0.123 -0.071
75% -0.028 0.217 0.017 -0.028 0.217 -0.001
95% 0.048 0.350 0.117 0.037 0.350 0.091
Min -1.481 0.021 -1.031 -1.781 0.021 -1.178
Max 0.253 0.901 0.550 0.278 1.207 0.403
Mean -0.151 0.157 -0.072 -0.167 0.155 -0.090
Std. Dev. 0.195 0.107 0.162 0.204 0.108 0.164
Observation 1734 1734 1734 1120 1120 1120
Holding risky asset Holding risky asset
θ σ20 + σ
2 Eν˜ θ σ20 + σ
2 Eν˜
5% -0.718 0.041 -0.543 -0.403 0.041 -0.295
10% -0.336 0.053 -0.205 -0.336 0.046 -0.205
25% -0.158 0.074 -0.074 -0.182 0.064 -0.074
50% -0.077 0.119 -0.022 -0.077 0.098 -0.022
75% 0.000 0.217 0.039 0.000 0.182 0.028
95% 0.095 0.352 0.186 0.064 0.350 0.126
Min -1.481 0.030 -1.031 -0.832 0.020 -0.550
Max 0.253 0.901 0.403 0.141 0.564 0.325
Mean -0.119 0.154 -0.042 -0.119 0.137 -0.051
Std. Dev. 0.197 0.113 0.168 0.171 0.094 0.140
Observation 528 528 528 344 344 344
Note: I only include samples with strictly consistent belief, i.e. pa > pb. Simple return
Eν˜ is equal to θ +
σ20+σ
2
2 . Risky assets refer to risky financial assets-i.e. firm or bank
bonds, investment funds, stock shares and other financial assets, excluding business
equity and real estate.
I find that, first of all, household expectations are quite heterogeneous.
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For the general population, in 2008 (2010), the perceived mean θ of log-
normal return varies from −1.487 (−1.781) to 0.253 (0.278), the perceived
variance σ20 + σ
2 ranges from 0.021 (0.020) to 0.901 (1.207), and the per-
ceived simple excess return goes from −1.043 (−1.189) to 0.550 (0.391)
across households. Such heterogeneity holds among households holding
risky assets. This finding casts doubt on the homogeneous expectation hy-
pothesis usually assumed in finance and macroeconomic modeling. It also
has important implication for preference aggregation under uncertainty.
Secondly, household expectations are very pessimistic in terms of both
perceived mean θ and simple return Eν˜. Across all sample households, in
both periods, the mean θ of unconditional log-normal distribution is nega-
tive and more than half of households expect θ would be negative. This also
holds with regard to the simple return Eν˜. Households holding risky assets
are more optimistic than average households, but there is pessimism also
among this group. Such pessimism is possibly influenced by the economic
situation, as the interviews were done following the financial crisis. One
important feature is that among households holding positive risky assets,
more than half believe that the simple excess return from stock markets
would be negative. From Lemma 6, it is known that these households can-
not be both risk averse and ambiguity averse. This indicates that a large
proportion of households are risk loving and/or ambiguity loving.
Thirdly, households are subject to much ambiguity. The perceived vari-
ance σ20 + σ
2 is strictly larger than historical stock return volatility. Under
my model, one part of the variance, σ20, represents individual ambiguity,
reflecting individual subjective uncertainty over the mean of stock returns.
From Table 5.2, it can be seen that household ambiguity is large compared
with realized stock return volatility. One important reason for ambigu-
ity is informational constraint, i.e. households have limited information
about how the stock market works, or they have difficulty understanding
information available to them.
The reported result on recovered household expectations offers one way
to understand household financial decisions and the stock market puz-
zle. There is a large literature about the fact that only a small propor-
tion of households hold risky assets, which is a puzzle since historically
stock returns have generated a very high equity premium−see Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995). One standard approach to solving such a puzzle is
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to consider entry and transaction costs in the stock market−see Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002). However, the relevance of participation costs for holding
risky assets is controversial, since the measurable participation cost is very
small compared with the historical stock return. The finding in this chap-
ter uncovers one alternative explanation: household expectations are too
pessimistic, and they are very ambiguous about stock returns. As will
be seen in later analysis, household expectation has significant effect on
households’ stock market participation and risky asset holdings.
Factors influencing individual belief
What can account for such large variation in household expectation? Table
5.3 and Table 5.4 show the OLS regression of household belief (θ in columns
(1) and (3) and σ20 +σ
2 in columns (2) and (4) ) on household characteristics
for 2008 and 2010 respectively.
First of all, the mean θ is closely related to wealth level (after ln trans-
formation), age and gender. Wealthy households expect a higher level of the
mean of log-normal return, while households with older household heads
have lower expectations. Interestingly, male household heads display more
optimistic expectations about stock returns, which holds for the general
population and for households with risky assets. In 2008, more educated
households showed more optimism.
Second, the large variation of ambiguity cannot be explained by observ-
able household characteristics. In 2008, male household heads showed less
ambiguity, and more educated households were less ambiguous; however,
such an effect is not significant in 2010 survey. Other variables like wealth
level, age, marital status and region do not have any significant effect.
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Table 5.3: OLS regression of household belief SHIW 2008
Household belief in 2008
All HH HH w. risky asset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logw2008 0.025∗∗∗ -0.005 0.021∗ -0.006
(0.007) (0.004) (0.012) (0.007)
No.household members -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006)
Age -0.001∗∗ 0.0002 -0.003∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0006)
No.income earner 0.014∗ -0.006 0.023∗∗ -0.009
(0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
Male 0.029∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.025∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.03) (0.014)
Married 0.015 -0.000 0.035 -0.015
(0.016) (0.009) (0.031) (0.017)
Separated 0.012 -0.0004 0.037 -0.009
(0.023) (0.013) (0.050) (0.027)
Widowed 0.043∗ -0.019 0.049 -0.017
(0.023) (0.012) (0.049) (0.025)
Primary school 0.111∗ -0.035 0.339∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.028) (0.039) (0.022)
Secondary school 0.106∗ -0.037 0.349∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.028) (0.039) (0.021)
Uni.or more 0.137∗∗ -0.039 0.368∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.029) (0.043) (0.024)
Employee -0.001 0.004 -0.420 0.017
(0.014) (0.008) (0.026) (0.016)
Self-employed 0.012 -0.0003 -0.001 0.011
(0.016) (0.009) (0.028) (0.018)
Live in North -0.015 -0.009 0.017 0.008
(0.015) (0.008) (0.038) (0.018)
Live in Center 0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.020
(0.016) (0.009) (0.040) (0.019)
Intercept -0.494∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.048) (0.136) (0.073)
N 1734 1734 528 528
R2 0.031 0.012 0.070 0.041
Note: In columns (1) and (3), the left-hand side variable is θ; in columns (2) and (4), the
left-hand side variable is σ20 + σ
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant
at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.4: OLS regression of household belief SHIW 2010
Household belief in 2010
All HH HH w. risky asset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logw2010 0.045∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008)
No.household members 0.001 -0.003 0.0009 -0.002
(0.008) (0.004) (0.014) (0.007)
Age -0.001∗ -0.0000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.0007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006)
No.income earner -0.005 0.0003 -0.009 0.006
(0.009) (0.005) (0.015) (0.008)
Male 0.048∗∗∗ -0.012 0.051∗∗ -0.008
(0.014) (0.008) (0.022) (0.011)
Married -0.029 0.023∗ -0.059∗∗ 0.028
(0.022) (0.012) (0.030) (0.018)
Separated -0.020 0.012 -0.046 0.042∗
(0.028) (0.013) (0.042) (0.022)
Widowed -0.020 0.026∗ -0.062 0.037
(0.029) (0.015) (0.047) (0.027)
Primary school -0.043 -0.005 -0.037 0.018
(0.058) (0.020) (0.050) (0.030)
Secondary school -0.039 0.0003 0.001 0.005
(0.056) (0.019) (0.023) (0.012)
Uni.or more -0.025 -0.006 (omitted) (omitted)
(0.059) (0.021) () ()
Employee 0.0007 -0.005 0.031 -0.003
(0.017) (0.009) (0.033) (0.017)
Self-employed 0.004 -0.012 0.045 -0.028∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.033) (0.017)
Live in North 0.007 -0.009 0.004 -0.020
(0.020) (0.011) (0.035) (0.026)
Live in Center 0.017 -0.010 0.003 -0.029
(0.023) (0.013) (0.037) (0.028)
Intercept -0.547∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ -0.467∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗
(0.097) (0.049) (0.156) (0.093)
N 1120 1120 344 344
R2 0.060 0.033 0.088 0.049
Note: In columns (1) and (3), the left-hand side variable is θ; in columns (2) and (4), the
left-hand side variable is σ20 + σ
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant
at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Financial market participation
How will household expectations be related to their decision to hold risky
assets? Table 5.5 reports the probit regression of stock market participation
decisions on their belief and observable characteristics.7
I first run the regression controlling for wealth level only, since existing
literature documents that household wealth level has a large impact on the
likelihood of their holding risky assets. Regression result in columns (1)
and (3) confirms such conclusion, and such effect is both economically and
statistically significant.
In columns (2) and (4), I control for the effect of household expecta-
tions and other variables. Wealth level , number of household members and
living region have a significant effect: higher wealth level and living in the
north or center are positively related to stock market participation, while
the number of household members is negatively related to the participa-
tion decision. In 2008, household expectations (both mean and variance)
have a significant positive effect on their participation. The positive effect
of variance is surprising at first glance. One interpretation is that what
matters for household financial decisions is the simple return, which equals
to θ +
σ20+σ
2
2
, and households would like to hold risky assets if the return
can compensate for its riskiness and ambiguity. However, the effect of
household belief is not significant in 2010.
In the above probit regression, one concern is the endogeneity of the
wealth variable. In IV estimation not reported here, I instrument household
wealth with their net annual income, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is
not rejected, and the above conclusion still holds.
7Marital status variables do not have any significant effect. Since it is not the variable
of my interest, it will not be reported in the below regression tables. However, the
reported result is after controlling for marital status effect.
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Table 5.5: Probit regression for market participation
Participation in 2008 Participation in 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logw2008 1.198∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ - -
(0.030) (0.088)
logw2010 - - 1.217∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.104)
Theta - 0.810∗∗∗ - 0.576
(0.283) (0.395)
Sigma - 1.210∗∗ - 0.528
(0.513) (0.728)
No.household members - -0.118∗∗∗ - -0.129∗∗
(0.045) (0.060)
Age - -0.008∗∗ - -0.004
(0.004) (0.006)
No.income earner - 0.035 - -0.017
(0.060) (0.076)
Male - 0.146∗ - 0.097
(0.88) (0.107)
Primary school - 0.772 - 3.721∗∗∗
(0.614) (0.238)
Secondary - 0.948 - 3.676∗∗∗
(0.605) (0.223)
Uni.or more - 0.986 - 3.768∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.257)
Employee - 0.036 - 0.218
(0.108) (0.148)
Self-employed - -0.130 - 0.107
(0.134) (0.176)
Live in North - 0.497∗∗∗ - 0.555∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.173)
Live in Center - 0.640∗∗∗ - 0.430∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.191)
Intercept -13.764∗∗∗ -13.337∗∗∗ -13.931∗∗∗ -18.064∗∗∗
(0.324) (1.055) (0.316) (1.126)
N 7977 1734 7951 1120
Pseudo R2 0.270 0.357 0.339 0.343
Note: Participation is defined by positive amount of risky financial assets. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant
at 1%.
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5.5.2 Testing constant relative risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion
In this section, I test the reasonableness of constant relative risk aversion
and relative ambiguity aversion assumptions. One testable implication is
that: risky asset share out of saving is independent of saving level, and sav-
ing rate out of wealth is independent of wealth level. I use two approaches
to test this implication: cross-sectional test and panel first-difference test.
To control for endogeneity in the cross-sectional regression, I run a GMM
regression, using net annual income and/or value of durable goods to in-
strument wealth.
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 report the results on how the risky asset share
is related to saving using data from 2008 and 2010 respectively. In columns
(1), (3) and (5), I run OLS without controlling for endogeneity caused by
saving level, in columns (2), (4) and (6), I instrument household saving with
household net annual income and/or value of durable goods. The sample in
columns (1) and (2) includes households with risky assets, in columns (3)
and (4) includes households with risky assets and reporting their beliefs,
and in columns (5) and (6) includes households with risky assets and pos-
itive excess return expectation. The dependent variable is the log of risky
asset share, and the independent variables include log of household saving
and other controls. The parameter of interest is the coefficient of log saving,
which should be zero according to the model. In 2008, column (1) in Table
5.6 shows that the risky asset share is negatively related to saving level,
which can be explained by increasing risk aversion or increasing ambiguity
aversion; however, the effect is economically insignificant. After controlling
for endogeneity, the effect becomes statistically insignificant, as shown in
column (2). In columns (3) and (4), I control for the effect of household
expectations, the regression without considering endogeneity cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, but such conclusion changes
once I control for endogeneity. In columns (5) and (6), I concentrate on the
sample with positive excess return expectations, which is most relevant to
our recovery. The coefficient of saving is not different from zero, and the
GMM C statistic shows that there is no serious endogeneity among this
sample.
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Table 5.6: Cross-sectional test of risky asset share invariant to saving
SHIW 2008
Risky asset share 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logsaving2008 -0.044∗ 0.069 0.006 0.185∗∗ -0.025 0.082
(0.025) (0.058) (0.038) (0.090) (0.054) (0.102)
Theta - - 0.501∗∗ 0.433∗∗ -0.206 -0.213
(0.196) (0.197) (0.538) (0.517)
Sigma - - 1.143∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.870∗∗
(0.335) (0.333) (0.359) (0.348)
No.household members -0.034 -0.025 -0.030 -0.028 -0.049 -0.037
(0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.043) (0.059) (0.056)
Age -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
No.income earner 0.009 -0.015 0.045 0.009 0.080 0.055
(0.035) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.070) (0.068)
Male 0.017 -0.010 0.050 0.005 -0.156 -0.194
(0.057) (0.059) (0.101) (0.108) (0.118) (0.120)
Secondary 0.093 0.017 0.004 -0.072 -0.315∗∗ -0.322∗∗
(0.078) (0.086) (0.145) (0.146) (0.143) (0.141)
Uni.or more -0.051 -0.084 -0.109 -0.285 -0.250 -0.320∗
(0.097) (0.124) (0.164) (0.195) (0.158) (0.170)
Employee -0.070 -0.075 -0.078 -0.106 -0.042 -0.070
(0.070) (0.071) (0.104) (0.108) (0.135) (0.132)
Self-employed -0.019 -0.062 -0.049 -0.142 0.102 0.032
(0.082) (0.085) (0.127) (0.127) (0.152) (0.151)
Live in North 0.211∗∗ 0.194∗∗ -0.057 -0.140 -0.148 -0.173
(0.084) (0.088) (0.128) (0.143) (0.178) (0.173)
Live in Center 0.283∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ -0.091 -0.134 -0.311 -0.299
(0.088) (0.091) (0.135) (0.142) (0.204) (0.197)
Intercept -0.556∗ -1.477∗∗∗ -0.777∗ -2.114∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.759
(0.291) (0.501) (0.432) (0.733) (0.587) 0.895
N 1291 1291 528 528 259 259
R2 0.017 0.026 0.065 0.044
p-value of Hansen’s J test - 0.571 - - - 0.470
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.031 - 0.032 - 0.246
Note: Risky assets refer to risky financial assets-i.e. firm or bank bonds, investment funds, stock shares
and other financial assets, excluding business equity and real estate. Saving is the sum of riskfree assets
and risky financial assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at
5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.7: Cross-sectional test of risky asset share invariant to saving
SHIW 2010
Risky asset share 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logsaving2010 -0.005 0.093∗∗ -0.065 0.025 -0.097 0.113
(0.022) (0.039) (0.053) (0.104) (0.068) (0.168)
Theta - - 1.111∗∗ 1.021∗∗ 2.683∗∗ 2.614∗∗
(0.501) (0.471) (1.159) (1.073)
Sigma - - 0.801 0.767 -0.216 -0.048
(0.714) (0.679) (0.864) (0.769)
No.household members 0.028 0.027 0.131∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.081 0.113
(0.028) (0.028) (0.068) (0.066) (0.074) (0.076)
Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 0.007 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
No.income earner -0.056∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.086 -0.098 -0.074 -0.109
(0.032) (0.032) (0.070) (0.071) (0.078) (0.082)
Male -0.093∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.095 -0.105 -0.073 -0.145
(0.045) (0.045) (0.117) (0.114) (0.159) (0.173)
Secondary 0.038 -0.031 -0.011 -0.062 0.206 0.067
(0.073) (0.076) (0.230) (0.214) (0.301) (0.297)
Uni.or more 0.027 -0.095 0.145 0.058 0.321 0.106
(0.081) (0.090) (0.233) (0.223) (0.311) (0.344)
Employee -0.075 -0.081 -0.306∗∗ -0.308 0.044 0.037
(0.064) (0.064) (0.151) (0.148) (0.178) (0.182)
Self-employed -0.046 -0.075 -0.221 -0.241 0.124 0.053
(0.069) (0.070) (0.159) (0.158) (0.192) (0.191)
Live in North 0.109∗ 0.085 0.264 0.199 0.351 0.184
(0.064) (0.065) (0.152) (0.165) (0.277) (0.299)
Live in Center 0.140∗∗ 0.111 0.268 0.208 0.377 0.230
(0.068) (0.068) (0.163) (0.167) (0.287) (0.297)
Intercept -0.794∗∗∗ -1.568 -0.024 -0.747 -0.750 -2.441∗
(0.257) (0.370) (0.699) (1.020) (0.800) (1.393)
N 1484 1484 344 344 152 152
R2 0.011 0.057 0.048 0.099 0.036
p-value of Hansen’s J test - 0.970 - 0.827 - -
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.006 - 0.317 - 0.169
Note: Risky assets refer to risky financial assets-i.e. firm or bank bonds, investment funds,
stock shares and other financial assets, excluding business equity and real estate. Saving is the
sum of market value of the riskfree assets and risky financial assets. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
For 2010 data, Table 5.7 delivers similar information, and confirms that
the coefficient of log saving is not significantly different from zero. The
difference is that in column (2), the effect of saving on risky asset share is
still significant after controlling for endogeneity; in column (4) the saving
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level does not cause endogeneity among the sample population who reports
their beliefs, and the coefficient of saving is not statistically different from
zero for this population. The conclusion from these two tables is that
risky asset share is hardly variant to the saving level, and this finding is
consistent with the prediction of the model.
Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 investigate whether household saving rate is in-
variant to wealth level as predicted by the model, using 2008 and 2010 data
respectively. For both tables, in columns (1), (3) and (5), I run OLS with-
out controlling for endogeneity caused by wealth level, in columns (2), (4)
and (6), I instrument household wealth with household net annual income
and/or value of durable goods. The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes
households with risky assets, in columns (3) and (4) includes households
with risky assets and reporting their belief, in columns (5) and (6) includes
households with risky assets and positive excess return expectation. The
dependent variable is the log of saving rate, and the independent variables
include the log of household wealth and other controls. For 2008 data in
Table 5.8, columns from (1) to (4) show that wealth level has a significant
effect on saving rate even after controlling for the effect of household expec-
tation and endogeneity of household wealth level: a 1% increase in wealth
will lead to an increase of 0.201% and 0.135% in saving rate for house-
holds without and with reporting their expectation respectively, which is
inconsistent with constant relative risk and ambiguity aversion model. I
turn to the households expecting positive excess return, which are most
relevant to the analysis. Column (6) shows that the coefficient of wealth is
not statistically different from zero once I instrument wealth level with net
annual income and the value of durable goods, and the magnitude of the
coefficient is quite small. The same conclusion holds for the 2010 survey
as confirmed by the regression result in Table 5.9. From cross-sectional
regression, whether saving rate is invariant to wealth level is inconclusive,
depending on the population I focus on. For households with risky assets
and expecting a positive equity premium, who are likely to be both risk
averse and ambiguity averse, the saving rate is invariant to wealth level;
but for the general population, this is not true.
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Table 5.8: Cross-sectional test of saving rate invariant to wealth SHIW
2008
Saving rate 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logwealth2008 0.471∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.022) (0.034) (0.030) (0.049) (0.045) (0.065)
Theta - - 0.022 0.096 0.087 0.253
(0.086) (0.094) (0.306) (0.342)
Sigma - - 0.041 0.059 0.182 0.119
(0.164) (0.174) (0.221) (0.242)
No.household members -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.041 -0.058 -0.068∗
(0.022) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026) (0.041) (0.041)
Age -0.001 0.003∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
No.income earner -0.018 0.019 -0.014 0.031 0.042 0.085
(0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.041) (0.044)
Male -0.002 0.042 -0.022 0.035 -0.006 0.015
(0.025) (0.028) (0.040) (0.047) (0.065) (0.069)
Secondary -0.067 0.075 -0.176∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.180∗ -0.064
(0.041) (0.048) (0.061) (0.069) (0.107) (0.105)
Uni.or more -0.163∗∗∗ 0.101 -0.262∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.277∗∗ -0.000
(0.050) (0.063) (0.072) (0.084) (0.120) (0.125)
Employee -0.056∗ -0.039 0.021 0.050 0.005 0.067
(0.032) (0.035) (0.044) (0.052) (0.067) (0.084)
Self-employed -0.085∗∗ -0.010 0.029 0.132∗∗ 0.082 0.234∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.046) (0.056) (0.062) (0.086)
Live in North -0.056 -0.017 -0.026 0.076 0.003 0.060
(0.036) (0.039) (0.073) (0.079) (0.089) (0.096)
Live in Center -0.140∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.138∗ -0.060 -0.125 -0.116
(0.041) (0.045) (0.082) (0.088) (0.107) (0.116)
Intercept -5.398∗∗∗ -2.905∗∗∗ -5.063∗∗∗ -2.456∗∗∗ -4.642∗∗∗ -1.345∗∗
(0.247) (0.354) (0.340) (0.475) (0.559) (0.664)
N 1291 1291 528 528 259 259
R2 0.454 0.336 0.463 0.306 0.412 0.186
p-value of Hansen’s J test - 0.161 - - - 0.115
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
Note: Saving is the sum of market value of the riskfree assets and risky financial assets. Wealth is the sum of
saving and nondurable consumption expenditure. Saving rate is the ratio of saving over wealth. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.9: Cross-sectional test of saving rate invariant to wealth SHIW
2010
Saving rate 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logwealth2010 0.400∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.387∗∗∗ -0.030
(0.016) (0.027) (0.035) (0.005) (0.046) (0.094)
Theta - - -0.319∗∗ -0.156 -0.672 -0.320
(0.161) (0.168) (0.477) (0.598)
Sigma - - -0.473 -0.444 -0.932∗∗∗ -0.876∗
(0.295) (0.306) (0.357) (0.467)
No.household members -0.046∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.092∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.029) (0.034) (0.048)
Age -0.0008 0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.0005 -0.006 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
No.income earner -0.029∗∗ -0.016 -0.009 0.021 0.018 0.053
(0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.040) (0.054)
Male -0.002 0.022 0.042 0.094∗∗ 0.009 0.089
(0.020) (0.022) (0.040) (0.046) (0.074) (0.085)
Secondary -0.075∗∗ 0.079∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.039 -0.169∗ 0.078
(0.032) (0.038) (0.050) (0.062) (0.100) (0.122)
Uni.or more -0.175∗∗∗ 0.091∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.285∗∗ 0.122
(0.039) (0.048) (0.059) (0.073) (0.133) (0.138)
Employee -0.054∗ -0.058∗ -0.066 -0.067 -0.048 -0.003
(0.029) (0.031) (0.057) (0.063) (0.091) (0.105)
Self-employed -0.080∗∗∗ -0.044 -0.165∗∗∗ -0.095 -0.165∗ -0.011
(0.030) (0.034) (0.064) (0.079) (0.098) (0.126)
Live in North -0.080∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.007 0.169∗∗ -0.061 0.205
(0.025) (0.027) (0.072) (0.083) (0.122) (0.140)
Live in Center -0.097∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.006 0.169∗ -0.054 0.181
(0.027) (0.031) (0.076) (0.087) (0.137) (0.155)
Intercept -4.640 -2.383∗∗∗ -4.481∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗∗ -4.035∗∗∗ -0.459
(0.172) (0.270) (0.312) (0.537) (0.376) (0.945)
N 1484 1484 344 344 152 152
R2 0.445 0.297 0.491 0.255 0.483 0.0085
p-value of Hansen’s J test - 0.000 - 0.130 - 0.664
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
Note: Saving is the sum of market value of the riskfree assets and risky financial assets. Wealth is the sum of
saving and nondurable consumption expenditure. Saving rate is the ratio of saving over wealth. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Since I have a rotating panel, I can take advantage of the time varia-
tion in panel data: the first-difference can eliminate the unobservable and
constant variables. Out of 4621 panel households, 593 households report
that they hold risky assets in both surveys. Table 5.10 investigates whether
risky asset share change is related to saving change: the dependent vari-
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able is change of log risky asset share, and the parameter of interest is
the coefficient of log saving change. In columns (1) and (3), the regression
is run without considering endogeneity caused by saving, in columns (2)
and (4), saving change is instrumented by net annual income change and
change in the value of durable goods. Compared with columns (1) and (2),
columns (3) and (4) control for the effect of household expectation. Table
5.10 shows that saving change can not explain the change of risky asset
share, and its effect is not different from zero. The endogeneity of saving
does not seem to be serious. Table 5.11 reports the effect of wealth change
in the change of household saving rate. As shown in column (1) and (3),
the effect of wealth is still significant after first difference. When I instru-
ment wealth change by the change of net annual income, the significant
effect disappears.
Table 5.10: Panel test of risky asset share invariant to saving
Risky asset share change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logsaving -0.056 0.215 -0.205 -0.879
(0.048) (0.201) (0.142) (0.649)
∆ theta - - 0.213 0.458
(0.433) (0.552)
∆ sigma - - 0.768 0.774
(0.693) (0.682)
Intercept 0.089∗∗∗ 0.056 0.043 0.191
(0.031) (0.037) (0.084) (0.166)
N 593 593 81 81
R2 0.004 0.067
p-value of Hansen’s J test - -
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.140 - 0.146
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%,
***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.11: Panel test of saving rate invariant to wealth
Saving rate change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logwealth 0.432∗∗∗ 0.161 0.431∗∗∗ 0.160
(0.036) (0.105) (0.075) (0.218)
∆ theta - - -0.062 0.019
(0.130) (0.161)
∆ sigma - - -0.048 -0.038
(0.305) (0.340)
Intercept -0.017 0.010 -0.039 0.010
(0.032) (0.015) (0.032) (0.046)
N 593 593 81 81
R2 0.350 0.213 0.382 0.232
p-value of Hansen’s J test - -
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.003 - 0.257
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant
at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
To sum up, the analysis in this section shows that risky asset share is
invariant to saving level, and saving rate is invariant to wealth level, which
confirms the predictions of the model. I consider constant relative risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion as a good first approximation.
5.5.3 Recovering individual risk and ambiguity aver-
sion
Recovery based on panel data
Once I have recovered individual belief and confirmed the assumption of
constant relative risk and ambiguity aversion, time preference β, relative
risk aversion ρ, and relative ambiguity aversion A can be uniquely recovered
according to Proposition 11. The recovery result in Proposition 11 requires
a special panel dataset, where I can observe individual zero and non-zero
asset demand under the same return of riskfree asset across time. Assum-
ing that the return of risk free asset is invariant between 2008 and 2010, I
have 148 such observations. Note that the recovery argument in Proposi-
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tion 11 only applies to an individual being both risk averse and ambiguity
averse, since the recovery argument is based on the first order conditions, a
necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximization when the utility
function is concave, which holds for both risk aversion and ambiguity aver-
sion. From Lemma 6 it is known that a necessary condition for risk and
ambiguity averse individuals to hold risky assets is that the simple excess
return of risky asset is positive. As shown in the above analysis, constant
relative risk aversion and ambiguity aversion is a good approximation for
such a population. So I only recover preference of individuals who ex-
pect simple excess return to be positive. Among these 148 observations, I
have 65 observations with positive simple excess return. For the remain-
ing 83 observations (56%), individuals hold risky assets though they think
the simple excess return is negative, so they must be either risk loving or
ambiguity loving. A large proportion of people being either risk loving or
ambiguity loving is also identified by experimental research Wakker (2010).
However, my identification framework can not recover preference of such
individuals, and it is not of my interest.
Table 5.12: Recovered risk and ambiguity aversions based on panel data
Time preference Re. risk aversion Re. ambiguity aversion
β ρ A
5% 0.964 0.001 0.296
10% 0.977 0.002 0.385
25% 0.992 0.006 0.777
50% 1.010 0.012 1.581
75% 1.016 0.033 3.958
95% 1.023 0.080 16.383
Min 0.942 0.0003 0.114
Max 1.107 0.114 25.415
Mean 1.004 0.023 3.578
Std. Dev. 0.024 0.026 5.243
Observation 47 47 47
Note: The above recovery assumes the riskfree asset return is invariant across two-year period.
Table 5.12 reports the recovered time preference β, relative risk aver-
sion ρ and relative ambiguity aversion A based on 47 panel observations
assuming invariant interest rate. The mean of time preference is 1.004 and
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the median is 1.010, which is quite consistent with existing empirical re-
search. One important feature is that the heterogeneity of time preference
across individuals is very moderate, with standard deviation being 0.024.
In the following part, when I use cross-sectional data to recover individual
risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, I expect that assuming time prefer-
ence to be homogeneous across individuals would be without much loss of
generality.
Table 5.12 shows that the mean of recovered relative risk aversion is
0.023. It is much smaller than other existing research based on micro data,
which only estimates relative risk aversion without considering ambiguity
aversion, and suggests that relative risk aversion is larger than 1.8 Although
the magnitude is small, the relative risk aversion is different from 0. The
t test rejects risk neutral assumption at significance level 1%. Besides, the
risk aversion is heterogeneous across individuals, with standard deviation
0.047.
The parameter which interests me most is relative ambiguity aversion,
since current research gives very little evidence. Table 5.12 shows the mean
of relative risk aversion is 3.578, with minimum 0.114 and maximum 25.415.
The heterogeneity of ambiguity aversion is quite large with a standard
deviation of 5.243. The t test rejects the hypothesis that relative ambiguity
aversion is 0 at significance level 1%.
Recovery based on cross-sectional data
The data requirement based on Proposition 11 is too stringent, instead,
in this section I assume time preference is homogeneous and is set to be
β = 1. The above analysis suggests that it is a reasonable assumption.
Then from Corollary 7, relative risk aversion and ambiguity aversion can be
uniquely recovered from one observation of individual saving rate and risky
asset share in cross-sectional data. In 2008 data, among 1734 households
who report consistent beliefs, 528 households (30.5%) holds risky assets.
Since I am only interested in recovering individual preference which is both
risk averse and ambiguity averse, I concentrate on the sample with positive
simple excess return expectations. In 2008 data, out of 528 households, 259
8However, the empirical evidence is far from being conclusive, the estimated relative
risk aversion ranges from 0.05 Binswanger (1981) to over 1000 Schluter and Mount
(1976).
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households (49.1%) hold expectations that simple excess return of risky
assets is positive. In 2010 data, among 1120 households with consistent
belief, 344 households (30.7%) report positive risky assets. 112 out of these
344 households (44.2%) expect positive excess return of risky assets, which
my analysis focuses on.
Table 5.13: Recovered risk and ambiguity aversions based on
cross-sectional data
Individual preference in 2008 Individual preference in 2010
ρ A ρ A
5% 0.001 0.198 0.002 0.131
10% 0.002 0.332 0.003 0.369
25% 0.007 0.792 0.007 0.895
50% 0.019 1.782 0.017 1.349
75% 0.054 3.810 0.034 2.876
95% 0.334 8.355 0.237 6.885
Min 0.0001 0.019 0.0002 0.027
Max 0.861 18.670 0.507 23.966
Mean 0.062 2.90 0.050 2.498
Std. Dev. 0.127 3.070 0.096 3.562
Observation 130 130 67 67
Note: The above recovery assumes homogeneous time preference across individuals.
Table 5.13 reports the recovered relative risk aversion and relative am-
biguity aversion based on cross-sectional data from 2008 and 2010 respec-
tively. In 2008, among 259 households who hold the expectation that simple
excess return of risky assets is positive, 130 households (50.2%) are both
risk averse and ambiguity averse. So out of 528 households holding positive
risky assets, around 24.6% are both risk averse and ambiguity averse. In
2010, among 112 households who hold positive excess return expectations,
67 households (59.8%) are both risk averse and ambiguity averse. So out
of 344 households holding positive risky assets, around 19.5% are both risk
averse and ambiguity averse.
In 2008, the mean of relative risk aversion is 0.062. The t test rejects
the hypothesis that relative risk aversion is 0 at the 1% significance level.
139
The mean of relative ambiguity aversion is 2.90. The t test rejects the
hypothesis that relative ambiguity aversion is 0 at the 1% significance level.
Preference heterogeneity (both in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion)
across households can be seen from the standard deviation (0.127 and 3.070
respectively).
In 2010, the mean of relative risk aversion is 0.050. The t test rejects the
hypothesis that relative risk aversion is 0 at significance level 1%. The mean
of relative ambiguity aversion is 2.498. The t test rejects the hypothesis
that relative ambiguity aversion is 0 at significance level 1%. As in 2008,
preference heterogeneity across households is large. The recovery result
from cross-sectional data is very similar to the one from panel data, which
lessens the concern about the homogeneous time preference assumption.
5.5.4 Testing over-identification from expected util-
ity model
I have performed a test on whether the risky asset share and the saving rate
are invariant to (financial) wealth level, and the result gives support to the
constant relative risk aversion and relative ambiguity aversion assumptions.
However, such a test can not distinguish the ambiguity model from the
CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) expected utility model, which also
gives such a prediction. Actually there is a large literature on testing the
first implication and recovering relative risk aversion based on the risky
asset share equation and historical stock return and volatility, see Friend
and Blume (1975), Chiappori and Paiella (2011). One way to distinguish
these two models is to test the over-identification of risk aversion from
the CRRA expected utility model as shown in Lemma 8. If the CRRA
assumption holds, the relative risk aversion recovered from the consumption
equation and the risky asset share equation, i.e. ρκ and ρα respectively,
should coincide.
I first test the over-identification restriction imposed by the CRRA
model using a few panel observations, and the result is reported in Ta-
ble 5.14. The mean of ρα is equal to 2.212, which is consistent with other
empirical investigations into relative risk aversion based on the risky asset
share. The mean of ρκ is 0.025, which is much smaller than ρα. The t test
rejects the null hypothesis that ρα and ρκ are equal, casting doubt on the
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CRRA model.
Table 5.14: Over-identified risk aversion based on panel data
Identification from asset share Identification from saving rate
ρα ρκ
Min 0.114 0.0003
Max 13.004 0.114
Mean 2.183 0.023
Std. Dev. 2.686 0.026
Observation 47 47
P-value of t test: 0.014
Note: The above recovery assumes the riskfree asset return is invariant across two-year period.
Table 5.15: Over-identified risk aversion based on cross-sectional data
Identification based on
2008 data
Identification based on
2010 data
ρα ρκ ρα ρκ
5% 0.224 0.001 0.139 0.002
10% 0.332 0.002 0.364 0.003
25% 0.660 0.007 0.762 0.007
50% 1.290 0.020 1.152 0.017
75% 2.527 0.055 2.067 0.033
95% 5.366 0.448 3.916 0.237
Min 0.0001 0.0001 0.037 0.0002
Max 8.110 1 11.946 0.507
Mean 1.838 0.073 1.596 0.049
Std. Dev. 1.641 0.156 1.683 0.095
Observation 133 133 68 68
P-value of t test: 0.000 P-value of t test: 0.000
Note: The above recovery assumes homogeneous time preference across individuals.
Table 5.15 reports the over-identified relative risk aversion from cross-
sectional data from 2008 and 2010 respectively. I assume homogeneous
time preference across individuals and assume β = 1. The over-identified
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relative risk aversion is quite similar to the one recovered from panel data
in Table 5.14. The t test rejects with strong significance the hypothesis
that ρα and ρκ are equal.
Based on the over-identification restriction test and the fact that the
recovered relative ambiguity aversion is significantly different from zero,
I conclude that the data support the constant relative risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion model over the CRRA model.
5.5.5 Analyzing risk aversion and ambiguity aversion
Correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion
One interesting and important question is: are households’ risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion correlated, and will more risk averse households
be more ambiguity averse? In Table 5.16, I run a simple OLS regression
of ambiguity aversion on risk aversion. It shows the hypothesis that the
coefficient is 0 cannot be rejected, and there is no evidence that these two
parameters are significantly correlated.
Table 5.16: Correlation between risk and ambiguity aversions
Data in 2008 Data in 2010
(1) (2)
Risk aversion 3.778 12.797
(2.296) (12.838)
Intercept 2.269∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.863)
N 130 67
R2 0.024 0.118
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%,
***significant at 1%.
Factors affecting risk and ambiguity aversion
As can be seen from the above analysis, the heterogeneity of household
preference is quite large. What accounts for such large variation? How are
individual preference parameters related to individual characteristics?
142
Table 5.17: OLS regression of individual preference
Preference in 2008 Preference in 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logw2008 -0.013 -0.438 - -
(0.014) (0.554)
logw2010 - - -0.031∗ 0.184
(0.018) (0.472)
No.household members 0.026 0.934∗ -0.010 0.093
(0.017) (0.553) (0.010) (0.504)
Age -0.002 0.015 -0.001 -0.133
(0.001) (0.030) (0.002) (0.092)
No.income eaner 0.005 -0.168 0.019 -0.093
(0.024) (0.510) (0.016) (0.515)
Male 0.015 1.547∗∗∗ 0.045∗ -0.426
(0.041) (0.478) (0.025) (1.414)
Married -0.074 -0.275 0.022 0.877
(0.050) (0.664) (0.033) (1.293)
Separated -0.044 0.623 -0.030 0.376
(0.044) (0.697) (0.041) (1.361)
Widowed 0.036 0.696 0.013 2.851
(0.087) (1.009) (0.069) (3.500)
Secondary 0.052 -0.909 0.030 -5.086∗∗
(0.036) (0.813) (0.049) (2.276)
Uni.or more 0.071 -0.075 0.040 -3.277∗
(0.038) (1.044) (0.036) (1.858)
Employee -0.045 0.070 -0.045 -2.657
(0.037) (0.811) (0.049) (1.796)
Self-employed -0.034 0.778 -0.071 -2.669
(0.033) (0.822) (0.046) (2.073)
Live in North -0.047 -0.215 0.110 0.521
(0.087) (1.164) (0.061) (2.595)
Live in Center -0.026 -0.889 0.071 0.042
(0.090) (1.178) (0.038) (2.259)
Intercept 0.171 4.500 0.312 12.709∗∗
(0.256) (6.195) (0.180) (6.083)
N 130 130 67 67
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.196 0.184 0.200
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%,
***significant at 1%.
Table 5.17 reports the OLS regression of household preference (both
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relative risk aversion and ambiguity aversion) on individual characteristics.
In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable is relative risk aversion, and
in columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is relative ambiguity aver-
sion. In 2008, male household heads are more ambiguity averse; but this
correlation is not significant in 2010. The result shows that large variation
of risk and ambiguity aversion across households cannot be explained by
observable household characteristics: their effect is negligible. Noticeably,
wealth level is neither correlated to relative risk aversion nor correlated to
relative ambiguity aversion, presenting evidence in favor of the constant
relative risk and ambiguity aversion assumption.
Risky asset share holding
How will individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion affect consump-
tion and portfolio choice? In the theoretical model in Section 5.2, I examine
the qualitative effect of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. In this sec-
tion, I present evidence of the quantitative effect.
In Table 5.18, I run a regression of the risky asset holdings on household
preference, expectation, and other observable characteristics. In columns
(1) and (3), I run simple OLS, and in columns (2) and (4), I instrument
household wealth by net annual income. Wealth has a significant positive
effect on the risky asset holding in both 2008 and 2010. Risk aversion is
positively related to the risky asset holding in 2008, but such an effect
is not significant in 2010. In contrast, ambiguity aversion is significantly
negatively correlated with risky asset holding across time. The expected
mean of the risky asset return has a significant positive effect on risky asset
holdings, however the effect of ambiguity is not significant. All these results
are consistent with the predictions of the model.
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Table 5.18: OLS regression of risky asset holding
Risky asset in
2008
Risky asset in
2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logw2008 1.637∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗ - -
(0.096) (0.127)
logw2010 - - 1.501∗∗∗ 0.744∗
(0.118) (0.419)
Risk aversion 0.858∗∗ 0.694∗∗ -0.128 -2.288
(0.359) (0.326) (0.807) (1.932)
Ambiguity aversion -0.121∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.030)
Theta 2.104∗∗∗ 2.975∗∗∗ 3.612∗∗∗ 8.137∗∗
(0.783) (0.856) (1.264) (3.549)
Sigma -0.023 0.079 -3.089∗∗∗ -0.596
(0.473) (0.468) (1.087) (1.508)
No.household members -0.084 -0.102 -0.015 0.046
(0.086) (0.077) (0.056) (0.091)
Age -0.001 0.003 -0.009 0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.022)
No.income eaner 0.046 0.060 -0.015 -0.115
(0.105) (0.098) (0.091) (0.193)
Male -0.126 -0.020 -0.093 -0.221
(0.140) (0.141) (0.195) (0.238)
Secondary -0.387 -0.456∗ -0.565∗ 3.161
(0.256) (0.234) (0.289) (6.689)
Uni.or more -0.460∗ -0.357 -0.706∗∗ 3.376
(0.276) (0.254) (0.329) (6.913)
Employee 0.002 0.095 0.030 -0.310
(0.188) (0.192) (0.230) (0.486)
Self-employed 0.193 0.368∗∗ -0.183 -0.035
(0.154) (0.163) (0.205) (0.374)
Intercept -7.246∗∗∗ -3.795∗∗∗ -4.880∗∗∗ -1.985
(1.203) (1.452) (1.045) (4.445)
N 130 130 67 67
Pseudo R2 0.832 0.815 0.919 0.744
p-value of Hansen’s J test - 0.415 - 1.000
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.007 - 0.001
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%,
***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.19: OLS regression of first period consumption
Consumption in
2008
Consumption in
2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logw2008 0.401∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ - -
(0.072) (0.105)
logw2010 - - 0.234∗∗ 1.732
(0.088) (6.467)
Risk aversion 0.664∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.642 3.926
(0.193) (0.182) (0.758) (13.529)
Ambiguity aversion -0.001 0.011 0.003 0.021
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.147)
Theta -0.936∗∗ -1.711∗∗∗ -1.524 -9.421
(0.419) (0.487) (1.002) (34.135)
Sigma -0.362 -0.444 1.226 -4.172
(0.260) (0.300) (0.748) (22.403)
No.household members 0.124∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.017
(0.051) (0.046) (0.042) (0.284)
Age -0.001 -0.006 0.013∗∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.037)
No.income eaner -0.013 -0.041 0.048 -0.003
(0.052) (0.052) (0.066) (0.329)
Male 0.015 -0.107 0.040 0.467
(0.076) (0.091) (0.144) (2.052)
Secondary 0.064 0.146 0.369∗ 1.268
(0.112) (0.112) (0.200) (6.802)
Uni.or more 0.066 -0.011 0.648∗∗∗ 0.846
(0.121) (0.133) (0.195) (3.702)
Employee -0.041 -0.154 -0.099 0.518
(0.090) (0.119) (0.163) (3.154)
Self-employed -0.140 -0.302∗∗∗ 0.030 -0.471
(0.097) (0.111) (0.173) (1.828)
Intercept -7.246∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗ 5.668∗∗∗ -9.817
(1.203) (1.042) (0.873) (772.881)
N 130 130 67 67
Pseudo R2 0.550 0.038 0.625
p-value of Hansen’s J test - 0.384 - 1.00
p-value of GMM C statistic - 0.001 - 0.406
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%,
***significant at 1%.
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In Table 5.19, I present evidence of the effect of household preference
on consumption decisions. Risk aversion has a significantly positive effect
on the consumption level in 2008; in contrast to the risky asset holding
case, ambiguity aversion does not show any significant effect on consump-
tion. The expected mean of the risky asset return is negatively related
to consumption in 2008, but ambiguity has no significant effect in either
period. Household wealth level and the number of household members
is positively correlated with consumption level in both periods. Marital
status and living region have significant effect in 2008, but not in 2010.
So risk aversion governs both consumption and portfolio choice, how-
ever, ambiguity aversion mainly affects the allocation of savings to the risky
assets.
5.6 Robustness checks
In this section, I show results from robustness check. To deal with the
concern of mis-specification of parameters R, σ2 and β, I examine how
sensitive are the recovered preference parameters to the specification of
these parameters.
Alternative parameter specifications In the baseline results re-
ported in Section 5.5, I assume households know the riskfree asset return
R and the variance of log risky asset return σ2. I take the value of R to be
0.983, the value of σ2 to be 0.02. When I do recovery using cross-sectional
data, I also assume the homogeneous time preference β to be 1. I check
robustness of the recovery results under the following alternative specifi-
cations: R = 1 and R = 1.01; σ2 = 0.04 and σ2 = 0.06; β = 0.99 and
β = 0.98.
The robustness check based on panel data shows that the recovered
preference parameters−time preference β, relative risk aversion ρ and rel-
ative ambiguity aversion A are sensitive to belief parameters R and σ2.
Given σ2 = 0.02, when R = 1, the means (standard deviations) of β, ρ and
A are 0.989 (0.019), 0.019 (0.020) and 2.617 (3.093); when R = 1.01, the
means (standard deviations) of β, ρ and A are 0.981 (0.016), 0.016 (0.017)
and 1.736 (1.771). Given R = 1, when σ2 = 0.04, the means (standard de-
viations) of β, ρ and A are 0.988 (0.020), 0.021 (0.021) and 7.745 (15.559);
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when σ2 = 0.06, the means (standard deviations) of β, ρ and A are 0.984
(0.017), 0.022 (0.021) and 3.319 (3.155).
The robustness check based on cross-sectional data shows that the re-
covered relative risk aversion ρ and relative ambiguity aversion A are sen-
sitive to belief parameters R and σ2, but less sensitive to time preference
parameter β. In 2008 data, given σ2 = 0.02 and R = 0.983, when β = 0.99,
the means (standard deviations) of ρ and A are 0.078 (0.168) and 3.046
(3.358); when β = 0.98, the means (standard deviations) of ρ and A are
0.068 (0.140) and 2.927 (3.727). Given σ2 = 0.02 and β = 1, when R = 1,
the means (standard deviations) of ρ and A are 0.060 (0.122) and 3.815
(6.203); when R = 1.01, the means (standard deviations) of ρ and A are
0.072 (0.127) and 3.144 (5.202). Given R = 1 and β = 1, when σ2 = 0.04,
the means (standard deviations) of ρ and A are 0.065 (0.127) and 7.431
(12.444); when σ2 = 0.06, the means (standard deviations) of ρ and A are
0.075 (0.137) and 9.115 (14.733). A robustness check from the 2010 data
delivers similar results.
The basic conclusion from the robustness check exercise is that the ex-
act magnitude of households’ relative risk aversion and relative ambiguity
averion depends on how precise household belief is; however, some robust
results are preserved: the recovered preferences display considerable het-
erogeneity, the average relative risk aversion is less than 1, and the average
relative ambiguity aversion is 3 or larger.
5.7 Conclusion
5.7.1 Summary of results
Despite growing interest in modelling ambiguity aversion in decision theory,
and the widespread use of ambiguity aversion models in economics and
finance, the problem of identification has not been addressed until recently.
In this chapter, under some reasonable assumptions about the parametric
form of ambiguity preference and individual belief, I examine the shape
of individual ambiguity preference using data from the Italian household
survey. The findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows.
The recovered household expectations are heterogeneous and pessimistic.
The expected mean of the stock market returns is barely positive, and much
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lower than historical realization. The variance of expected stock returns
is much higher than historical volatility, which implies much ambiguity
under my model. The result here is qualitatively consistent with existing
evidence.
The evidence supports that constant relative risk aversion and ambigu-
ity aversion can be a good approximation. The saving rate out of wealth
is invariant to wealth level, and the risky asset share out of saving is in-
variant to the saving level. The data, with high significance, rejects other
functional forms like constant absolute risk aversion and/or constant rel-
ative ambiguity aversion, which imply that the value of the risky asset is
invariant with the saving level. Constant relative ambiguity aversion has
one desirable property: it is independent of the utility unit attached to risk
preference.
The recovered average relative risk aversion is much smaller than 1 and
the recovered average relative ambiguity aversion is about 3 or larger. I do
the recovery, firstly, using a special panel dataset assuming that the risk-
free interest rate constant across time. The recovered time preference is
fairly homogeneous across individuals, and consistent with existing micro-
evidence. Without loss of generality, I assume the same time preference
across individuals, and use cross-sectional data on consumption, saving
and portfolio choice to recover individual relative risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion. The recovered relative risk aversion is smaller than the
one estimated when only considering risk (usually it is believed that rela-
tive risk aversion is between 1 and 2). Currently there is no comparable
evidence on the magnitude of relative ambiguity aversion.
The chapter also distinguishes two models−the subjective expected util-
ity model and the smooth ambiguity aversion model. If individuals are
subjective expected utility maximizers, their consumption and portfolio
choice will put a strong over-identification restriction on relative risk aver-
sion. The data rejects such a restriction at a high significance level. The
evidence that the recovered relative ambiguity aversion is significantly dif-
ferent from 0 also gives support to smooth ambiguity aversion model.
This chapter provides further analysis of individual risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion. Relative risk aversion is not significantly related to
relative ambiguity aversion, and the large variation of risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion can hardly be explained by household characteristics.
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Quantitatively, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion have a significant effect
on consumption and risky asset holding, however, they play different roles.
5.7.2 Future research
In this chapter, the model is two-period, which means the individual is do-
ing short-horizon planning. Such an assumption can be restrictive, since the
individual is believed to be fully rational and will take the future into con-
sideration when making decisions. One area for future research is to build a
long-horizon model (finite or infinite), and to derive the corresponding Eu-
ler equation, based on which to estimate preference parameters. Another
restrictive assumption I make is that the only risk ( and ambiguity) comes
from asset returns, and there is no background risk. Background risk will
bring additional difficulties for identification, which is still an open ques-
tion.
The data I use is not fully satisfying in the sense that there is large
attrition with respect to non-reporting expectations about stock market
performance. How this will influence our result is not clear. This could
be captured in a future survey with a specific module to elicit out reliable
individual ambiguous beliefs.
Appendix A. Identification when ρ > 1
In Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 of this chapter, I solve the individual opti-
mization problem and prove the identification under the assumption that
relative risk aversion ρ is less than 1. In this part, I establish the corre-
sponding results when the relative risk aversion is greater than 1.
Suppose
u(c) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ, (A1)
where ρ > 1, and
φ(u) = −(−u)
1+A
1 + A
, (A2)
then
φ−1 = −[−(1 + A)φ] 11+A . (A3)
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Consumers will solve the problem:
max
{c0,α}
u(c0) + βφ
−1
{
Eµ˜φ
[
Eν˜u
((
R + (ν˜ −R)α)(w − c0))]}. (A4)
The log-normal approximation of portfolio return would be
ln
(
R+ (ν˜−R)α) ≈ r+α( ln(ν˜)− ln(R))+ασ2 + σ20
2
−α2σ
2 + σ20
2
. (A5)
Then the expected second-period utility for one realization µ of µ˜ :
Eν˜u(c1) =
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
F (α)
)
exp
[
(1− ρ)α(µ− r)
]
, (A6)
where
F (α) = (1− ρ)(r + ασ
2 + σ20
2
− α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
). (A7)
Determination of α
Eµ˜[φ(Eν˜u(c1))] =
−[ (I−c0)1−ρ
ρ−1 ]
1+A
1 + A
G(α)Eµ˜ exp
[
(1 + A)(1− ρ)αµ˜
]
, (A8)
where
G(α) = exp
(
(1 + A)(1− ρ)(r + ασ
2 + σ20
2
− α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
− αr)
)
. (A9)
Given µ˜ ∼ N(θ, σ20),
(1 + A)(1− ρ)αµ˜ ∼ N
(
(1 + A)(1− ρ)αθ, (1 + A)2(1− ρ)2α2σ20
)
. (A10)
Then
Eµ˜ exp
(
(1+A)(1−ρ)αµ˜
)
= exp
(
(1+A)(1−ρ)αθ+α2 (1 + A)
2(1− ρ)2σ20
2
)
.
(A11)
Therefore,
φ−1
{
Eµ˜
[
φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)]}
=
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ H(α) exp
(
α2
(1 + A)(1− ρ)2σ20
2
)
,
(A12)
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where
H(α) = exp
[
(1− ρ)
(
r + α(θ − r) + ασ
2 + σ20
2
− α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
)]
. (A13)
Since in the individual optimization problem, portfolio choice and first-
period consumption choice are uncorrelated, without loss of generality, α
can be determined by solving the following maximization problem:
max
α∈[0,1]
φ−1
{
Eµ˜
[
φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)]}
. (A14)
First order condition:
θ − r + σ
2 + σ20
2
−
(
(ρσ2 + σ20)− (1 + A)(1− ρ)σ20
)
α = 0. (A15)
Then the optimal solution is
α =
θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
ρ(σ2 + σ20) + (ρ− 1)Aσ20
. (A16)
Determination of c0
max
{c0,α}
u(c0) + βφ
−1
{
Eµ˜
[
φ
(
Eν˜u(c1)
)]}
=
c1−ρ0
1− ρ + β
(I − c0)1−ρ
1− ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)K(α)
)
, (A17)
where
K(α) = r+α(θ−r)+ασ
2 + σ20
2
−α2ρσ
2 + σ20
2
+α2
(1 + A)(1− ρ)2σ20
2
. (A18)
F.O.C w.r.t c0,
c−ρ0 = β(I − c0)−ρ exp
(
(1− ρ)H(α)
)
. (A19)
It gives
c0 = κw, (A20)
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where
κ =
{
1+β
1
ρ exp
[
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
r+
(θ − r + σ2+σ20
2
)2
2
(
ρ(σ2 + σ20) + (ρ− 1)Aσ20
))]}−1. (A21)
Identification
Lemma 9. Assume that the individual has constant relative risk aversion
and constant relative ambiguity aversion. Assume the risky asset return is
log-normal with ambiguous mean being normally distributed. Suppose
1. at time s, with asset returns (ν˜s, R), the individual has consumption
rate κs, and only invest in the riskfree asset;
2. at time t, with asset return (ν˜t, R), the individual has consumption
rate κt, and invest αt of saving in the risky asset.
Then β, ρ and A can be uniquely identified as
ρ =
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
ln 1−κ
t
κt
− ln 1−κs
κs
+
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
, (A22)
β = (
1− κs
κs
)ρ exp
(
(ρ− 1)r
)
, (A23)
A =
(θt − r + σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)− αtρ(σ2t + σ20t)
αt(ρ− 1)σ20t
. (A24)
Proof. It follows the same argument in the proof of Proposition 11.
Corollary 9. Assume that the individual has constant relative risk aversion
and constant relative ambiguity aversion. Assume the risky asset return is
log-normal with ambiguous mean being normally distributed. Suppose at
time t, with asset return (ν˜t, R), the individual has consumption rate κ
t,
and invest αt of saving in the risky asset. If individual time preference β
is known, then individual relative risk aversion and ambiguity aversion can
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be uniquely identified as
ρ =
ln β + r +
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
ln 1−κ
t
κt
+ r +
αt(θt−r+σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)
2
, (A25)
A =
(θt − r + σ
2
t+σ
2
0t
2
)− αtρ(σ2t + σ20t)
αt(ρ− 1)σ20t
. (A26)
Appendix B. Interpretation of relative risk
and ambiguity aversion
In this part, I characterize the uncertainty premium in terms of relative
(or multiplicative) uncertainty. This characterization will make it clear
what relative risk aversion and relative ambiguity aversion measure in the
smooth ambiguity model.
Consider a multiplicative uncertainty w˜ = w0(1+kx˜) = w0(1+ y˜) with
EµEνx˜ = 0. Then uncertainty premium p(k) = e(w0, u, φ, kx˜) is defined
by
Eµφ
(
Eνu
(
w0(1 + kx˜)
))
= φ
(
u
(
w0 − p(k)
))
. (B1)
Then it satisfies
p(0) = 0. (B2)
Differentiate both sides of equation (B1) with respect to k, the following
holds
Eµφ
′
(
Eνu
(
w0(1 + kx˜)
))
Eνu
′(
w0(1 + kx˜)
)
w0x˜
= φ
′
(
u
(
w0 − p(k)
))
u
′(
w0 − p(k)
)
(−p′(k)). (B3)
At k = 0, it becomes
φ
′(
u(w0)
)
u
′
(w0)w0EµEνx˜ = φ
′
(u(w0))u
′
(w0)(−p′(0)). (B4)
Since the uncertainty satisfies EµEνx˜ = 0, therefore
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p
′
(0) = 0. (B5)
Further differentiate both sides of equation (B3) with respect to k, it
gives
Eµφ
′′
(
Eνu
(
w0(1 + kx˜)
))(
Eνu
′(
w0(1 + kx˜)
)
w0x˜
)2
+ Eµφ
′
(
Eνu
(
w0(1 + kx˜)
))
Eνu
′′(
w0(1 + kx˜)
)
w20x˜
2
=φ
′
(
u
(
w0 − p(k)
))(
u
′(
w0 − p(k)
)(− p′(k)))2
+ φ
′
(
u
(
w0 − p(k)
))
u
′′(
w0 − p(k)
)(− p′(k))2
+ φ
′
(
u
(
w0 − p(k)
))
u
′(
w0 − p(k)
)(− p′′(k)). (B6)
At k = 0, it becomes
φ
′′(
u(w0)
)
u
′2(w0)w
2
0Eµ(Eνx˜)
2 + φ
′(
u(w0)
)
u
′′
(w0)w
2
0EµEνx˜
2
= φ
′(
u(w0)
)
u
′
(w0)
(− p′′(0)). (B7)
Take Taylor expansion of p(k) around k = 0, it gives
p(k) = p(0) + kp
′
(0) +
1
2
k2p′′(0). (B8)
Substitute p(0), p
′
(0) and p
′′
(0) into above equation (B8), it follows
e(w0, u, φ, kx˜)
w0
=
p(k)
w0
=
1
2
k2[−φ
′′(
u(w0)
)
φ′
(
u(w0)
) u′(w0)w0Eµ(Eνx˜)2 − u′′(w0)
u′(w0)
w0EµEνx˜
2]
=
1
2
[aR(w0, u)u
EEµ(Eν y˜)
2 + rR(w0)EµEν y˜
2], (B9)
where aR = −φ
′′(
u(w0)
)
φ′
(
u(w0)
) u(w0) is the relative ambiguity aversion, uE =
u
′
(w0)
u(w0)
w0 is the elasticity of utility with respect to wealth, and r
R = −u
′′
(w0)
u′ (w0)
w0
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is the relative risk aversion.
In the above decomposition of uncertainty premium (B9), the sec-
ond term 1
2
rREµEν y˜
2 is the risk premium−the share of wealth individ-
ual would like to pay to avoid the risk indexed by EµEν y˜
2; the first term
1
2
aR(w0, u)u
EEµ(Eν y˜)
2 is the ambiguity premium−the share of wealth in-
dividual would like to pay to avoid the dispersion of expected values, and
it will becomes 0 if Eµ(Eν y˜)
2 = 0, i.e. no dispersion of expected value.
The meaning of relative risk aversion and relative ambiguity aversion
becomes clear now. Denote the ambiguity premium by ea(w0, u, φ, kx˜), and
risk premium by er(w0, u, φ, kx˜), then
rR =
2er(w0, u, φ, kx˜)
EµEν y˜
2 , (B10)
aR =
2ea(w0, u, φ, kx˜)
uUEµ(Eν y˜)2
. (B11)
More specifically, relative ambiguity aversion measures the share of
wealth individual would like to pay for replacing the ambiguous prospect
with the purely risky one with mean EµEν y˜ which equals to 0 here, and
variance EµEν y˜
2. Relative risk aversion measures the share of wealth in-
dividual would like to pay for replacing the purely risk prospect with its
expected mean EµEν y˜.
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